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Anti-Treaty-Shopping Provisions: A
Comparative Analysis
Simone M. Haug*
ABSTRACT

Tax avoidance through international treaty shopping has
become a subject of intense controversy in the international
community. By shrewdly structuring businesses, corporations
are currently able to take advantageof tax exemptions contained
in tax treaties, though the countries that have joined the treaties
never intendedfor them to benefit from such provisions. Many
nations, including the United States, view this practice as tax
treaty abuse. In response to such abuses, many countries are
now incorporatingstrict anti-treaty-shoppingprovisions in their
bilateraltax treaties.
Ms. Haug begins the Article by describing the practice of
treaty shopping and, specffically, the various methods of tax
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treaty abuse. She then examines the dfferent approaches
countries are taking to preventsuch abuses. After assessing the
utility and feasibility of countries' attempts to combat treaty
shopping, the author concludes that, while strict anti-treatyshopping provisions In bilateral treaties may be somewhat
effective, the only way to truly control tax avoidance is to
harmonize the internationaltax system. To achieve this goal,
the author argues, countries must either Increase their treaty
networks or enter into a multilateral tax convention. Due to
countries' concerns that such a convention would adversely
affect their sovereignty, however, Ms. Haug is not optimistic that
such a solution will come tofrultion.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the last fifteen years, treaty shopping has become a
highly sensitive problem in the context of tax avoidance and
evasion. Intergovernmental organizations like the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)1 and the
United Nations (U.N.) 2 developed official commentaries on the

1.
In 1963, the Fiscal Committee of the OECD published the first model
treaty, which included commentaries providing explanations and interpretations
of the model. Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital (OECD Draft
1963) [hereinafter 1963 OECD Model Treaty]. Neither the model treaty nor its
commentaries contained any anti-abuse provisions. But with fundamental
changes taking place in the sophistication of tax avoidance and evasion methods,
as well as the performance of cross-border transactions, the OECD reacted by
adopting the 1977 Model Convention and commentaries. Model Double Taxation
Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD 1977) [hereinafter 1977 OECD Model
Treaty]. The commentaries on the 1977 OECD Model Treaty include some
suggestions about how to deal with treaty shopping. This version was updated in
1992 by integrating into the commentaries extensive recommendations
concerning anti-treaty-shopping provisions. Model Tax Convention on Income and
on Capital (1992) (revised on Sept. 1, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 OECD Model Treaty].
2.
In 1980, the United Nations (U.N.) Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Tax
Treaties Between the Developed and Developing Countries drafted its own model
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topic.
In addition, the United States inserted anti-treatyshopping clauses into its model treaty and domestic law.3 The
practical solution to treaty shopping is the subject of many

controversies among OECD member states, tax practitioners, and
4
commentators.
The term "treaty shopping" refers to the use of bilateral tax
treaties by a resident of a nontreaty country to obtain treaty

benefits that would not otherwise be available but for the
interposition of an entity (e.g., a corporation) Into one of the treaty
countries. 5 Treaty shopping emerged out of the inconsistencies
among domestic international tax regimes worldwide and the
increasing economic interdependence of world trade.
The United States is a leader in setting policies to prevent
treaty shopping, not only in substantive treaty provisions, but
also in domestic law.8 Even prior to the 1977 and 1981 U.S.
models, U.S. treaty policy was concerned with limiting treaty
benefits. 7 The 1977 draft of the first official8 U.S. model treaty9

tax treaty, primarily with concern for the well-being of developing countries. U.N.
DEP'T OF INT'L ECONOMICS & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION
BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/102. U.N.
Sales No. E.80.XVI.3 (1980) [hereinafter U.N. MODEL CONVENTION]. The U.N.
model treaty commentaries include relatively mild language against treaty
shopping. In 1983, the U.N. Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International CoOperation in Tax Matters expressed Its concern about the increasingly popular
practice of treaty shopping. See InternationalCo-Operation in Tax Matters, Report
of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on InternationalCo-Operation In Tax Matters on the
Work of its FirstMeeting. U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/128. U.N. Sales No. E.83.XVI. 1 (1983)
[hereinafter International Co-Operation in Tax Matters). In 1987, the Group
produced a more detailed guideline relating to the abuse of tax treaties. U.N.
DEP'T OF INT'L ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON TAX MATTERS at 5, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/203. U.N. Sales No. E.88.XVI
(1988) [hereinafter 1987 Ad Hoc Group].
3.
Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Treaty, June 16, 1981, 1
Tax Treaties (CCH) 211 (1990) [hereinafter 1981 U.S. Model Treaty].
4.
See Jonathan Schwarz, Survey of World Taxation, FIN. TIMES, May 20,
1994, at 2.
5.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE [A.L.I.], FEDERAL INCOME TAX
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION 11 150 (1992).

PROJECT:

6.
International Tax Evasion/Tax Treaty Issues: Hearing Before a
Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of
Representatives, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 346 (1987) (statement of Alan Granwell,
former International Tax Counsel of the U.S. Treasury Department) [hereinafter

1987 Hearing].
7.
H. David Rosenbloom, Tax Treaty Abuse: Policies and Issues, 15 L. &
POL'Y INT'L BUS. 763, 779-810 (1983).
8.
An unofficial model for internal reference for treaty negotiators, which
was never published, was in use soon after the conclusion of the U.S.-U.K. treaty
in 1945. KLAUS VOGEL ET AL., UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES 87 (1989).
9.
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, May 17, 1977, 1 Tax
Treaties (WGL) f,019 (1990) [hereinafter 1977 U.S. Model Treaty]. The Treasury
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limited treaty benefits applicable to dividends, interest, and
royalties if "special measures" resulted in substantially less tax
than was generally imposed and if foreign ownership equaled or
10
The
exceeded twenty-five percent of the capital of the company.
1
limitation-on-benefits article in the 1981 Model Treaty, however,
is more complex and stringent than its 1977 predecessor. It
applies to all entities, not just corporations, and denies all treaty
benefits, not just benefits relating to dividends, interest, and
royalties, unless the entity satisfies specified requirements. Since
1981, a limitation-on-benefits article has been inserted into every
These
newly negotiated or renegotiated U.S. tax treaty.
measures, however, were not deemed sufficient to combat treaty
shopping, especially in connection with the changes to U.S
2
The United
domestic law made by the 1986 Tax Reform Act.'
States enacted, as part of its domestic law, a safeguard against
the possibility of obtaining treaty relief from the newly introduced
branch profits tax by anyone other than a "qualified resident" of a
treaty partner. This elaborate domestic anti-treaty-shopping law,
however, was surpassed in its sophistication by the anti-abuse
provisions in the recent treaties the United States has made with
3
This
Germany, Mexico, and, in particular, the Netherlands.'
high level of sophistication has led some experts to complain
about the complexity of the limitation-on-benefits articles
be included
contained in those tax treaties and those expected to 14
in a new version of the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty.
The elaborate limitation-on-benefits provisions in U.S.
treaties and domestic law have caused officials in other countries,
as well as practitioners in the United States, to characterize U.S.

officials as paranoid concerning the issue of treaty shopping. For

Department intended to establish a uniform starting point for U.S. treaty

negotiations, while trying to adapt it, as much as it seemed adequate from a U.S.
policy point of view, to the revised OECD model, 1977 OECD Model Treaty, supra
note 1, that was published in the same year. InternationalTax Treaties: Hearing
Before the Committee on ForeignRelations, United States Senate, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 103 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Hearing].
1977 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 9, art. 16.
10.
1981 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 3.
11.
Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (approved Oct. 22, 1986).
12.
David H. Rosenbloom. Toward a New Tax Treaty Policy for a New
13.
Decade, 9 AM. J. TAX POIY 77, 77-94 (1991). See also U.S.-Germany Income Tax
39,030; U.S.-Mexico Tax
Treaty, signed Aug. 29, 1989, 2 Tax Treaties (WGL)
62,100; U.S.-Netherlands
Treaty, signed Sept. 18, 1992, 2 Tax Treaties (WGL)
Income Tax Treaty, signed Dec. 18, 1992, 3 Tax Treaties (WGL); 66,030.
Stanford G. Ross, U.S. International Tax Policy: Where Are We? Where
14.
Should We Be Going?, 1990 TAx NOTES INT'L 781.
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15
example, former International Tax Counsel, David Rosenbloom,

coined the expression that "anything worth doing is worth
overdoing" when describing the U.S. attitude toward treaty
shopping. 16
This Article analyzes whether the complex, detailed, and often
rigid measures taken by the United States to combat treaty
shopping are appropriate or overzealous.
Part II provides
background on treaty shopping, demonstrating how treaty
shopping can have a detrimental effect both on the source
country and on the undistorted flow of international investment.
Part III reviews the available countermeasures to treaty shopping
and the factors affecting the anti-treaty-shopping measures taken
by particular jurisdictions.
Part IV, through comparative
analysis, demonstrates that varying positions on the behavior, as
well as ways of regulating it, largely depend on the historical and
economic situation of the individual country involved.
Part V
examines treaty shopping and the available countermeasures
from a global perspective, paying particular attention to the
unique position of the United States.
Part VI concludes by
suggesting that the United States should reconsider its effort to
completely eradicate treaty shopping in favor of measures that, in
the long-term, could better contribute to efficiency and simplicity.

I.

THE ABUSE OF SOURCE TAX RELIEF

Treaty shopping is often referred to as "treaty abuse" or "tax
avoidance," however, it has long been regarded as a legitimate
instrument of international tax planning. 17 There is a general
understanding that taxpayers are free to structure their economic
actions in ways they deem most beneficial so long as they do not
go beyond a tolerable point. 18 At what point legitimate tax

15.
Mr. Rosenbloom was the International Tax Counsel at the Treasury
Department during the years 1977-1981.
16.
See Rosenbloom, supra note 13, at 84.
17.
Some practitioners still consider treaty shopping to be perfectly
legitimate.
See Helmut Becker, Treaty Shopping-A German Approach, J.
STRATEGY INTL TAX'N 191 (1985).

18.
This rule applies within all Western constitutional democracies. One
of the classical opinions on this issue can be found in the United Kingdom tax
case of Westminster v. C.I.R., 19 T.C. 490, 520 (U.K. 1905). In Westminster, the
court stated: "Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax
attaching under the appropriate Act is less than it otherwise would be." See also,
e.g., Bass v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 595 (U.K. 1968); Judgment of April 14, 1959,
Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfG]
[federal
constitutional
court),
9
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 237, 249 (F.R.G.
1959); Judgment of June 10, 1981 Conseil d' Etat, 33 Dr. Fisc. comm. 2187 (reg.
n. 19.079) (Fr. 1981).
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planning ends and tax avoidance or abuse begins, however, is
often a matter of interpretation.1 9
In the international context, a taxpayer will always seek to
diminish worldwide tax liability. While this is also true for
business activities conducted in a single jurisdiction, there seems
to be a much higher level of awareness of the tax consequences in
international transactions. 20 There are two underlying reasons
for this phenomenon. First, a taxpayer considering an investment
abroad must find out whether he or she will be subject to double
taxation resulting from an overlap of concurring residence and
source taxation. 2 1 For reasons of competitiveness, a taxpayer
may be obliged to find means of avoiding double taxation. For
example, the taxpayer might take advantage of the source tax
relief granted by a tax treaty. Second, differences in the taxation

of a certain type of income at diverging tax rates in the
international community provide many more possibilities to
reduce the overall tax burden than when a business is conducted
in a single jurisdiction. 2 2 The international investor may be able
to minimize tax liability by basing the business in a low-tax
jurisdiction by routing the investment through other jurisdictions,
or by modifying the form of the investment.
A. Avoiding Double Taxation
1. Double Taxation
Double taxation occurs when the same item of income is
taxed more than once. It can arise in two forms: 1) directly,
when a single taxpayer is doubly taxed, or 2) economically, when
the same income is taxed twice-even though technically two
distinct taxable entities exist. The imposition of more than one

19.
As opposed to tax evasion, which identifies tax reduction by illegal
means, tax avoidance is used to describe the reduction of tax liability by legal
means. Tax avoidance, however, has pejorative overtones, especially in the
context of artificial arrangements, loopholes, anomalies, or other deficiencies of
tax law.
20.

MILTON GRUNDI, THE WORLD OF TAx PLANNING 2 (1984).

For example, an investor from Singapore, a country that does not yet
21.
have a treaty with the United States, may get taxed thrice when doing business in
the United States: first, when the investor's profits are taxed by the United
States; second, when the investor pays the branch profits tax; and third, when
the investor gets fully taxed by the investor's home country, which lacks a foreign
tax credit. Salil Tripathie, U.S.-Dutch Treaty Wipes Out Asian Firms' Tax Perks.

Bus. TIMES, July 6, 1992, at 1.
22.

GRUNDI, supra note 20, at 2.
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tax on the same income has its roots in the generally
acknowledged principle that jurisdiction to tax is a function of
national sovereignty. 23 No international concept or norm that
prohibits double taxation exists. Therefore, under international
law a state is permitted to tax foreign transactions as long as
there is a sufficient nexus between the taxpayer and the taxing
24
state. This nexus arises from either a territorial or personal link
to the taxing jurisdiction and gives the state the authority to tax
the income of either an5 individual or a legal entity on the basis of
2
source and residency.

Under the source principle, a state has the right to tax the
income derived from any activity of a taxpayer within its territorial
scope, regardless of whether the earner of the income has any
other connection with the state (e.g., is a resident of that
country).2 6 Tax systems that emphasize source taxation base
their tax claims on the geographic area from which the income
27
originates.
The principle of residency, on the other hand, permits a state
to tax the worldwide income of any person that has a substantial
connection to that taxing jurisdiction and thus qualifies as a
resident under the laws of that state. 28 Consequently, tax
systems that favor residence taxation base their tax claims
primarily on the personal connection of the taxpayer to the
29
country.
Having complete sovereignty to create a tax system, a state
will adjust these principles to its needs and combine them under
a consideration of its economic and political realities. Generally,
a capital exporting country will emphasize the residence based
taxation, whereas a capital importing country will favor a higher
tax base under the source principle. As a consequence of these

23.
VOGEL ET AL., supra note 8, at 17.
24.
DAVID WILLIAMS. TRENDS ININTERNATIONAL TAXATION 103 (1991).
25.
Tax jurisdiction may be asserted under the principle of nationality,
which is very controversial and has only been adopted by the United States and
the Philippines-the latter following the U.S. pattern. Both countries tax citizens
on their worldwide income, regardless of their residency. U.N. CENTER ON
TRANSNAT'L CORP., INT'L INCOME TAXATION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 9, U.N. Doc.
ST/CTC/56, U.N. Sales No. E. 88. II.A.6 (1988); see also Richard D. Pomp. The
Experience of the Philippines in Taxing Its NonresidentCitizens, 17 N.Y. U.J. INT'L L.
& POL. 245 (1985).

26.
Mimi E. Gild, Tax Treaty Shopping: Changes to the U.S. Approach to
Limitation on Benefits Provisions In Developing Country Treaties, 30 VA. J. INT'L L.
553, 555 (1990).
27.
Yitzhak Hadari. Tax Treaties and Their Role in the FinancialPlanning of
the MultinationalEnterprise, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 111, 115 (1979).
28.
Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of
MultinationalEnterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18 (1993).
29.
Hadari, supra note 27, at 115.
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principles, more than one state can have concurrent jurisdiction

over the same income creating an overlap, which leads to double
taxation.3 0 This overlap is likely to generate an excessive tax
burden on the taxpayer.

From a global view, the excessive tax

burden may inhibit the free exchange of goods and services and

thus may have

a negative effect

31
international capital flows.

on the development

of

2. Avoiding Double Taxation
To remedy double taxation's detrimental effects, most
developed countries seek to unilaterally3 2 reduce or eliminate
double taxation of their resident taxpayers by providing for a
foreign tax credit or an exemption of foreign source income from
tax.3 3 Under the foreign tax credit method, double taxation is
alleviated by allowing the taxpayer to offset the tax on foreign
source income in the amount of foreign tax imposed on this
income.3 4 The credit for foreign income taxes, however, is limited
to the effective tax rate of the country of residence. In contrast,
the exemption system excludes foreign source income from the
tax base in the case of dividends received by a parent corporation
or income earned by foreign branches of
from a foreign subsidiary
35
resident corporations.

30.
Gild, supra note 26. at 556.
There are conflicts other than the source-residence conflict that can
31.
give rise to double taxation (e.g., source-source or residence-residence conflicts).
A source-source conflict may arise when two countries claim to be the source of
one transaction. A residence-residence conflict may emerge when two countries
emphasize primarily residence-based taxation and both consider themselves to be
the "personal link" Jurisdiction. See, e.g., De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v.
Howe, [1906] App. Case 455 (appeal taken from T.C.). For a discussion of
differences in the source rules adopted in various national laws, see Robert J.
Patrick. General Report. 65(B) CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL [C.D. FIsC.
INT'L] 15, 18-28 (General Report of Robert J. Patrick) (1980).
Until recently, the prevailing view was that the source country would
32.
Recently, however, the principle was
have to alleviate double taxation.
established that the source country has the primary right to tax the income
CHARLES E. McLuRE ET AL.,
earned within its borders.
DIFFERENTIALS ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 117 (1990).

INFLUENCE OF TAX

Nations utilizing foreign tax credits include: the United States, the
33.
United Kingdom, and Japan. Most European countries, however, use variations
of the exemption method.
BORIS T. BITTKER & LAURENCE LOKKEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL
34.
TAXATION 69-3 (2d ed. 1991).
35.
A third option is the deduction method, which treats the foreign tax as
a production cost of the foreign income and reduces the tax base by the amount
of tax paid in the foreign country. The effect is a reduction, but not an
elimination, of double taxation. See VOGEL ET AL., supra note 8. at 17.
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Bilateral tax treaties, however, are the most effective means
of removing tax barriers that hinder the free flow of capital and
technical know-how in the international community.
The
alleviation of double or excessive taxation is achieved either by
giving exclusive tax jurisdiction over a certain type of income to
one of the treaty countries or by allocating portions of the revenue
between the two states.
Generally, in treaties between two
developed countries, the source country yields its right to tax the
domestic income earned by the residents of the other country and
reciprocally obtains the same right for its own residents.
Through this system of reciprocity, an approximately neutral
38
revenue effect may be achieved.
However, not all states maintain treaty relationships with
each other. As a result, an investor whose country does not have
a treaty with the country in which the investor wants to do
business is likely to use other countries' treaties in order to
obtain source tax relief.
B. The IncentlveforAbuse-Tax Policy Considerations
The opportunity for taxpayers to take advantage of source tax
relief granted by the existence of a treaty arises from the
dissimilarities among domestic international tax systems. These
dissimilarities are exacerbated when states seek to gain an
advantage by creating a favorable tax environment in order to
attract foreign capital.
While the location of direct investment 37 is partly restricted
by such factors as work-force quality, production costs, and
infrastructure,3 8 growing internationalization is creating greater
mobility of persons and products. The growing mobility of capital
coupled with the flexibility to choose a multinational's
organizational structure may lead to an increasing influence of
tax differentials in the determination of investment location. 3 9 As
the economic integration of the world economy proceeds and the
nontax barriers to cross-border investment vanish with growing

36.
In tax treaties between developing and developed countries, the source
country generally waives Its jurisdiction over certain items of income or lowers the
tax rate on the income, and the residence country compensates Its residents for
double taxation by granting a tax credit or an exemption. Thus, existing trade
imbalances will be leveled out with respect to the levied tax and the revenue is
more or less apportioned between the fiscalities. See A.L.I., supra note 5, at 10.
37.
Direct investment is equity investment in real estate and service
corporations; whereas portfolio investment means the diversified holdings of
securities of enterprises of various types by an individual or institution.
38.
McLuRE ETAL., supra note 32, at 43.
39.
Id.
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internationalization, investment
influenced by tax considerations.

decisions

are

increasingly

1. Intergovernmental Tax Competition
Governments, aware of the mobility of investment capital,
engage in international tax competition. They seek to make their
own countries as favorable for investment as possible in order to
enhance economic growth and promote employment. In this
context, two types of countries are to be distinguished: (1) those
having a genuine tax system providing tax incentives to some
themselves
distinguishable items or persons, and (2) those selling
40
and their services to persons trying to escape tax.
Since investment decisions are made in an effort to maximize
net profit after tax, an international investor will structure his or
her business in order to achieve that goal, even if the resulting
structure does not make sense economically for pre-tax profits. If
a country provides tax privileges to a certain legal entity, or for
certain forms of income, the incentive to take advantage of this
special treatment will certainly affect investment decisions.
Although most of these countries otherwise have genuine tax
systems, their policies of attracting investment provide fertile
ground for artificial business arrangements, whose only purpose
is to avoid taxation. Artificial structures take advantage of the

fact that some countries, 4 ' provide favorable conditions for
foreign investment by maintaining different tax treatment for
various types of income. Such countries do not regard anti-abuse
2
clauses in their tax treaties as crucial. 4

40.
WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 35. States that are regarded as favorable
locations for intermediary entities can be differentiated as follows: (1) states that
have no or a very low income tax in general (e.g., Bermuda and the Bahamas); (2)
states that have no or a very low income tax with regard to a certain type of entity,
like holding corporations (e.g., Switzerland, Lichtenstein, and Luxembourg); and
(3) states that assert taxation solely on the territoriality principle and, therefore,
have no income tax on foreign source income (e.g., Panama, Venezuela, and
Liberia). See VOLKER KLUGE, DAs DEUTSCHE INTERNATIONALE STEUERRECHT 133 (3d
ed. 1992).
41.
For example, Luxembourg, which may for some purposes be
considered a tax haven, is a high tax country of residence having a nominal tax
rate of 57% of corporate tax. including business, wealth, local, and church tax.
Luxembourg proves that a country that is a tax haven in some circumstances
may be a high tax country in others. COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE INT'L, 1990
INTERNATIONAL TAx HANDBOOK (1990).
42.
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Double
Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies, In ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION, TAX AVOIDANCE AND EvASION 87. 102 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 OECD
Report].
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2. Differences in Bilateral Tax Treaties
The absence of a tax treaty between an investor's country of
residence and the host country may induce the investor to
structure the investment through a country that does have a
treaty with the host country. Likewise, even where an investor's
country of residence has a treaty with the host country, the
investor may be able to achieve a better advantage through a
different treaty.4 3 In the context of bilateral tax conventions, each
treaty is negotiated on a country-by-country basis and therefore
different benefits are accorded to the residents of various treaty
partners. The withholding rates applicable to interest, dividends,
and royalties are subject to a wide range of diversity. 4 4
The disparity among tax treaties provides an incentive for
international investors to use the most beneficial treaty for their
transactions. Thus, it is not only the absence of a tax treaty that
promotes treaty shopping, but also differences in tax relief that
constitute a major incentive for the use of other countries' tax
treaties.
C. The Occurrenceof Treaty Shopping

1. Development of the Treaty Shopping Concept
It is clear that the lack of conformity in domestic and
conventional international tax rules provides fertile ground for
extensive international tax planning. Tax planning in connection
with income tax conventions is widely referred to as "treaty
shopping," a term coined in the United States as a variation of the
45
term "forum shopping" used in U.S. civil procedure.
a. Definition
Treaty shopping occurs when a taxpayer, residing in a third
country, takes advantage of the benefits of a treaty that would not
normally be available to the taxpayer. The treaty shopper does so

43.

1987 Ad Hoc Group, supra note 2.

44.

For example, U.S. treaties contain provisions reducing the interest tax

rate from the statutory 30% withholding to 15% (Canada), 10% (Australia), 5%
(Switzerland), and zero (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, etc.). Similarly,
source tax reductions differ in German income tax treaties: the interest rates
range from 25% (Thailand), 20% (Pakistan), 15% (Malaysia), 12.5% (Jamaica),
10% (Greece) to zero (France, the United States, etc.).
45.
DELOITTE HASKINS & SELLS INTERNATIONAL, TREATY SHOPPING:
AN
EMERGING TAx ISSUE AND ITS PRESENT STATUS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES 2 (Helmut

Becker & Felix J. Warm eds., 1988) [hereinafter TREATY SHOPPING].
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by creating a corporation in a country that has a favorable tax
treaty with the target country. 46 In other words, treaty shopping
is the practice of rerouting income through one or more artificial
entities in different countries for the main or sole purpose of
obtaining treaty benefits that are not directly available to the true
earner of income. 4 7 From the United States and OECD points of
view, treaty shopping occurs when a third country resident takes
advantage of a bilateral treaty that is intended to benefit only
residents of the contracting states.4 8 In other countries, however,
the term may be used more broadly, not necessarily involving a
49
triangular arrangement.
b.

The Basic Situations

The Commentaries on the 1995 OECD Model Convention
mention two principal means by which treaty benefits may be
obtained: (1) the direct conduit method and (2) the stepping stone
structure.5 0
The direct conduit method is a way of shifting
income through an interposed corporation in a country that has
an advantageous tax treaty. For example, assume countries A
and B have entered into a tax treaty that entitles their residents,
including companies organized under their laws, to benefits with
regard to income derived from the other country. Country C has
no or a less favorable treaty with country A, but does have a
favorable treaty with country B. When a resident of country C
forms a corporation in country B, this conduit company, 5 1 being a
resident of country B, is entitled to benefits under the bilateral AB treaty. In addition, the income of the conduit company enjoys a
special tax exemption under the domestic laws of country B (e.g.,
a branch exemption in a parent-subsidiary relationship).
The
conduit company is thereby able to distribute its profits to the
52
resident of country C under beneficial circumstances.

46.

Id. at 289.

47.
1987 Ad Hoc Group, supra note 2, at 2.
48.
See 1995 OECD Model Treaty, supra note 1. para 22 (Commentary);
see also Infra note 149-50 and American Law Institute, supra note 4, at 150.
49.
International Tax Glossary, 42 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION
[BIFD] 274, 276 (1988). See also Infra note 174; supra note 65.
50.
1995 OECD Model Treaty. supra note 1. However, the basic structures
are thoroughly explained in an earlier report. 1987 OECD Report, supra note 42,
at 88.
51.
A company is considered a conduit when it pays out an amount of
interest and royalties that is at least 90% of the amount of interest and royalties
It receives.
52.
1987 OECD Report, supra note 42, at 88.
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The stepping-stone structure is similar to the direct conduit

method. The difference is that the corporation in country B, a
high tax country, is fully subject to tax and thus must pay tax on
its interest, dividend, and royalty income.

Since expenses are

deductible in country B, however, the corporation avoids having
substantial net income by paying out large amounts of interest,
commissions, service fees, and similar expenses to a related
company in a low-tax jurisdiction (e.g., country C). The income
from country A is thereby channeled from country A to country C
at almost no tax cost due to the tax treaty between the high-tax
countries, A and B, and the base reduction practiced by the
conduit company in country B. 53
The essential difference between the direct conduit method
and the stepping stone is that the direct conduit makes use of an
exemption from tax in the intermediary country, while the
stepping stone reduces the tax liability in the intermediary
country by means of a counterbalancing expense. 5 4 Stepping
stone companies profit from three important elements: (1) the
stepping stone company can deduct all of its expenses against its
receipts; (2) the stepping stone country does not impose a
significant withholding tax on the outbound payments; and (3)
the stepping stone company's receipts must be received free of
host-country withholding tax (or subject to significantly reduced
withholding tax) by virtue of an existing tax treaty.5 5
As these examples illustrate, there are a great variety of
arrangements that can yield tax treaty benefits.6 6 There is the

53.
Id.
54.
1987 Ad Hoc Group, supranote 2, at 4.
55.
GRuNDI. supra note 20, at 72.
56.
The following paragraphs offer examples that are not considered treaty
shopping under the strict definition, which would require the use of a tax treaty
by a third-country investor. They are, however, regarded as treaty shopping in
the respective countries.
There are two structures principally used by U.S. investors to exploit
peculiarities of the Dutch and German tax systems. The "Same Country Holding"

takes advantage of a provision that exempts from tax dividends and capital gains
received from an affiliated Netherlands company when the Netherlands parent
company holds at least 5% of the shares. See TREATY SHOPPING, supra note 45, at
12. Dutch treaties, however, require a participation in a Netherlands company of
at least 25% in order for a foreign person to be eligible for full or partial refund of
Netherlands withholding tax under the treaty. Id.
Investors, therefore, who
cannot directly attain the 25% participation requirement will form a wholly owned
Netherlands corporation, which in turn invests in another Netherlands company.
The interposed company is exempt from tax under the participation exemption
and at the same time qualifies for treaty benefits. Id.
A "Quintet Structure" is often used in connection with German treaties
because Germany suspends treaty benefits for a foreign investor holding more
than 25% of a German corporation. In order to avoid this, a foreign company will
form five subsidiaries under the law of the treaty country, each subsidiary holding
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potential to channel funds tax-free or tax-reduced through several
intermediary countries by using different forms of interposed
entities (e.g., partnerships, trusts, etc.).5 7

The income involved

may change its character several times during5 8the transfer (e.g.,
from dividend to interest income, or vice versa).
The described treaty shopping structures have three common
characteristics. First, the beneficial owner or owners of the treaty
shopping entity are not residents of the country where the entity
is created. Second, little, if any, real economic contact with or
presence in the jurisdiction of the interposed entity exists.
Finally, either the legal entities or the income involved is subject
59
to little or no tax in the treaty jurisdiction of their residence.
2. Treaty Shopping as a Tax Planning Instrument
Generally, treaty shopping situations arise in circumstances
where a treaty partner imposes low tax on its residents or special
classes of residents. For example, holding companies may pay no
no
taxes on certain classes of income and, in addition, may have
60
withholding tax on the payment of income to nonresidents.
a. Definition and Function of Base and Conduit Companies
"Base companies" and "conduit companies" are both classical
instruments established for the sole or predominant purpose of
less than 25% of the German corporation, thus avoiding suspension of treaty
benefits. Becker, supranote 17, at 193.
Until the termination of the U.S.-Antilles treaty. U.S. persons with
57.
illegal money would use a highly sophisticated system that began with the
creation of a trust account in Antigua to launder. Treasury Department News
Release B-1033 followed by Treasury Department News Release B-1046 at 80.
This trust fund was then used to invest in a holding company in the Cayman
Islands with bearer shares, which in turn capitalized an Antilles company. The
latter then reinvested in a U.S. corporation, thereby returning the money to its
U.S. source, laundered and almost untraceable. However, this example does not
constitute treaty shopping under the strict definition because the U.S. resident
would be eligible for treaty benefits. See RICHARD A. GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND
THEIR USE BY U.S. TAXPAYERS-AN OVERVIEW, A REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE BY THE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL (TAX DIVISION) AND THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY (TAX POLICY), (1981) thereinafter GORDON
REPORT].

Converting the character of the income might be very useful in
58.
circumstances where a back-to-back loan is not possible because of special
domestic tax provisions (e.g., arms-length or thin capitalization provisions).
Interest from the source country might be accumulated in a tax haven branch
and then paid out as a dividend, which, under many systems. is exempt from tax.
59.
A.L.I., supra note 5, at 151.
60.
1987 Hearing, supra note 6. at 352.
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tax minimization. By making use of tax advantages granted by a
certain country, these intermediary entities generally reside in
jurisdictions having extensive treaty networks, often no-tax or
low-tax jurisdictions, or a jurisdiction with special treatment of
certain types of entities or income. A base company is a company
through which certain activities are carried out on behalf of
related companies in high-tax countries. 61 A base company seeks
to minimize tax in the country of residence-the country in which
the investor actually resides, while the main function of the
conduit company is to serve as a pass-through entity that
redistributes the income it receives from a related company in one
country to its shareholders in another country. 6 2 The conduit

company seeks to obtain tax advantages

in the source

country-the country in which the economic substance of the
investment is located. In most cases, the same structure can be
used to achieve both objectives. 63 In either case, the interposed
entity will seek to minimize tax. Thus, many treaty shopping
entities can be regarded as both base companies and conduit
companies, depending upon which of the companies' transactions
are involved.
b. Government Response to Treaty Shopping
Most members of the OECD, including the United States,
regard treaty shopping principally as a means of reducing sourcebased taxation, solely affecting the source country. 64 Other forms
of tax avoidance (Le., the reduction of residence taxation through
the use of base companies) are considered to be subject to
domestic rules for determining which facts give rise to tax
liability. 6 5
For the United States, this position is easy to

61.
62.
63.
64.

InternationalTax Glossary, supra note 49, at 25.
Id. at 57.
1987 OECD Report, supra note 42.
David H. Rosenbloom, DerivativeBenefits: Emerging U.S. Treaty Policy,

2 INTERTAX 83 (1994). See infra note 174.

65.
1995 OECD Model Treaty, supra note 1, para. 22. Utilization of
"subpart F type" provisions, transfer pricing, or substance-over-form provisions
may provide ways of dealing with abusive treaty-based tax avoidance. Subpart F
provisions are named after the pattern set by §§ 951-64 in subpart F of the U.S.
Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.). These provisions are designed to frustrate the
manipulative use of controlled foreign corporations by U.S. persons to minimize
federal income tax. Subpart F treats the earnings of such a corporation as if the
ratable share of the earnings generated overseas had been distributed to the U.S.
shareholders. I.R.C. §§ 951-964 (1988).
The term "transfer pricing" refers to the determination of prices to be charged,
especially within a multinational enterprise for transactions between various
group members. Since these prices are riot freely negotiated, and thus may
deviate from prices agreed upon by nonassociated trading partners, they lead to a
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maintain by inserting a specific savings clause in each of its
treaties. The savings clause restricts the personal scope of the
treaty and preserves the right of the United States to tax its
For
citizens and corporations independently of the treaty.
countries that do not use a savings clause, 66the anti-basecompany legislation may have treaty implications.
c. Nature of Intermediary Entities
An important aspect of treaty shopping is the nature and
degree of the activity performed in the interposed entity. 67 Some
companies function merely as "shell" companies, having no staff
or business operations. These are often managed by unrelated
local trust companies. Others, in comparison, constitute the
regional centers for multinational enterprises formed for the
purpose of centralizing banking or insurance activities for the
whole group. There is no consensus, however, as to what degree
of activity an interposed entity must undertake in order not to be
considered a base or conduit company. Depending on which tax
expert is consulted, a treaty shopping entity can range from a
letter-box company 6 s to a holding company with extensive
The decisive element for its
management functions. 6 9
characterization as a treaty shopping entity is the motive of its
creation-whether the entity has largely7" or solely7 ' been established for reasons of tax minimization. Though the creator's true
motive is often difficult to determine, the degree of activity of an

particular tax issue in cross-border transactions. This occurs because the tax
authorities would like to adjust these prices to at-arm's-length prices. Several
tools have evolved for achieving this purpose (e.g., cost-based methods).

66.

1987 OECD Report, supra note 42, at 71.

67.
The nature and degree of the activity performed by the interposed
entity is particularly relevant to the discussion of anti-treaty-shopping measures.
See Infra notes 111-45, 226-48 and accompanying text.
68.
A letter-box company is a company that has only complied with the
bare essentials for organization (incorporation and registration) in a particular
country without having an office, business assets, or employees in that country.
Such a company only has an address (often a bank or an attorney) to which the
mail can be directed. The actual commercial activities are carried on in another
country.
KoRMANN, DIE STEUERPOLITIK DER INTERNATIONALEN UNTERNEHMUNG 218
69.
(2d ed. 1970).
70.
Id. at 215.
71.
According to Volker Kluge, an abusive intent should not be presumed
when a multinational decides, for economic reasons, to centralize its participation
in several countries in a single subsidiary, which then is located in a low-tax
country. KLUGE, supra note 40, at 135.
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interposed entity can certainly serve as evidence of the creator's
intent, although it is not conclusive.

Another indicator of tax avoidance may be the nature of the
entity. While production companies are not likely to be set up for
72
purposes of tax avoidance, companies created for holding,
fmancing, 7 3 and licensing 7 4 are classic planning options,
functioning as intermediary entities without an economic interest
in their countries of residence.

72.
For example, under prior law, a Japanese multinational could set up a
Dutch holding company that had the function of holding the shares of the
parent's subsidiary in the United States. The Dutch holding company, completely
passive in nature, would be established for the sole purpose of reducing taxes on
dividends and capital gains. Under this arrangement, dividend payments
received from the U.S. subsidiary by the Dutch holding company could be
reduced to 5% under the U.S.-Netherlands treaty then in effect. 1947 U.S.Netherlands Treaty, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH)
6258. In addition, the dividends
could be accumulated tax free in the Dutch holding company due to the
participation exemption under Dutch law, and then reinvested to buy other assets
of the same kind. The Netherlands and the United States, however, have since
concluded a new treaty under which the Japanese multinational's holding
company would not likely be eligible for a reduced withholding rate. U.S.Netherlands Income Tax Treaty, signed Dec. 18, 1992. art. 26, 2 Tax Treaties
(CCH) 6103 (entered into force Dec. 31, 1993).
73.
Finance companies could be structured basically in the same way as
holding companies, except that the Dutch intermediary would provide debt
capital to the U.S. subsidiary, which the Netherlands corporation had in turn
received from its Japanese parent. By means of this back-to-back loan
arrangement-a minimum spread of 12.5 basis points-the U.S. subsidiary could
enter into a debtor-creditor relationship with its parent in Japan through a
completely passive intermediary. (The Netherlands has a rule comparable to the
U.S. transfer pricing rules under § 482 of the I.R.C. However, they apply a far
lower standard than the United States, deeming 12.5 basis points sufficient. This
results in a difference between 10 and 9.875% on a back-to-back loan). A
somewhat different type of finance subsidiary might have held the Japanese
multinational's participation in North America and Europe. The Dutch finance
subsidiary could operate as the financial center for all of the intragroup financial
relationships within these geographic regions. The Dutch finance subsidiary
could issue loans and provide banking activities for the group by means of a fully
equipped staff that managed its operations. It is doubtful that companies of this
kind would be regarded as base or conduit companies. The place of effective
management would usually be situated in the country where the base company
was incorporated. See Joseph C. Amico, Planning Under Article 26 of the 1992
U.S.-NetherlandsTax Treaty, 6 TAX NOTES INT'L 1333 (1993).
74.
For example, assume that the Japanese multinational developed a new
product, patented in favor of the Dutch licensing company. The Dutch licensing
company would license to the whole group of subsidiaries and function as the
pivot for the licensing operations with respect to North America and Europe.
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The Evolving Practice of Treaty Shopping

Until recently, 75 one of the most common types of conduit
structures involved the Netherlands as a base country for conduit
companies, either alone or in connection with the Netherlands
Antilles. 76 The Netherlands, despite having a normal tax rate
structure,7 7 makes an ideal host country for multinationals
seeking to reduce withholding tax at source and minimize tax in

the country of residence, while paying as little tax in the
Netherlands as possible. The advantage of the Netherlands is its
extensive treaty network78 combined with its flexible, narrow tax
base, especially relating to specific income items such as
dividends, capital gains, interest, and royalties.
For example, under Netherlands domestic legislation, if a

Netherlands company holds at least five percent of the shares of

another Netherlands company, the dividends and capital gains

are exempt from tax.79 Furthermore, interest and royalties are
deductible and may narrow the tax base by means of earningsstripping.8 0 Finally, income attributable to an offshore branch of
a Dutch company is exempt from Netherlands tax (branch
exemption) because the Netherlands uses the exemption method

The new U.S.-Netherlands tax treaty, which replaced the existing
75.
treaty signed in 1948, includes such a complex and complicated limitation-onbenefits clause. U.S.-Netherlands Income Tax Treaty, signed Dec. 18, 1992, art.
26, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 6103 (entered into force Dec. 31, 1993). Under that
clause, third country users will basically have no chance to engage in treaty
shopping with the Netherlands as a base country. However, it still leaves the
possibility for U.S. residents to treaty shop by using the Dutch connection.
Amico, supranote 73.
76.
When focusing on dividend payments, the Netherlands received a
major part of the payments ($332 million), compared to dividends paid to
Germany ($124 million). France ($213 million), and Japan ($63 million), a fact
that is related to the status of the Netherlands as the most important host
The
GORDON REPORT, supra note 57, at 177.
country for multinationals.
Netherlands is surpassed only by Switzerland, which in respect to dividend
payments to tax haven countries is at the top with $984 million. Id.
The Netherlands has a tax rate on corporations of 35% and a top rate
77.
for individuals of 60%. Adrian J.M. Timmermans, General Report, In CAHIERS DE
DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL, INTERPRETATION OF DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS 439

(1993) [hereinafter DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION]. In order to be considered a tax
haven, a country's tax rates must be 5% or less. Id.
78.
As of October 1992, the Netherlands had active treaties with 46
countries. Id. An additional three treaties had been concluded, but were not yet
in force. Id. With three other countries, the Netherlands had fiscal agreements
and an additional two needed to be ratified. Id.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
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rather than the credit method to alleviate double taxation.8 1
These provisions made the Netherlands an excellent place for
reducing international taxation and were used for investment in
the United States on a wide scale until the renegotiation of the
U.S. -Netherlands treaty in 1993.
Focusing on the United States treaty network, it appears that
a large part of foreign direct and portfolio investment in the
United States and U.S. companies' access to foreign capital
markets 8 2 historically were regularly structured through tax
haven jurisdictions. Although the United States never negotiated
any treaties with tax havens, such treaty relationships did
develop by extension of certain U.S. treaties to dependencies of
U.S. treaty partners.8 3 Some of those former dependencies built

their entire legal frameworks on the exploitation of the treaty
network acquired through the earlier colonial relationship. s 4 .
Probably the most widely utilized treaty relationship, both by
third-country users and U.S.-based multinationals seeking access
to the Eurobond market, was with the Netherlands and the
Netherlands Antilles. 8 5 For decades 85 one of the most popular

81.
The requirements of the exemption were satisfied when the branch had
"some" tax levied on it. Dutch law exempts profits if the resident corporation's
foreign branch has been "subject to tax," regardless of the rate. Amico, supra
note 73.
82.
Prior to the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369. 98 Stat. 494
(1984). the 30% withholding tax on gross payments of portfolio interest
constituted a barrier to entering the Eurobond market.
83.
By 1983, more than 21 tax treaties with dependencies were
terminated. The only treaty renegotiated has been the one with Barbados. 1 Tax
Treaties (CCH) 1103.
84.
Examples are the Netherlands Antilles and the Cayman Islands.
85.
See supra note 77-81 and accompanying text regarding the economic
importance of transactions structured over the Netherlands Antilles.
86.
Even if the use of the Antilles to get access to the Eurobond market
may not be regarded as treaty shopping in a pure legal sense, economically it had
the same effect. As opposed to the usual definition of treaty shopping, where a
third-country user takes advantage of a treaty to which the user's country of
residence is not a party, the "beneficial owner" of the purported treaty shopping
entity, a U.S. resident, would have been entitled to treaty benefits under the
provisions of the U.S.-Antilles treaty. 1955 Protocol, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 6236.
However, this unusual structure was due to a peculiarity of the Eurobond
market.
The Eurobond market is tax free to the lender, with the result that the payor
pays tax on the payee's income. The U.S. payor who wanted access to finance
opportunities in the Eurobond market therefore would have been obliged to pay
30% withholding tax under I.R.C. §§ 1441, 1442 on the payees' interest income.
To circumvent this obligation, the U.S. payor established an entity on the Antilles
that was not subject to withholding tax under the treaty since it satisfied the
limitation-on-benefits provision. Legally, therefore, this phenomenon cannot be
Identified as treaty shopping. Economically, however, it had the same effect
because, from the U.S. Treasury's point of view, third-country residents, as the
recipients of the income, saved the tax. See Tax Evasion Through the Netherlands
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structures was the "Dutch sandwich," which involved a
combination of tax base reduction and a tax haven. The term
"Dutch sandwich" describes a chain of corporations linked
together by a Netherlands corporation. For example, a foreign

investor would create a Netherlands Antilles corporation, which in
turn owned a Netherlands subsidiary, which in turn owned an
Antilles creditor corporation. Channeling interest income received
from a U.S. payor through those entities would enable the Antilles
corporation and, finally, the third-country user to avoid U.S.
withholding tax.8 7 The less complicated structure of the "openfaced sandwich" involved an Antilles company that owned a
Netherlands subsidiary, which in turn owned a U.S. corporation.
This structure was widely used by foreign investors as a holding
to take
company structure for U.S. investments in order not 88
advantage of the U.S.-Netherlands Antilles tax convention.
Although, at present, many of those structures are no longer
applicable to the United States, less developed countries tend not
to bar third country users from obtaining treaty benefits. Less
developed countries are more concerned about encouraging
investment. For example, Cyprus offshore companies are still
widely used for investing in Russia or other Eastern European
This tax minimization structure certainly has
countries.8 9
assisted less developed countries in attracting investment by
guaranteeing that an already risky return will not be burdened
with tax.

Antilles and Other Tax Haven Countries: Hearing Before the Subcomnm of the
Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-29 (1983) [hereinafter
1983 Hearingi(statement of William J. Anderson, Director of General Government
Division).
87.
RICHARD A. WESTIN, THE TAx LExICON 158 (1989). See also Eugene L.
Vogel et al., Inward Investments in Securities and Direct Operations Through the
British Virgin Islands: How Serious a Rival to the Netherlands Antilles Island
Paradise,34 TAXL. REV. 321, 402 (1979).
88.
"Interest on bonds, notes, debentures, securities, deposits or any other
form of indebtedness (including interest from mortgages or bonds secured by real
property) paid to a resident or corporation of one of the Contracting States shall
be exempt from tax by the other Contracting State." U.S.-Netherlands Tax
Convention, signed Jan. 1, 1947, art. VIII, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 6203 (extended
by the protocol between the United States and the Netherlands to the Netherlands
Antilles, effective on Nov. 10, 1955, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 6236).
89.
Cyprus offshore companies with income from sources outside Cyprus
pay only 4.25% tax, which is one tenth of the normal company rate. MARSHALL J.

LANGER, PRACTICAL INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING 81-1 (3d ed. 1996).
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3. Scope and Economic Impact
A high level of sophistication has been achieved in methods of
profiting from existing tax treaties not directly available to the
investor. The use of treaty shopping as a tax planning device has
become so important that a computer system has been developed,
containing a database of 185 countries' tax rates and provisions
as well as over 800 international tax treaties. 90 The system
shows tax advisers the most efficient way of repatriating profits
and income from international transactions by exploiting the
existing worldwide treaty network. 9 '
Although treaty shopping practices may provide some insight
into the scope of tax avoidance in the context of international tax
planning, the apparent impact of the use of tax treaties on
investment flows is startling. For example, in 1988, forty-two
percent of foreign investment on the Madrid stock exchange came

from the United Kingdom, in contrast to eighteen percent from
Germany, fifteen percent from Switzerland, and eight percent
from France. 92 Only five percent of the investment was held
directly by U.S. investors. 93 Those figures seemingly characterize
U.K. investors as the leading force on the Spanish market. It
becomes apparent, however, that this data does not reflect the
genuine investment position. The explanation is that there was
no income tax treaty between the United States and Spain,9 4 and
therefore most of the investment flows from the United States and
other overseas investors were channeled through London in order
to take advantage of existing tax treaties.
Similarly, the
remarkable percentage of Swiss investment can be attributed to
some German investment activities directed to Spain through
Swiss corporations.
The Office of Tax Analysis at the U.S. Treasury Department
released
some interesting statistics
about international

90.
Clive Wolman, Computer Guide to Tax Avoidance, FIN. TIMES. Oct. 10,
1985, at 1. In one instance, the system was used to analyze a British company
receiving interest income in the amount of 19.5 million British pounds from
Brazil, Belgium, Italy, and South Korea. Id. The program concluded that the
corporation could save 2.1 million British pounds by passing the income received
from Brazil and Italy through a subsidiary set up in Germany, and the income
from Belgium and South Korea through a Netherlands subsidiary. Id. The latter
was then to be channeled through another Finnish company. Id. The system also
pointed out several other possibilities that might not be as efficient, but might
better fit the needs of a particular multinational. Id.
91.
Id.
92.
HANDELSBLATT, June 29, 1988, at 32 (F.R.G.).
93.
Id.
94.
The income tax treaty with Spain was signed on February 22, 1990,
and entered into force in November 1990. U.S.-Spain Income Tax Treaty, signed
Feb. 22, 1990, 3 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 79.550.
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investment behavior in the late 1970s, when treaty shopping was
beginning to be recognized as a growing problem. 95 By comparing
U.S. payments to foreign persons in 1977, one discovers several
The payments made to persons in the
astonishing facts.
Netherlands Antilles ($160 milion) exceeded payments made to
persons in Germany ($115 million), a major trading partner of the
United States. 95 Payments to Switzerland ($680 million) exceeded
the payments made to all major industrialized countries such as
the Netherlands ($347 million), France ($250 million), Germany
($115 million), and Japan ($135 million).9 7 Obviously, these
figures constitute a departure from the economic reality of the
capital flows.
The discrepancy becomes even more apparent with respect to
interest payments from the United States. Antilles residents
received $127 million, whereas only $18 million was paid to
residents of Germany, $102 million to residents of the United
Kingdom, $51 million to residents of France, and $35 million to
Keeping in mind that the
residents of the Netherlands. 98
Netherlands Antilles is an island with no more than 250,000
inhabitants, it is clear that the major part of the interest received
by investors resident in the Netherlands Antilles did not remain
on that tiny island. In 1983, payments of all kinds of income to
Antilles residents were $2.1 billion, which accounted for nineteen
percent of the total U.S. payments to all countries in that year. 9 9
Interest payments to Antilles residents exceeded the sum of
interest payments made to the residents of Canada, Germany,
France, and the United Kingdom by some $120 million. l0 0 Of the
total U.S. source based interest payments made to creditors
around the world, 33.4% were made to residents of the
Antilles.' 01
In 1984, after the United States repealed the
withholding tax on portfolio interest,' 0 2 the interest payments to
the Netherlands Antilles declined.' 0 3 The United States repeal of
its withholding tax on portfolio interest made the use of an
Antilles intermediary for the receipt of interest unnecessary in
most cases.

95.
Marshall J. Langer, Tax Treaties CreatingTax Haven Situations, 11 TAX
NoTEs 667 (1980).
96.
Id. at 668.
97.
Id.
98.
GORDON REPORT, supra note 57, at 177.
99.
1987 Hearing,supra note 6, at 28.

100.

Id. at 9.

101.

Id. at 28.

102.
103.

See I.R.C. §§ 871(h), 881(c) (1994).
1987 Hearing,supra note 6, at 28.
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D. The Problems of Treaty Shopping
These figures show the extent to which investment flows have
been distorted for the purpose of saving taxes. It can be argued
that it is not treaty shopping, but rather the dissimilarity of tax
systems, the overlapping tax jurisdictions leading to double
taxation, and intergovernmental tax competition that are
primarily responsible for the distortion of the economic flows.
Thus, the investor, in order to preserve competitiveness, must
find ways to deal with the discontinuities among national tax

regimes, and does so by using tax treaties to reduce source
country tax. Since the main objective of tax treaties is to provide
free flows of international trade and investment, some

commentators argue that it does not matter whether the desirable
result is achieved by the direct or indirect use of tax treaties.
While this view may seem reasonable to investors, it does not take
into account the interests of the source country.' 0 4
1. Revenue Loss
Treaty shopping results in tremendous revenue losses for the
source country.' 0 5 For example, in 1981, about $9.6 billion of
U.S. source income was paid to foreign persons.1 0 6 Out of that
$9.6 billion, $6.5 billion, or sixty-eight percent, was received by
persons residing in five countries: the Netherlands, Netherlands
Antilles, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Switzerland.10 7 Three
of these five countries qualified as tax havens or quasi-taxhavens.' 0 8 The Antilles residents received the most income,
approximately $1.4 billion, L0 9 and had the least amount of tax
withheld, about $26.6 million." 0 Netherlands residents received
$1.339 billion, with only $88 million being withheld. Swiss
residents received payments of only $1.2 billion, but had $221

104. According to the U.S. definition, treaty shopping is solely a problem of
the source country. In accordance with this view, other types of treaty abuse
(such as actions to reduce residence taxation and Its influence on the residence
country) are not subject to analysis. See A.L.I., supra note 5, at 150.
105. Unfortunately, no statistics exist about the amount of revenue lost to
treaty shoppers. Therefore, the only way to find out the average revenue loss is to
compare out-flowing payments of U.S. source income with the amount withheld
from these payments. See 1983 Hearing, supra note 86, at 7 (opening statement
of Chairman Barnard).

106.

Id.

107.

Id.

108. Id.
109. According to W.J. Anderson, Director of General Government Division,
this figure excludes Eurobonds. Id. at 18.

110.

Id.
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million in tax withheld. 1 1

The reason Swiss recipients attracted

the highest amount of U.S. withholding tax is that the Swiss tax

authorities, during the course of their normal activities, would
verify whether the recipient of the income was in fact a Swiss
resident. 1 12 If not, Switzerland would withhold a thirty percent
tax from the payee and remit the tax to the United States. 1 13 Had

the other states been as thorough about discerning whether the
recipients of U.S. source income were true residents of their
countries, the United States would have collected many more tax
dollars. Although no exact figures exist about lost revenue, it can
likely be assumed that the United States lost a substantial sum to
the Netherlands and the Antilles. The fact that, in 1981, sixtyeight percent of U.S. source income flowed to only five U.S. treaty
countries, three of which were considered tax havens, indicates
that many third-country investors took advantage of an existing
treaty network for their investments in the United States. The
assumed revenue loss is a significant amount that a state cannot
afford to ignore. 14 Furthermore, if no efficient safeguards for the

111.
$126 million was withheld directly by U.S. agents, while Switzerland
collected additional taxes of over $95 million. Id. at 15. The higher amount of
direct U.S. withholding is likely attributable to the stricter limitatlon-on-benefits
provision in the U.S.-Swiss treaty. Id.
112. This effort was due to the anti-treaty-shopping legislation adopted by
Switzerland. Bundesratsbeschluss betr. die ungerechtfertigte Inanspruchnahme
von Doppel-Besteuerungsabkommen [abuse ordinance], Dec. 14, 1962, 1962 as 1622,
amended by Kreisschreiben der Eidgenoessischen Steuerverwaltung, Dec. 31, 1962.
These provisions were initially designed to prevent resident entities of Switzerland,
under non-Swiss control, from abusively claiming treaty benefits in a foreign state
under a Swiss treaty. Id. The provisions were directed at conduit companies or profit
accumulating base companies by denying treaty benefits unless residents of
Switzerland are "predominantly interested." Id. In other words, the Swiss legislation
actually protects the treasuries of its treaty partners from Swiss-resident, but not

Swiss-owned, companies. The adoption of these unilateral measures was driven by the

international criticism of the special tax regimes in Swiss tax law granted to specific
legal structures and the resulting pressure put on Switzerland by foreign treaty-partner
countries to renegotiate or terminate existing tax treaties. Under these circumstances,
Switzerland feared that its reputation as a tax haven would lead to a weakened
bargaining position in further treaty negotiations and have a detrimental effect on its
role as a major financial center. See generally H. Masshart. Die ungegechertgte
Inanspruchnahmevon Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen,31 ARcHrV FOR SCHwEIZERiSCHES
ABGABENRECHT 226 (1962/63); see also Max Widmer. Die schwelzerlschen Massnahmen
gegen den Mlssbrauch von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen,40 STEUER UND WIRTSCHAFT
382 (1963); GERHARD KRAFT, DIE MISSBRAUCHUCHE INANSPRUCHNAHME VON DOPPELBESTEUERUNGSABKOMMVEN 74 (1991).
113.
1983 Hearing,supra note 86, at 16.
114.
"It appears that we are losing billions of dollars in taxes which are
slipping through our fingers, whereas [U.S.] citizens in this country are being held
to such a rigid performance of their tax obligations...." Id. at 15 (statement of
William G. Anderson, Director of General Government Division).
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same country were inserted into the respective treaties, the
revenue loss would increase with the growing trade and

investment volume, leaving a far larger tax deficiency for the
United States.
2. The Impediment of the Principle of Reciprocity
The underlying principle of all bilateral tax treaties, the
principle of reciprocity, is impeded when a third-country resident
derives benefits from a treaty intended to serve only the interests
of residents of the contracting states.
This deficiency in
reciprocity results when a third-country resident derives benefits

through the interposition of a treaty-protected entity, while the
source country's residents are not necessarily able to obtain
similar benefits from the third country. 115 This may have an
adverse effect on both the source country's government and Its
resident investors.
In general, both parties to a tax treaty make concessions on
their source based tax. The source country fully or partially
relinquishes its right to tax domestic source income earned by
residents of the other party and reciprocally obtains the same
concessions for its own residents. For example, the U.S. Treasury
Department generally assumes the neutrality of tax treaties in
their revenue effect, which means that one provision resulting in
a loss of revenue will be offset by other provisions, increasing
revenue." 6 When treaties, concluded on the assumption of a
particular level of actual and potential income and capital flows
between two countries, are used by third-country residents, the
level and balance of the anticipated capital flows are distorted to
the extent that the U.S. government loses income by reducing its
source based tax, as well as by allowing U.S. taxpayers to claim a
foreign tax credit for taxes paid on income from the nontreaty
countries.
One state's renunciation of the right to tax a certain type of
income in a tax treaty is usually based on the right to tax such
income by the other party to the treaty. Thus, the purpose of the
treaty is to alleviate double taxation when a beneficiary of one
contracting state derives income from sources within the other
state. In circumstances where unintended beneficiaries are free
to choose the location of the intermediary entity, however, treaties

115. 1987 Hearing. supra note 6, at 5.
116. Rosenbloom, supra note 7, at 774 n.34. The 1975 U.S-U.K. Treaty,
signed Dec. 31, 1975, 3 Tax Treaties (WGL) 89,030, however, resulted in a
substantial revenue gain for the United States. See SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMM., REPORT ON THE INCOME TAx TREATY WITH THE U.K., S. ExFc. REP. No. 18.
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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designed to eliminate double taxation are frequently being utilized
This is especially true in
to eliminate taxation altogether.
combination with tax haven situations. This result goes beyond
the treaty's purpose.
It is certainly not in the interest of either treaty partner to
allow a loophole in the treaty to prevent tax from being levied by
either state, in particular when it concerns persons who have no
signfficant economic nexus with the country in which the treatyprotected entity is located. In addition, any deviation from
provisions of the source country's domestic tax law should be
limited to the intended beneficiaries, otherwise the objective of the
legislation enacting such provisions is subverted.
Further, there is no justification for the fact that the
unintended application of a bilateral tax treaty combined with the
use of no- or low-tax jurisdictions may result in a lower tax
burden for a third-country investor than for a resident of one of
This may lead to a competitive
the treaty countries. 117
disadvantage for the intended beneficiaries of the treaty, because
they are not able to structure their investments tax-free or at a
comparable low rate.
3. Reduction of the Incentive to Conclude Tax Treaties
If residents of third countries that have no tax treaty or a less
favorable tax treaty with the source country can still obtain
source basis tax benefits, these third countries will be under less
pressure to enter into a treaty with the source country. They will

lack motivation to form their own treaties, since their residents
are able to shop for benefits in the existing treaty network at
minimal cost and without the third country having to grant any
reciprocal rights. 118 Undoubtedly such incentives would have a
detrimental effect on the source country, especially with regard to
its ability to expand its income tax treaty network and its ability
to renegotiate its existing treaties on more favorable terms.
For example, in the case of the United States, treaty shopping
denies U.S. investors the advantages that they would receive from
an expanded U.S. treaty network. While a third country user can
obtain the benefits of a U.S. treaty indirectly through treaty
shopping, U.S. residents investing in the third country might not
be able to obtain reciprocal benefits in a similar situation." 9 The
U.S. government would have to credit the full amount of tax paid

117.
118.
119.

GORDON REPORT, supra note 57, at 158.
Rosenbloom, supranote 7, at 775.
1987 Hearing,supra note 6, at 349.
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by its residents to the third country, while at the same time
foregoing the amount of U.S. tax that should have been collected
from the third country's investors. A similar situation applies to
the renegotiation of treaties. When a treaty partner's residents
can obtain more favorable benefits under another treaty, U.S.
residents have to be satisfied with the less advantageous benefits
of the existing treaty.
If a third country, whose residents are able to treaty shop, is
nonetheless willing to enter into treaty negotiations, the third
country's bargaining position is generally enhanced, making it
difficult for the source country to obtain concessions in
negotiations. 1 20 Since the third country is accustomed to having
the most favorable benefits under another treaty for its investors,
it will want to be granted the most advantageous provisions for its
treaty or otherwise refuse to conclude one. It is not always
possible, however, to make the same concessions to every
country, since the outcome of the negotiations largely depends on
the specific situation between the negotiating countries.
Besides eliminating double taxation and thus providing a
more favorable investment environment for the residents of
contracting states, treaties are designed to provide an exchange of
information. 12 1 The possibility for a taxpayer involved in crossborder transactions to engage in tax avoidance or evasion is

substantially diminished when a mutual exchange of information
is provided. Therefore, one important aspect of tax treaties is to
assist the tax authorities in dealing with international auditing
problems. 122 In this respect, the expansion of a country's treaty
network is indispensable, but may be inhibited by treaty
shopping.
Taking all these factors into account, it is clear that treaty
shopping has a detrimental effect on the source country's
revenue, as well as its position within the international
community. In the last two decades, treaty shopping has become
a widely employed tax planning device with significant economic
impact. It is understandable, therefore, that a source country
would fight treaty shopping with all possible means at Its
disposal.

120. Id. at 350.
121.
Even though treaties exist that deal only with exchange of Information
(such as U.S.-St. Lucia Agreement for the exchange of information with respect to
taxes, Apr. 22, 1991, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 268), tax treaties usually provide the
best basis for an exchange of Information.
122. A.L.I., supra note 5, at 54.
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III. COUNTERMEASURES TO THE EXISTING TREATY SHOPPING PRACTICE

As a result of the problems created by treaty shopping, the
present prevailing view is that this common practice should be
restrained. The commentaries of the OECD Model Convention
explicitly emphasize that a tax treaty should not facilitate tax
evasion and therefore should include safeguards to prevent its
abuse. 1 23 Yet, it took almost four decades for the OECD to
recognize the extent of the treaty shopping problem. 12 4 Now,
however, the commentaries of the OECD and the U.N. Ad Hoc
Group of Experts for Co-Operation in Tax Matters (U.N. Ad Hoc
Group of Experts) 125 recommend the insertion of specific
provisions dealing with the abuse of treaty benefits by third party
users.
The 1995 OECD Commentary contains detailed
suggestions on how to phrase anti-treaty-shopping provisions in
order to provide some help to OECD member countries, and to
accomplish certain continuity and conformity for a common

international interpretation. 12 6 Furthermore, the Commentaries
refer to the discussion whether and under which prerequisites
treaty shopping can be curtailed if the treaty in question does not
The following
contain such anti-treaty-shopping clauses. 12 7
discusses the possible ways to deal with treaty shopping in tax
treaties as well as in domestic law.
A. Introduction to the Concepts of Limitation-on-BenefitsProvisions
In Tax Treaties
Before creating anti-treaty-shopping clauses, it is first
necessary to identify the situations and structures in which treaty
shopping transactions occur and then find adequate solutions to

123.
1995 OECD Model Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1, 7 (Commentary).
124.
For further discussion, see KLAUS VOGEL, DOUBLE TAXATION
CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY TO THE OECD-, UN-, AND U.S.-MODEL CONVENTIONS
FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION OF INCOME AND CAPITAL WITH PARTICULAR
PREFERENCE TO GERMAN TREATY PRACTICE 9 (1991).
125.
The U.N. Model Convention and its commentaries were developed by
the U.N. ESCOR's Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Tax Treaties Between the
Developed and Developing Countries, which completed its work in 1980 without
paying too much attention to treaty abuse. For this purpose, the Ad Hoc Group of
Experts on International Co-operation in Tax Matters was organized to gradually

work out proposals for international cooperation to combat tax evasion and
avoidance. The first substantive suggestions in terms of full-blown anti-treaty-

shopping provisions were made in 1987 and resemble the provisions of the OECD
commentaries. See InternationalCo-OperationIn Tax Matters, supra note 2.
126. 1995 OECD Model Treaty, supra note 1.
127.

Id.
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confer benefits only to the entities entitled to them. 128 The OECD
suggests taking into account the extent to which actual benefits
may be obtained by conduits, the legal context in both contracting

states, and the degree to which bona fide investors might
unintentionally be affected. 12 9

The U.N. and OECD models

themselves (and not only the commentaries) utilize two types of
anti-treaty-shopping measures: the limitation on residence status
test in Article 4 of the respective models, and the beneficial
ownership test in Articles 10-12.130
1. Limitation on Residence Status Test
In all treaty shopping structures, interposed entities in one or

more treaty countries provide advantages for a third country

taxpayer that would otherwise not have been available in a direct
transaction. This possibility for tax planning has its roots in the
concept that residents of the contracting states are entitled to the

benefits of the treaty. 13 1 Thus, if the interposed entity is treated
as a resident of a contracting state under the domestic law of that
state, it has the authority to claim rights under the bilateral tax
convention. The U.S., OECD, and U.N. model treaties 3 2 each
provide detailed interpretations of the term "resident of a

contracting state."13

A person qualifies as a resident if the

person is subject to taxation under the laws of the state "by
reason of [the person's] domicile, residence, place of management
34
or any other criterion of a similar nature."'
The OECD Model, however, excludes from the definition of

the term "resident of a contracting state" any "person who is liable

128.
1987 OECD Report, supra note 42. at 95.
129. Id.
130.
1995 OECD Model Treaty, supra note 1; U.N. Model Convention, supra
note 2.
131.
The OECD and U.N. models employ the same wording to determine the
scope of the treaty: "This Convention shall apply to persons who are residents of
one or both of the contracting states." 1995 OECD Model Treaty, supra note 1,
art. 1; U.N. MODEL CONVENTION. supra note 2. art. 1. The U.S. model, additionally,
contains a savings clause that restricts the personal scope of the treaty as
determined by Article 1(1) and retains the rights of the United States to tax its
citizens and incorporated entities as if the treaty had not come into effect. 1981
Model Treaty, supra note 3.
132.
1995 OECD Model Treaty, supra note 1; 1981 U.S. Model Treaty, supra
note 3; U.N. MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 2. In addition, the U.S. model
contains the terms "citizenship" and "place of incorporation," both of which are
derived from its domestic law. 1981 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 3.
133.
1995 OECD Model Treaty. supra note 1, art. 4; U.N. MODEL CONVENTION,
supra note 2; 1981 U.S. Model Treaty. supra note 3.
134.
1995 OECD Model Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4; U.N. MODEL CONVENTION,
supra note 2; 1981 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 3.
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to tax in that state in respect only of income from sources in that
state or capital situated therein."13 5 The commentaries explain
that this situation can arise with regard to individuals (e.g., in the
case of foreign diplomatic and consular staff), but also in the case
of foreign-held companies exempted from tax in the intermediary
country on their foreign income by special privileges designed to
attract conduit companies. 13 6 The OECD acknowledges that this
provision might be interpreted so broadly as to exclude all
residents of countries adopting a territorial principle in their
Therefore, the provision must be interpreted
taxation. 13 7
restrictively, which, absent any specification, might render it
totally ineffective. The same result was reached by the U.N. Ad
Hoc Group of Experts, which pointed out that a court might
38
regard this treaty provision as being inapplicable to companies.1
Thus, under the general rules, a conduit is regarded as a
person or entity resident in the state of conduit and entitled to
claim benefits even though the true recipient of the income would
not be eligible for favorable treatment. Since this situation is not
deemed to be satisfactory, various approaches are being proposed
to prevent the abuse of treaty provisions. One radical suggestion
is the abstinence approach. Since treaty shopping often involves

the interposition of companies in low-tax countries or tax havens,
one effective solution is to refrain from concluding treaties with
such countries. This approach, however, is neither feasible nor
desirable in all cases. Although in treaty practice most countries,
including the United States, have already terminated many
treaties with tax havens, I3 9 it sometimes seems desirable to
maintain treaty relations with such countries (e.g., for purposes of
information exchange). Also, the abstinence approach is not a
solution with respect to countries not considered tax havens that
have favorable domestic investment laws that further the spread
of conduit companies (e.g., the Netherlands). Thus, a restriction
of the general application of the residence rule is arguably
necessary.

135.
136.
137.

1995 OECDModel Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4(1).
Id.
1995 OECD Model Treaty, supra note 1.

138.

U.N.

DEP'T OF INT'L EcONOMICS AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, CONTRIBUTION TO

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION INTAX MATTERS, U.N. Doc. ST/EA/203, U.N. Sales No.
E.88.XVI 9 (1988).
139. The United States had 21 tax treaties with tax havens, all of which
were terminated in 1986. Only the treaty with Barbados, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH)
1103 (Feb. 28, 1986). has been renegotiated. Other countries do not have any
treaty relations with tax havens. 1987 Hearing, supranote 6, at 352.
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2. The Beneficial Ownership Test
Articles 10, 11, and 12 of the OECD and U.N. models, which
deal with reducing rates of withholding tax on interest, dividends,
and royalties, limit the benefits available under the treaty to the
"beneficial owner" of the income. 140 Under these models, if an
entity establishes a conduit company in order to take advantage
of reduced withholding tax rates, it would be unable to qualify for
treaty relief because it would not be the beneficial owner of the
income. The term "beneficial owner," however, is not a precise
legal term. 14 1 It also is not a term that can be interpreted by
referring to the domestic law of the contracting states. Few, If
any, countries offer a definition of this term in their domestic
laws. The OECD commentaries only refer to the matter by
providing that treaty benefits should not be available when a third
person-an intermediary, such as an agent or nominee-is
interposed between the beneficiary and the payor.' 4 2
This
reference may be interpreted, for purposes of obtaining treaty
benefits, to mean that the real, economic title should prevail over
the formal, legal title with regard to dividends, interest, or
royalties. In other words, effect should be given to the substance
rather than the form of the transaction. 143 Thus, treaty relief for
those types of income should not be available for entities that
function as conduits between the payor and a person not covered
by the scope of the treaty.

In practice, however, the beneficial owner language in the
interest, dividends, and royalty articles constitutes a relatively
superficial inquiry. Absent a sham corporation 14 4 or crnduit
company, whose function is limited to that of a nominee or agent,
an incorporation is given effect, even if the corporation is wholly
owned by a third-country resident. Therefore, the source country
has to show that the treaty-protected entity is a sham or a
conduit company, acting as a mere intermediary with very narrow

140.
1995 OECD Model Treaty. supranote 1; U.N. MODEL CONVENTION, supra
note 2.
141. The International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation maintains the
position that the terms "beneficial owner" and "economic owner" can be equated,
In contrast to legal owner. The Committee on Fiscal Affairs initially considered
adopting the term of "final recipient" instead of "beneficial owner." VOGEL, supra
note 124, at 456.
142.
1995 OECD Model Treaty, supra note 1. art. 10, para. 12; art. 11. para.
8; art. 12, para. 4.
143.
See discussion on the U.S. domestic law regarding "substance versus
form," lnfra notes 189-200 and accompanying text.
144. The discussion on the United States domestic concept of a "sham
company" shows that this term requires an extremely narrow definition. See Infra
notes 290-91 and accompanying text.
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powers. In practice, this is difficult for the source country to
prove and raises questions of categorization. The mere fact that a
corporation's main function is holding assets or rights is not in
itself enough to classify it as an intermediary. 1 4 5 It is doubtful
whether a company operating as the financial center for an
international group could be regarded as a conduit, even though
its principal purpose is to profit from treaty benefits to which its
owners would not be entitled.
Apparently, therefore, the
beneficial owner test does not provide sufficient means to curtail
treaty shopping.
3. Additional Provisions Designed to Eliminate Treaty Shopping
The Fiscal Committee of the OECD recognized that the
existing model clauses did not effectively combat treaty shopping
practices and it therefore developed several additional approaches
to the problem. The commentaries on the 1977 OECD Model
suggested that the negotiating states should define more
specifically who should be entitled to treaty benefits. 14 6 To help
identify the beneficial owner, several objective tests, which were to
be included in an express limitation-on-benefits provision, were
suggested by the OECD commentaries and the U.N. Ad Hoc
Group of Experts at its 1987 meeting. 14 7 Various forms of these
tests have been adopted by several states in their treaty
practices. 148
The theory behind the limitation-on-benefits provisions is to
provide treaty benefits only to entities having a sufficient nexus

with the country of residence. This can either be determined by
looking at the direct and indirect owners or beneficiaries of the
entity or by focusing on the economic ties between the entity and
the treaty country.
a. Direct or Look-Through Approach
The "direct" or "look-through" approach focuses on the direct
and indirect owners or beneficiaries of an entity and allows treaty
benefits to a corporation only insofar as the company is owned by
residents of one of the contracting states.14 9 Interestingly, in an

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

1987 OECD Report, supra note 42, at 93.
1977 OECD Model Treaty, supra note 1. art. 10, para. 22.
1987 OECD Report, supra note 42, at 93.
See discussion Infra notes 369-72 and accompanying text.
The suggested wording of such a safeguarding clause reads as follows:
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earlier draft of the OECD commentaries on the look-through
approach, only residents of the other contracting state could
qualify for treaty benefits. 150
The 1994 update of the
5
commentaries, however, includes residents of either state.' '
This change has a significant impact on whether reduction of
residence country tax by means of treaty shopping is viewed as
abusive. Under the 1994 wording, an entity resident in one
contracting state that is owned by residents of the other
contracting state can claim treaty benefits in that other state.
Since the wording is directed against conduit companies, the
commentaries to the OECD Model suggest that every state
wishing to adopt such a provision should determine "the criteria
according to which a company would be considered as owned or
controlled by nonresidents." 15 2
This determination can be
achieved by requiring a specified portion of shares to be held by
residents of one of the contracting states in order for a company
to qualify for treaty benefits. 153 However, while these provisions
are relatively straightforward, they only focus on one aspect of
conduit structures and may have no effect on stepping-stone
strategies. For example, a way to circumvent this provision would
be to create a corporation with very small equity capital held by
genuine residents. Under such a scheme, the real capital would
be provided in the form of debt, the interest on which would flow
to nonresidents.

A company which is resident of a Contracting State shall not be entitled to
relief from taxation under this Convention with respect to any item of
income, gains or profits unless it is neither owned nor controlled directly
or through one or more companies, wherever resident, by persons who are
not residents of a Contracting State.
1995 OECDModel Treaty, supra note 1, para. 13 (commentary). This means that
the entity must be owned ultimately by one or more individual residents of one or
both contracting states, thereby excluding the possibility that the rule might be
circumvented by having a two-tier structure in the treaty country.
150. The former version of Article 1, para. 13 of the 1992 OECD
Commentary follows:
A company which is a resident of a Contracting State shall not be entitled

to relief from taxation under this Convention with respect to any item of
Income, gains or profits unless it is neither owned nor controlled directly

through one or more companies, wherever resident, by persons who are
not residents of thefirstmentloned state.
1995 OECD Model Treaty and commentaries, supra note 1, art. 1, para. 13

(emphasis added). In the 1994 update, the paragraph was amended by replacing
the words "first-mentioned state" with "a Contracting state." Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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Base-Erosion or Channel Approach
The "base-erosion" or "channel" approach seeks to prevent

one of the main treaty shopping practices-the reduction of a

conduit corporation's tax base. 154 Under the channel approach, a
corporation resident in one of the contracting states will not be
permitted to claim benefits under the treaty if a certain

percentage (usually fifty percent) of such corporation's gross
income is used to pay interest or royalties to residents of third
countries. This approach focuses on companies with high gross
receipts but that have very low taxable income as a result of high
expenses paid to nonresidents, providing the most efficient
instrument in the combat of stepping-stone structures, which

otherwise are very difficult to single out.
c. Exclusion Approach
The "exclusion" approach denies tax treaty benefits to
companies that enjoy a special tax regime in their country of
residence. 15 5 These types of tax-exempt (or nearly tax-exempt)
companies, usually specifically defined in the commercial or tax
laws of the country of residence, are granted tax privileges that
give them a status similar to that of nonresidents. 15 6 Thus, if a
state creates special privileges for certain kinds of companies in

154.

The safeguarding clause suggested by the OECD reads as follows:

Where income arising in a Contracting State is received by a company
which is a resident of the other Contracting State and one or more persons
who are not resident of that other Contracting State
have directly or indirectly or through one or more
(a)
companies, wherever resident, a substantial interest in such
company, in the form of a participation or otherwise, and
exercise directly or indirectly, alone or together, the
(b)
management or control of such company,
any provision of this Convention conferring an exemption from, or a
reduction of, tax shall not apply if more than 50 percent of such income is
used to satisfy claims by such persons (including interest, royalties,
development, advertising, initial and travel expenses, depreciation of any
kind of business assets including those on immaterial goods, processes,
etc.).
1995 OECD Model Treaty. supra note 1, art. 1 (commentary, 19).
A way to phrase such an anti-abuse clause, as suggested by the 1995
155.
OECD Commentaries, is as follows: "No provision of the Convention conferring an
exemption from, or reduction of, tax shall apply to income received or paid by a
company as defined under Section . . . of the . . . Act, or under any similar
provision enacted by . . . after the signature of the Convention." 1995 OECD
Model Treaty, supra note 1. art. 1 (commentary, 15).
An example Is the Luxembourg Holding Company.
156.
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its tax law, countermeasures must be taken to prevent those
privileges from being utilized in connection with the benefits
offered by a tax treaty. 15 7 The easiest way to prevent such tax

treaty abuse would be to simply exclude these companies from

the scope of the treaty. Even if applied in its full range,'" 8
however, this countermeasure does not seem to interfere greatly
with certain conduit companies that carry on bona fide
business. 159

d. Subject-to-Tax Approach
The "subject-to-tax' approach allows tax relief in the source
country if the recipient of the income pays tax on the respective
income in the recipient's country of residence. The idea behind
this approach is that the objective of a treaty is to eliminate
double taxation and not to provide double exemption from tax.
Neither the U.N. Ad Hoc Group of Experts nor the OECD model
commentaries recommends this approach for several reasons.
First, deserving entities such as charities, pension funds, or
entities that are exempt from tax under domestic law for a specific
reason (e.g., to encourage economic development in a specific
area), might be barred from obtaining treaty relief. Second, this
countermeasure would not be able to impede stepping-stone
structures 160 or any other manipulation of tax rules in tax haven
countries. Third, it is relatively difficult to administer because the
tax rules, including, for example, tax thresholds and deduction
allowances, vary too much between countries to find an equitable
solution. 161

157. 1987 OECD Report. supra note 42. at 97.
158. As suggested by the OECD, the impact of such a provision can be
minimized if the treaty provision is limited to specific types of income, such as
dividends, interest, royalties, and capital gains. 1995 OECD Model Treaty, supra
note 1. Under such provisions, companies, as defined in the anti-abuse
provision, would remain entitled to profit from the nondiscrimination (Art. 24).
mutual agreement procedure (Art. 25), and exchange of information (Art. 26)
provisions. Id.
159. 1987 Ad Hoc Group, supranote 2, at 12.
160. In general, if a taxpayer Is relieved from tax because of personal
allowances (deductions) or because losses can be offset on other income, the
taxpayer would still be regarded as being subject to tax. Thus, "subject-to-tax"
provisions are directed against persons enjoying an exemption from tax on actual
income rather than a de facto exemption from tax when they have a net loss.
161. 1995 OECD Model Treaty, supranote 1, art. 1 (commentary).
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Bona Fide Provisions

The idea behind limitation-on-benefits provisions is to bar
only those entities from treaty relief that are established with the
The following four
intention of obtaining treaty benefits.
approaches might often result in severe restrictions for entities
Therefore, the
not created for treaty shopping purposes.
commentaries of the 1995 OECD Model Treaty emphasizes that
any approach has to be supplemented by provisions guaranteeing
1 62
treaty benefits in bona fide situations.
i.

Stock Exchange Test

Under the stock exchange test, relief may be granted to any
publicly traded company that is traded on a recognized stock
exchange in one of the treaty countries. 163 The rationale behind
this test is that such a company is less likely to be set up for the
Thus, there is a general
purpose of abusing a tax treaty.
presumption that there is an actual, commercial reason,
independent of tax considerations, for the company to be
In addition, since
organized in its country of residence.
ownership changes frequently and there is a wide range of
different owners, an efficient control of the ownership would
almost be impossible. The OECD commentaries and the U.N. Ad
Hoc Group of Experts suggest that the stock exchange test
functions as a blanket exception to all of the other more general
approaches (base erosion, channel approach, etc.). 164
ii.

Active Trade or Business Test

Another provision designed to protect bona fide arrangements
is the "active trade or business test," which considers whether the
resident company of a contracting state is engaged in substantive
business operations and genuine commercial activity. 16 5 The

162.
163.

Id., art. 1. para. 21.
The 1995 OECD Model Treaty, suggestion reads as follows:

The foregoing provisions shall not apply to a company which is a resident
of a Contracting State if the principal class of its shares is registered on an
approved stock exchange in a Contracting State or if such company is
wholly owned-directly or through one or more companies each of which is
a resident of the first-mentioned State-by a company which is a resident

of the first-mentioned State and the principal class of whose shares is so
registered.
1995 OECD Model Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1. para. 21(d).
164. Id.; 1987 Ad Hoc Group, supra note 2, at 17.
165. The 1995 OECD Model Treaty, supra note 1. art. 1, para. 21(b),
suggestion reads as follows: "The foregoing provision shall not apply where the
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active trade or business test, which is discussed in the 1995
OECD commentaries, 1 66 is the core of the bona fide concept. The
conduct of an active trade or business demonstrates the
genuineness of an operation. The draw-back of this provision,
however, is that it is extremely
difficult to define what constitutes
16 7
an active trade or business.
iii. Motive Test
The "motive test,"16 8 which shares the same goal as the active
trade or business test, requires a company to demonstrate that its
principal purpose, the conduct of its business, and the income

derived from the business are motivated primarily by ordinary
commercial considerations rather than the desire to obtain tax
relief. 16 9 Therefore, anti-treaty-shopping provisions may provide
that no treaty relief will be granted if the sole, main, or principal
purpose of certain transactions is the reduction of source tax.
Because the prerequisites for obtaining treaty relief are
dependent on the subjective intent of the taxpayer and not on
objective criteria, the motive test is very problematic in its
application. "Sound business reasons" regarding a transaction or
business structure is a rather vague criterion for identifying an
intent to abuse a treaty. Therefore, in many cases, the primary
purpose of a structure or transaction will be excluded from a
rational judgment and its interpretation will be a matter of
arbitrariness. The test, however, is still useful in those instances
where sound business reasons are quite obvious and the intent of
tax treaty abuse unlikely.

company is engaged in substantive business operations in the Contracting State
of which it is a resident and the relief from taxation claimed from the other
Contracting State is with respect to income which is connected with such
operations."
166. Id.
167. Henk P.J. Goossen, Limiting Treaty Benefits, 20 INT'L TAXJ. 31 (1993).

168.

This test may be an exception to the general ownership and base-

erosion provisions in the OECD commentaries.
note 1, art. 1, para. 21(a).

169.

1995 OECD Model Treaty. supra

The anti-treaty-shopping clause in the OECD model Is as follows:

The foregoing provision shall not apply where the company establishes
that the principal purpose of the company, the conduct of its business and
the acquisition or maintenance by It of the shareholding or other property
from which the income in question is derived, are motivated by sound
business reasons and thus do not have as primary purpose the obtaining
of any benefits under this Convention.
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iv. Alternative Relief Test
Another variation on the bona fide provisions is the
"alternative relief test," suggested by the OECD commentaries.
The alternative relief test focuses on the ability of the taxpayer to
obtain similar or better treaty benefits from an alternative
treaty. 170
If the intermediate jurisdiction does not offer any
special benefits the investor could not otherwise obtain, forming
an entity in that jurisdiction and asserting rights under its tax
treaties disproves the notion that the interposition of the entity
17 1
was motivated by treaty benefits.
B. Implementation of Anti-Treaty-Shopping Provisionsin Domestic
Law
Besides inserting specific anti-treaty-shopping provisions into
the tax treaties, the issue can also be addressed by legislative
means, namely by incorporating anti-avoidance rules into
domestic tax law.
Domestic legislative measures aimed at
shopping
can exist in many forms. Some
restraining treaty
measures are of a general character and may apply to all kinds of
tax avoidance and evasion, whether in national or international
transactions. Other measures are very specific, involving complex
rules that define the concrete situations in which the benefits of
an international tax treaty can be obtained. Depending on their
scope and application, however, domestic anti-avoidance rules are
controversial with regard to their effect on the international legal
obligation created by a treaty. In other words, a domestic anti-

avoidance provision may result in a unilateral treaty override,
violating the well established international law principle of pacta
72
sunt servanda.'1
A large controversy exists within the international community
as to whether general domestic anti-avoidance rules are
applicable in the context of a treaty. In most countries, courts
tend to apply domestic abuse rules in circumstances involving tax

170. The anti-abuse clause of the 1995 OECD Model Treaty. supra note 1,
art. 1, para. 21(e), states that the term "nonresidents of a Contracting State" shall
"not be deemed to include residents of third states that have income tax
conventions in force with the Contracting State from which relief from taxation is
claimed and such conventions provide relief from taxation not less than the relief
from taxation claimed under this Convention."
171. Rosenbloom, supra note 64.
172. A.L.I., supra note 5, at 73. The principle means that agreements of the

parties to a contract must be observed.
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treaties, 173 but often only in specific areas (e.g., involving
avoidance schemes that make improper use of rules of domestic
law or involving resident taxpayers). 174 A dissenting view holds
that domestic anti-avoidance rules cannot be applied to treaty
situations, especially where the treaty itself contains provisions
aimed at counteracting its improper use.175
The different views are largely dependent on the
understanding of a treaty's purpose. Two basic views of the
nature of the treaty and the interpretive freedom of applying Its
provisions can be differentiated. According to the principles
178 most
adopted in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention,
states' agree that "common interpretation is equally binding on
the two parties" and therefore interpretation of a treaty should be
confined to its express terms.1 7 7 Some commentators argue that
there is "no justification for reliance on general legal principles of
domestic law in interpreting treaty law, or for8 closing loopholes
17
within treaties by reference to domestic law."
Other nations and commentators take a contractual
approach to tax treaty interpretation.1 79 Tax treaties, it is argued,
are concluded in a context of constant interaction, over a period
of time, and with the intent that they be flexible.' 8 0
The
negotiating parties, according to this view, had a certain intent
regarding their tax policy and economy. A treaty, therefore, must

173. - See applicability of Germany's Abgabenordnug (AO) § 42 Infra Part
IV.B.3.
174.
In contrast to the United States, which appears to take the position
that treaty shopping by its own residents is not generally a problem and which
has enacted domestic legislation against other forms of tax treaty abuse by its
own residents (e.g., through the use of base companies), Germany has a long line

of cases involving resident taxpayers who own Swiss base companies claiming
benefits under the German-Swiss treaty, to reduce residence taxation. The
German tax court, however, refused to apply anti-avoidance principles to base
companies whose parents were not resident taxpayers. Ruling as of Oct. 29,
1981, Bundesfinanzhof [BFH] [supreme tax court], 1982 Bundessteuerblatt, Tell
II [BStBl.lI] 150 (F.R.G.).
175. 1995 OECDModel Treaty, supra note 1. art. 1,para. 23.
176. The United States signed the Vienna Convention, but never ratified it.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered Into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The United
States strongly objected to the rigid terms of its provisions.
See Maria
Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before U.S. Courts, 28
VA. J. INT'L L. 281, 330 (1988).
177. Klaus Vogel, Double Taxation Treaties and Their Interpretation, 4 INT'L
TAX& Bus. LAw. 1, 70 (1986).
178. Id.
179. The United States is one of the major advocates of this theory. Stanley
I. Katz, United States National Reporter. In DOUBLE TAxATION CONVENTIONS, supra
note 77. at 615, 649.
180. Id.
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be sufficiently flexible to adapt the statutory text to relevant
developments and changes, not only in respect to teleological
interpretation but even further.1 8 1 Contrary to the approach in
which a state surrenders its sovereignty with respect to the
treaty's provisions once it becomes a signatory, the contractual
approach provides for a "retention of independence and autonomy
18 2
of interpretation and enforcement."
Although few countries apply their domestic anti-avoidance
rules to situations within the scope of a treaty, when it occurs, it
leads to a conflict between national tax law and treaty law. 183 In
dealing with the excessive tax planning associated with tax
treaties, a conflict arises: whether and to what extent domestic
anti-abuse rules or principles should prevail over the legal
wording of the treaty. In contrast to domestic legislation, tax
treaties involve the consent of a second party that may not agree
to the unilateral interpretation of a certain treaty provision.
To avoid this conflict with domestic law, the OECD model
treaty suggests that tax treaties include a provision similar to

Article 3(2),

which contains

a

general rule

for

domestic

interpretation of terms that are used in a treaty but are not
therein defined. That article states: "As regards the application
of the Convention by a Contracting State any term not defimed
therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the
meaning which it has under the law of that State concerning the
taxes to which the Convention applies." Article 3(2), however,
only applies to the interpretation of a treaty term if the term itself
is used in the convention and is ambiguous. 18 4 If the treaty itself
identifies the persons entitled to treaty benefits by providing that
all residents of the contracting states, including legal entities, are
entitled to treaty benefits, then treaty benefits to a legal entity
cannot be denied solely on the basis that its owners are not
residents. 18 5 Article 3(2) intends interpretation by domestic law
to be a means of ultima ratio,'86 and to be construed narrowly
without allowing the use of general principles and legal concepts.
This, however, is not the view of all states. In particular, the
United States' 8 7 and Canada understand Article 3(2) to refer to

181.
Id.
182. Id.
183.
TREATY SHOPPING. supra note 45, at 8.
184. Klaus Vogel & Rainer G. Prokisch, GeneralReport, in DOUBLE TAXATION
CONVENTIONS, supra note 77, at 55, 78.
185.
TREATY SHOPPING, supra note 45, at 8.
186.
Ultima ratio means the last resort.

187.

An article similar to Articles 3(2) of the 1981 U.S. Model Treaty, supra

note 3, which in turn has almost the same wording as Art. 3(2) of the 1995 OECD
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domestic law of the contracting states in a general way, which
implies the use of legal concepts and tradition. 188
Another justification for applying domestic law in connection
with a tax treaty may be the implicit intent of the contracting
states to grant each other the right to interpret the treaty in
accordance with the economic substance of a transaction or
structure rather than in accordance with its form. 8 9 This
implicit intent can be presumed if both contracting states have
such principles or rules in their domestic laws because then they
can be expected to agree on the mutual application of the
corresponding principles to the treaty1 9 0 In other words, the
substance over form approach of domestic anti-abuse clauses
may be applied legitimately to situations within the scope of a
treaty if both contracting states consider the standard to be
applicable under domestic law. The deficiency of this solution,

however, is that it would be difficult to identify the common
threshold because of the various degrees of abuse concepts.
It is also argued that there exists a "general legal principle
recognized by civilized nations" under which an artificial,
inappropriate structure or transaction should be evaluated
according to its substance rather than its form. 1 9 1 This general
principle assumes a universal anti-avoidance standard that
allows the application of a common rationale developed in case
law' 9 2 or the even more cautious application of anti-avoidance
3
rules.19

Model Treaty, supra note 1,is included in all U.S. tax treaties, except for the ones
entered into with South Africa, 3 Tax Treaties (CCH)
8203, Sweden, 3 Tax
Treaties (CCH) 8801, and the Russian Federation, 3 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 8003.
The models state: "As regards the application of the Convention by a Contracting
State, any term not defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires.
or the competent authorities agree to a common meaning pursuant to the
provisions of Art. 25 (Mutual Agreement Procedure) have the meaning which it
has under the laws of that state concerning the taxes to which the Convention
applies." 1981 U.S. Treaty, supra note 3.
188. Vogel, supra note 184, at 78.
189. Id.
190. Bernd Fahrholz, Schranken der Steuergestaltung bet grenztiber.
schreltenden Flnanztransaktonen: Abkommensrecht und InnerstaatllchesRecht, In
JOHANN

W.

GADDUM ET AL.. ZINSEN IM INTERNATIONALEN STEUERRECHT

51, 53 (1985):

Jrg M. M6ssner, Selbstdndgkett JurIstischerPersonen und Kapttalgesellschaften
In internationalenSteuerrecht, 32 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT [RI.W.]
208, 211 (1986).
191. Klaus Vogel, Steuerumgehung nach Innerstaatllchem Recht und nach
Abkommenrecht, 62 STEUER UND WIRTSCHAFT 369, 378 (1985).
192. VOGEL, supranote 124, at 56.
193. Id. at 56.
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Some countries have express anti-avoidance clauses that are
19 4
generally applicable to their tax system as a whole.
Transactions undertaken for tax purposes, if they are based on
artificial or unusual constructions that would not have been used
apart from tax considerations, cannot qualify for beneficial
treatment under domestic law. 1 9 5 These general abuse provisions
void any tax benefit obtained in a transaction contrary to the
basic principles of tax law or disallow advantages received by
transactions that contravene the principal understanding of the
law.196
The efficiency of general anti-avoidance provisions largely
depends on how they are interpreted by the courts. In some
states, the courts only rely on the literal wording of the law and
19 7
unless
therefore construe the anti-avoidance rules narrowly,
specific legislation clarifies the meaning. Different approaches
have been developed either by taking into account the principle of
substance over form' 9 8 or the notion of abuse of law (abus de
drolt,fraus legis).19 9 The prerequisites for proving the existence of
abuse vary among the nations, including the frequency with
which a transaction is considered to be abusive. Over the years,
most states have shifted from a very narrow interpretation of the
tax laws to 0a broader and more frequently applied anti-abuse
20
legislation.

194.
Procedure

For example, Austria: Bundesabgabenordnung § 22 ; France: Livre de
Fiscale,

art.

L

64;

Germany:

Abgabenordnung

Netherlands: Algemene Wet Rijksbelastingen, art. 21;
Tributaria, art. 24(2). See VOGEL, supra note 124, at 53.

195.

VOGEL, supra note 124, at 52.

196.

E.g., Germany's AO § 42.

[AO]

§

42:

the

Spain: Ley General

It provides that "the tax law may be

bypassed through the misuse of structural possibilities provided by the law." For
a detailed discussion of anti-avoidance measures, see LANGER, supra note 89, at

54-1.
197. In the United Kingdom, a judge is strictly bound by the literal wording
of the statute especially in regard to tax law. See Cape Brandy Syndicate v.
Comm'r of Inland Revenue, 12 T.C. 358, 366 (1920). Until very recently, the
British courts, following the House of Lords decision in ICC v. Duke of Westminster, 19 T.C. 490, 510 (U.K. 1905), insisted on strict, formal interpretations of tax

laws.
Those principles developed primarily in U.S. case law. See, e.g..
198.
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
This principle has been adopted by civil law countries, including
199.
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Austria. VOGEL, supra note
124, at 53.
200. Similarly, Article 31 of the Netherlands tax code has rarely been
applied since the general principle of fraus legis (abuse of law) prevailed.
Recently, however, the provision has become more important. Hoge RAAD, 20
953 BNB 1982/243, 20 954 BNB 1982/244, 20 991 1982/245.
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A unilateral treaty-override is most likely to occur when
domestic provisions are explicitly directed against treaty shopping
because the courts will have to apply domestic law rather than
treaty law. Many OECD member states 20 I consider it legitimate
for domestic legislation to override international treaties and for
such legislation to be binding on the courts.

20 2

Domestic

legislation, however, only overrides treaties if it is enacted after
the conclusion of the treaties and if there is an express legislative
intent to override the statute. 20 3 Only Switzerland, 2 04 the United
States, 20 5 and, very recently, Germany2 6 include anti-abuse

201.
For example, in the practice of the United States, Germany, and Italy,
lex posterior (later-in-time rule) prevails over treaties, although the constitutions
of Germany and Italy are silent on what happens to a lex posterior rule. Eric
Stein, International Law: Toward Internationalizationof Central-EasternEuropean
Constitutions, 88 Am. J. INT'L L. 427, 431 (1994). In France, however, the treaty
always prevails and a later-in-time statute cannot override a treaty. Karl Josef
Partsch, International Law and Munlcipal Law, In 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 238, 248 (Rolf Dolzen et al. eds., 1988).
202. VOGEL, supra note 124, at 55.
203.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 9 115(1)(a) (1987).
204.
In 1962, Switzerland inserted a provision in Its domestic law that
denies treaty benefits to corporate residents in which (a) nonresidents have a
"substantial interest;" and (b) the corporation's debt to nonresidents Is
higher
than six times its equity capital surplus reserves, or (c) the interest paid on
borrowings from nonresidents is higher than the average interest rate on debt
obligations issued by the Swiss Confederation, plus two percentage points, or (d)
more than 50% of treaty benefited income (dividends, Interest, and royalties)
derived by the corporation from the other country is used by the corporation to
satisfy claims of nonresidents to interest, royalties, development expenses, or
depreciation on any kind of business assets, or (e) expenses connected with such

income are not met exclusively from that income, or () the corporation falls to
distribute at least 25% of the relevant income. Bundesratsbeschluss betreffend
Massnahmen gegen die ungerechtfertigte Inanspruchnahme von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen des Bundes as of Dec. 14, 1992, Sammlung der
Eidgen6ssischen
Gesetze [AS]
1962 (abuse ordinance) (amended by
Kreisschreiben der Eidgen6ssischen Steuerverwaltung as of Dec. 31,1962).
205. The United States confined the anti-treaty-shopping measures in its
domestic law to specific applications, most notably the U.S. branch profits tax.
Section 884(e) of the Internal Revenue Code denies treaty benefits to a foreign
corporation seeking a reduced rate of, or exemption from, the branch profits tax
unless the taxpayer is a "qualified resident" of the treaty country. I.R.C. § 884(e)
(1988). See also I.R.C. § 883(c) (1988) (anti-treaty-shopping measures applicable
to foreign corporations engaged In shipping and air transport).
206.
Missbrauchs-bekaempfungs-und
Steuerbereinigungsgesetz
[AntiAbuse and Technical Corrections Act], Bundesratsdrucksache 788/93m,
amended by Drucksache 12/6 123 (F.R.G.).
The new legislation adds to
Einkommensteuergetz [EStG] [internal revenue code] § 50(d)(1)(a) (F.R.G.), which
denies treaty benefits to the
extent that persons have interests in the foreign company who would not
be entitled to tax relief if such persons received the income directly. and
there do not exist any business or other adequate reason for the
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provisions specifically aimed at treaty shopping in their domestic
tax laws.
The decision to employ specific limitation-on-benefits
provisions, general anti-treaty-shopping clauses, or general antiabuse rules in domestic law to combat treaty shopping largely
depends on a country's understanding of the fulfillment of
The implementation of an explicit,
international obligations.
complex limitation-on-benefits provision in domestic law may
create unilateral treaty overrides, an undesirable result with
regard to international obligations under a treaty. Such statutes,
however, even though constituting an override, do not raise
because the
particular problems with respect to interpretation
20 7
clear.
relatively
made
is
statutes
scope of the
General anti-abuse provisions, in contrast, raise the question
whether the domestic law can be interpreted and applied to

circumstances arising under a treaty. The likelihood that courts
may be reluctant to look beyond the literal wording of the treaty
affects the efficiency of general abuse provisions in the case of
treaty shopping. Therefore, it may be doubted that these general

provisions will have any influence regarding the restriction of
treaty shopping.
To avoid both conflicts with international obligations in the
case of specific anti-treaty-shopping statutes in domestic law and
legal uncertainty combined with possible weakness of general
abuse rules, it is best to implement such provisions into the
treaties. Consequently, there will be no violation of the principle
of pacta sunt servanda because the avoidance provisions are then
a result of the parties' negotiations.

interposition of the foreign company and the foreign company does not
conduct its own business activity.
The German domestic anti-treaty-shopping provision Is discussed in some detail
Infra Part IV.B.3.

207.

Katz, supra note 179, at 620.
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IV. A COMPARATIVE VIEW: THE CONCERN ABOUT TREATY ABUSE AND
ITS PREVENTION

A. The United States

1. Historical Background
After World War II, Europe and Japan lay in ruins. As they
attempted to recover from the destruction brought by the war, the
United States overwhelmingly dominated the world economy. 2 08
In the first three postwar decades, the United States became the
largest first lender of capital and accounted for a weighty share of
20 9
world income, trade, and capital flows.

Foreign direct investment in the United States was relatively
insignificant compared to U.S. direct investment abroad. 2 10
Therefore, during this period, U.S. tax policy focused on its
outbound investment rather than on inbound, foreign, direct
investment. 2 1 1
Its international tax policy emphasized
international competitiveness and the aim of achieving
nondiscriminatory tax treatment of U.S. and foreign-based
multinationals abroad, a policy known as capital import
2 12
neutrality.
In the 1960s, becoming aware that its capacity as a capital
exporting country was not unlimited and that foreign resources
were needed to finance domestic investment, several legislative
proposals were initiated to attract foreign capital. 2 13 The United
States also sought to discourage U.S. investment abroad, fearing
that its trade balance surplus would adversely affect its balance of
payments and reduce U.S. employment. 2 14 As a consequence, in
1964, the Interest Equalization Tax Act 2 15 restricted portfolio

208. In 1959, U.S. companies dominated 11 of the 13 major industries and
thus made up a significant share of the world gross product. ROBERT A. RAGLAND,
U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FORA GLOBAL ECONOMY E-2 (1991).
209. Of the world's 20 largest industrial corporations, the number of U.S.
headquartered corporations in 1960 was 18, as compared to only 9 in 1988. Id.
210. From 1955 to 1959, U.S. direct investment abroad constituted $75.5
billion. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD BANK 1990 (1990).
211. The 1954 Foreign Investment Incentive Act encouraged private
investment abroad for the purpose of promoting U.S. industry and reducing

government expenditures for foreign economic assistance. RAGLAND, supra note
208, at E-2.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Interest Equalization Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 88-563. 78 Stat. 809 (1964).
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investment by U.S. persons in long-term debt obligations of
foreign issuers.
In 1966, the Foreign Investors Tax Act 2 16 made portfolio
investment in U.S. markets attractive for foreigners by exempting
portfolio gains from tax.
To further encourage domestic
investment, the goal of U.S. tax policy became the achievement of
uniform tax treatment of the domestic and foreign operations 2 of
17
U.S. persons-a shift to a policy of capital export neutrality.

The shift to capital export neutrality was most prevalent in the
enactment of the controlled foreign corporation provisions in

1962.218 These provisions had the effect of imposing current U.S.
tax on certain classes of income earned by U.S.-owned foreign
subsidiaries.
The Foreign Investors Tax Act made the United States a sort
of tax haven for foreign portfolio investment. In so doing, it had a
siphoning effect on worldwide capital flows.
This incentive
provided for an opportunity to invest in a secure economic and
political environment based on a strong and stable currency
without having to pay any tax on gains thus derived, especially
with respect to Latin American capital resources. 21 9 It also
created new tax planning incentives
for portfolio investment and
220
opportunities for direct investment.
In the 1970s, a reversal of the U.S. international investment
position took place and the role of the U.S. economy changed
dramatically. By the 1980s, the United States became the world's
largest debtor, with both a colossal trade deficit and a skyrocketing rise in its importation of capital.2 2 The U.S. Congress
faced the potential revenue losses associated with the growing
ability of foreign-owned businesses to reduce their tax liabilities
either by taking advantage of existing domestic
tax law or by
22 2
making use of established treaty networks.

216:
217.
218.

Foreign Investors TaxAct, Pub. L. No. 89-809 (1966).
RAGLAND, supra note 208, at E-3.
I.R.C. § 951 et seq. (1988); Pub. L. 87-834, 76 Stat. 1006 (1962).

219. Many Latin American states do not tax their residents on foreign
Income. See generally CHARLES W. MCLURE, U.S. TAX LAWS AND CAPITAL FLIGHT
FROM LATIN AMERICA (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.

2687, 1988).
220. Richard J. Safranek & M. Celeste Pickron, Reaping the Profits, INT'L FIN.
L. REv., Nov. 1992 (special supp.). at 67.
221. Peter R. MeriU & Robert J. Patrick, U.S. International Tax Policyfor a
Global Economy. TAX NOTES INT'L, Jan. 20, 1992, at 137.
222. Id.
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2. Anti-Treaty-Shopping Measures in the U.S. Model Treaties and
in Treaty Practice

a. The Development of Anti-Avoidance Provisions in U.S. Tax
Treaties
Because U.S. treaty policy in the post-WWII years heavily
favored residence rather than source based taxation, the United

States sought primarily to reduce taxation at the source.

In

consideration of the economic situation of the first three post-war
decades, the reduction or elimination of source tax granted on a
2 23
reciprocal basis was most advantageous to the United States.
Therefore, the negotiators focused mainly on the reduction of
source based taxation in their treaties. By promoting U.S. tax
policies on a country-by-country basis, negotiators were not
concerned about the impact of having substantially different
provisions with other treaty partners. 22 4 For a long time, the
United States accepted, or at least did not heavily oppose, the
growing ability of third-country users to obtain treaty benefits. 2 25
The first limitation-on-benefits provision, which dates back to
the 1945 treaty between the United States and the United
Kingdom, 2 26 had a rather limited function and ability to prevent
treaty abuse. It denied a reduced tax rate for intercompany
dividends when the "relationship . . . of the corporations ha[d]
been arranged or ... maintained primarily with the intention of
securing such reduced rate."22 7 Since there was little guidance
for an interpretation and since the provision, lacking any
objective determinants, focused on the state of mind of the person
who had "arranged and maintained" the corporate structure, the
provision merely gave the courts a basis for decision in these
cases.

228

223.
224.

Id. at 137, 142.
If each treaty had accorded treaty partners more or less the same

benefits in the United States, it would have given rise to fewer issues Insofar as
investors from treaty countries were concerned.
225.
K. Kooiman, Art. 16: The U.S. Attitude to Treaty Shopping, 1983 BIFD
195. 196.
226. Id.
227.
U.S.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty, signed Apr. 16, 1945, art. VI, 3 Tax
Treaties (CCH) 89,100, at 89,107.
228. The "arranged and maintained test" was used in some other treaties
concluded in the 1950s. See, e.g., U.S.-Austria Income Tax Treaty, signed Oct.
25, 1956, art. VI, 1 Tax Treaties (WGL) 16.100, at 16,106; U.S.-Ireland Income
Tax Treaty, signed Sept. 13, 1949, art. VI, 2 Tax Treaties (WGL)
51,100, at
51,107: U.S.-Switzerland Income Tax Treaty, signed May 24. 1951, art. VI, 3 Tax
Treaties (WGL) 82. 100, at 82.107.
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The first specific anti-avoidance provision was inserted in the
1962 U.S.-Luxembourg treaty and it excluded Luxembourg
holding companies nonreciprocally from the scope of the
convention due to Luxembourg's favorable domestic-holdingA similar, but fundamentally different,
company laws. 2 2 9
provision was inserted in the 1963 protocol with the Netherlands
with respect to the Netherlands Antilles. 23 0 Unlike a tax-favored
Luxembourg entity, a tax-favored Antilles entity could avoid the
limitation on benefits by declining the special advantages offered
by the Antilles domestic law.2 1
2 32
In the 1970s, starting with the 1970 Finland treaty,
similar provisions excluded investment or holding companies from
Those provisions proved to be more
obtaining any relief.23
efficient in preventing the specifically identified abuse situation;
however, they were not directed against global treaty shopping
structures because these features had not yet grown to such
proportions that broad-based remedies were necessary.
b. The U.S. Model Conventions and Their Influence on Treaty
Policy
In 1977, the first U.S. model treaty was released. 23 4 Article
16 of the 1977 U.S. Model Treaty imposed an ownership test, but

only on dividends, interest, and royalties.

It denied treaty

benefits if (1) twenty-five percent or more of the treaty-protected
entity was owned by nonresidents of the treaty partner, and (2)
the treaty partner's tax on such payments was substantially less
23 5
than the treaty partner's tax on general business profits.
The shift to the 1981 model anti-treaty-shopping provisions is
substantial. The 1981 model treaty 23 6 includes a fairly detailed

229.
U.S.-Luxembourg Treaty. 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 5601.
230.
1963 Protocol with the Netherlands, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 6239.
231.
Rosenbloom, supra note 7, at 783.
232.
1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 2845.
233. U.S.-Iceland Income Tax Treaty, signed May 7, 1975, art. 27, 2 Tax
Treaties (WGL) 46,100, at 46,127; U.S.-Egypt Income Tax Treaty, signed Aug.
24, 1980, art. 24, 1 Tax Treaties (WGL) 34,100, at 34,124; U.S.-Morocco Income
64,100, at
Tax Treaty, signed Aug. 1, 1977, art. 24, 2 Tax Treaties (WGL)
64,124; U.S.-Korea Income Tax Treaty, signed June 4, 1976, art. 17, 2 Tax
Treaties (WGL) 57,100, at 57,117; U.S.-Norway Income Tax Treaty, signed Dec.
3, 1971, art. 20, 3 Tax Treaties (WGL) 69,030, at 69,050.
234.
1977 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 9.
235. Id.
236.
1981 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 3, art. 16. The U.S. Treasury
Department has been working on a revised U.S. model, but to date has not
released the results of its endeavors.
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provision designed to curtail treaty shopping. It contains a
limitation-on-benefits provision that is applicable to all treaty
benefits and includes a stock ownership test in connection with a
base-erosion test, publicly traded
test, business purpose test, and
2 7
a tax-favored income clause. 3
The ownership or look-through test incorporated in the U.S.
model requires a specified portion of shares to be held by
residents of one of the contracting states in order for a company
to qualify for treaty benefits. 238 Under this test, a corporation
qualifies as a resident if at least seventy-five percent of its shares
are held by residents of the contracting state. 2 3 9 The ownership
requirement varies in the actual treaty practices of the United
States because negotiators recognize the unusually high
threshold of a seventy-five percent ownership in the model. Most
recent U.S. treaties include a fifty percent test. 2 40 Since the
proportion of shares should reflect the true ownership, however,
the test has to take into account the ownership of nonvoting and
preference shares. Otherwise, arrangements might be made to
allot all voting shares to residents, while providing that a large

portion of the profits be distributed to nonresident, nonvoting
shareholders. As an example, the United States most recent
treaty with Mexico declares:
A person that is a resident of a Contracting State and derives
income from the other Contracting State shall be entitled .. . to
relief from taxation ...
only if...
more than 50 percent of the
beneficial interest in such person (or in case of a company, more
than 50 percent of the number of shares of each class of the
company's shares) is owned, directly or indirectly, by persons
entitled to the benefits of this Convention ... "241

While the recent U.S. practice has been to broaden the class
of qualifying shareholders to include residents of either treaty
country, the existing U.S. model treaty adopts the narrower rule
that a company resident in a contracting state must be owned by
individuals resident in that state in order to claim treaty benefits.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Under Article 16 of the 1981 U.S. Model, the ownership test is satisfied
if "more than 75% of the interest in such person is owned, directly or indirectly,
by one or more individual residents of the first-mentioned Contracting state." Id.
art. 16(0).
240. See, e.g., U.S.-Germany Income Tax Treaty. signed Aug. 29, 1989, art.
28(1)(e)(aa), 2 Tax Treaties (WGL)
39,030, at 39,058 (The ownership test Is
satisfied if "more than 50% of the beneficial interest in which (or in the case of a
company, more than 50% of the number of shares of each class of whose shares)

is owned, directly or indirectly, by persons entitled

to benefits of this

Convention.").
241. U.S.-Mexico Income Tax Treaty, signed Sept. 18, 1992, art. 17(1)(f)(i), 2
Tax Treaties (WGL) 62,100, at 62,118.
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The recent change in anti-abuse provisions indicates that the new
phrasing is solely aimed at third country residents attempting to
obtain treaty benefits. For this purpose, shareholders who are
residents of either country do not appear to engage in the type of
abuse at which 2the
provision is aimed-ownership by third
42
country residents.
The U.S. model also includes the base-erosion test, which is
now one of the main U.S. anti-treaty-shopping provisions. The
base-erosion test is almost always employed in connection with
the look-through test. 24 3 The 1981 U.S. Model, however, lacks
specificity in identifying the threshold of income being eroded
from the base.2 44 It denies treaty relief under Article 16(l)(b)
when a "substantial amount" of income is being eroded, but does
not define that term.2 4 5 Only with reference to recent treaty
practice can "substantial amount" be interpreted to mean more
than fifty percent. 24 6 The base-erosion test evolved in recent U.S.
treaties, becoming more complex and elaborate. For example, in
the U.S.-Mexico treaty, an entity is only entitled to treaty relief if
it satisfies both of the following conditions: (1) the ownership
test, and, (2) that "less than 50 percent of the gross income of
such person is used directly or indirectly, to meet liabilities
(including liabilities for interest or royalties) to persons not
entitled to the benefits of this Convention . ".."247
The U.S. model does not explicitly mention the exclusion
approach, but it has occasionally been incorporated into U.S.
treaties. The most recent example is the U.S.-Netherlands treaty,
which completely excludes conduit companies, most likely

242.
Joint Committee on Taxation explanation of the proposed U.S.-Czech
Republic income tax treaty, Oct. 26, 1993. reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties (WGL)

30,132.
243. The U.S. treaties with Australia, 1 Tax Treaties (WGL) 15,000, Italy, 2
Tax Treaties (WGL) 53,000 and New Zealand, 3 Tax Treaties (WGL) 67,000, do
not contain the base-erosion test.
244.
1981 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 3.
245. Id.
246.
The following treaties refer to "more than 50% of income being eroded
from the base": U.S.-Belgium Income Tax Treaty, signed July 9. 1970. 1 Tax
Treaties (WGL) 1 20,500; U.S.-China Income Tax Treaty, signed Apr. 30, 1984, 3
Tax Treaties (WGL)
72,000; U.S.-Finland Income Tax Treaty, signed Sept. 21,
1989, 2 Tax Treaties (WGL) 37,000; U.S.-France Income Tax Treaty, signed Aug.
31, 1994, 1 Tax Treaties (WGL) 38.000; and U.S.-Germany Income Tax Treaty,
signed Aug. 29, 1989. 2 Tax Treaties (WGL) 39,000.
U.S.-Mexico Income Tax Treaty, signed Sept. 18, 1992, art. 17(l)(f)(ii),
247.
2 Tax Treaties (WGL) 62.000, at 62,118.
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established for tax avoidance purposes, from the scope of the
248
treaty.
Under the 1981 U.S. Model, the stock exchange or publicly
traded test entitles a company to a presumption that it Is owned
by individual residents of a contracting state if the company has
substantial trading on a recognized stock exchange of either
contracting state.2 4 9 While the OECD commentaries and the U.N.
Ad Hoc Group of Experts view the stock exchange test as a
blanket exception to all other provisions, the 1981 U.S. Model
considers the publicly traded test to be an exception to the
ownership test, while the base-erosion test is stil applicable. 25 0
Most post-1981 U.S. treaties, however, contain no baseerosion test for publicly traded companies and thus function as a
complete safe harbor. 2 5 1 For example, the U.S.-Mexico treaty
grants treaty benefits to persons resident in one contracting state
who derive benefits from the other contracting state if the person

248. A person is entitled to treaty benefits "1if1 the company is not a conduit
company." U.S.-Netherlands Income Tax Treaty, signed Dec. 18, 1992, art.
26(1)(c)(ifi)(c), 3 Tax Treaties (WGL) 66,030, at 66,056. However, there is one
exception:
[A] conduit may qualify for benefits if it is publicly traded and the base
reduction payments do not exceed 70% of the total income to [E.C.]
members and 30% to others. Under Article 26(1), a person is eligible for
treaty benefits when a conduit... satisfies the requirements [that]... at
least 30% of the aggregate vote and value of all of its shares is owned,
directly or indirectly, by five or fewer companies resident in the
Netherlands, the principal classes of the shares of which [are listed on a
recognized stock exchange located in either country, and] at least 70% of
the aggregate vote and value of all of its shares is owned, directly or
indirectly, by five or fewer companies that are residents of the United

States or of member states of the European Communities, the principle

classes of shares of which are substantially and regularly traded on one or
more recognized stock exchanges [and] .
conduit base reduction test....

.

. such company satisfies the

Id. art. 26(1)(C)(iv), (1(C)(ii)(A), (1)(C)(ii(B).
249. VOGEL ET AL., supra note 8, at 61 (Commentary on Art. 16).
250. See 1995 OECD Model Treaty, supra note 1; U.N. MODEL CONVENTION,
supra note 2; 1981 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 3.
251.
Two treaties require that a publicly traded company still satisfy the
base-erosion test of Article 16(1)(b). U.S.-Cyprus Income Tax Treaty, signed Mar.
19, 1984, art. 26, 1 Tax Treaties (WGL) 1 29,126; U.S.-Jamaica Income Tax
Treaty, signed May 21, 1980, art. 17, 2 Tax Treaties (WGL) 55,117. The other
post-1981 treaties function as a complete safe harbor, without additional
requirement, under the limitation-on-benefits article. E.g., U.S.-Australia Income
Tax Treaty, signed Aug. 6, 1982, art 16(1)(a), 1 Tax Treaties (WGL) 15,046; U.S.Barbados Income Tax Treaty, signed Dec. 31, 1984, art. 22(1)(a), 1 Tax Treaties
(WGL) 1 20,122 (entered Into force Feb. 28, 1986); U.S.-Italy Income Tax Treaty,
signed Apr. 17, 1984, Protocol Art. 2(1)(a), 2 Tax Treaties (WGL) 53,060; U.S.New Zealand Income Tax Treaty, signed July 23, 1982, art. 16(11(a), 3 Tax
Treaties (WGL) 1 67,046.
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is either "a company in whose principal class of shares there is
substantial and regular trading on a recognized securities
exchange located in either of the states" or "a company which is
wholly owned, directly or indirectly, by a resident of that
contracting state in whose principle class of shares there is such
substantial and regular trading on a recognized securities
In the U.S.exchange located in either of the states."25 2
Netherlands treaty, however, the presumption of a publicly traded
company, being less likely to be formed for purposes of tax treaty
abuse, was not deemed to be valid in the case of indirect
ownership. 2 53 As a result, 2a54 conduit base reduction test was
included in the Dutch treaty.
Even though the idea behind an activity requirement is clear,
the reason why the active trade and business test is not
contained in the 1981 U.S. Model might be that the situations to
which this test may be applied remain uncertain-leaving the
flexibility to distinguish bona fide residents to the tax
authorities. 2 5 5 Although a vague rule, this provision has been
25 7
2 56
and in recent U.S. treaties
included in U.S. domestic law

without providing any advance definition of what constitutes an
active trade or business. However, the application of the active
trade and business test to Dutch intermediate holding companies
using the Netherlands as a base for international financial
services was too uncertain. 25 8 Therefore, it was crucial for the
Netherlands during the negotiation of its treaty with the United
States to provide an advance distinction between base companies
engaged in banking or licensing activities and pure flow-through
entities, which, in extreme cases, were created for a single

252. U.S.-Mexico Income Tax Treaty, signed Sept. 18, 1992, 2 Tax Treaties
(WGL) 1 62,100.
253. U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, signed Dec. 18, 1992, Art. 26(5)(d), 3 Tax
Treaties (WGL) 9 66,030.
254. Id. "[T]he conduit base reduction test means ... payments... made

to an associated enterprise... that are subject to an aggregate rate of tax ...in
the hands of the recipient that is less than 50 percent of the rate that would be
applicable had the payment been received in the State of residence of the payor."
Id.
255. 1981 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 3.
256. I.R.C. § 884(e)(4)(D) (1988).
257. The test, for example, is included in the U.S. treaty with Mexico, which
requires the person claiming treaty benefits to be engaged in the active conduct of
a trade or business and the income to be derived in connection with, or be
incidental to, this trade or business. U.S.-Mexico Income Tax Treaty, signed Sept.
18, 1992, 2 Tax Treaties (WGL) 5 62,000.
258. Mary C. Bennett, The U.S.-Netherlands Tax Treaty Negotiations: A U.S.
Perspective, 45 BIFD 3,5 (1991).
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transaction. 25 9
Considering the special situation of the
Netherlands as an attractive country for headquarter companies,
the quantum of activity meeting the active trade or business test
had to be determined ex-ante rather than ex-post. Therefore,2 60a
headquarter test was included in the U.S.-Netherlands treaty.
This test provides that benefits can be obtained by a company
that performs a substantial portion of the supervisory and
administrative functions for a multinational corporate group
doing business in at least five countries. 2 6 1 The headquarter test
is important for Dutch holding companies because it provides
them a safe harbor rule. The test
was adopted exclusively in the
262
U.S. treaty with the Netherlands.
The U.S. model2 63 and most recent U.S. treaties contain
provisions that the OECD commentaries would approve as bona
2 4
fide provisions, such as the motive test and derivative clauses. 8
26
5
The motive test
is found in the 1981 U.S. Model 26 6 as well as in
recent U.S. treaties. For example, in the U.S.-Mexico treaty an
entity not otherwise entitled to treaty benefits may nonetheless
demonstrate its entitlement to such benefits. 2 67 While the motive
test gives broad discretion to the tax administration, it generally

gives entities that otherwise would not qualify for treaty benefits
the opportunity to do so. In the United States, the taxpayer may
obtain an ex-ante determination under the motive
test in a private
2 68
letter ruling from the Internal Revenue Service.

259.
U.S.-Netherlands Treaty. signed Dec. 18. 1992. 3 Tax Treaties (WGL) V
6,030.
260. Id.
261. For the United States, the determination of business activity would
probably be governed by Treas. Reg. §§ 1.884, 1.367(a)-2T(b)3, which require that
"the officers and employees of the corporation carry out substantial managerial
and operational activities." For the Netherlands, this issue has already been
decided in connection with the participation exemption and for VAT purposes,
namely when "a holding company has a controlling and administrative function
with respect to the active companies in the corporate group."
262.
U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, signed Dec. 18, 1992. 3 Tax Treaties (WGL) 1
6,030.
263.
1981 U.S. Model Treaty. supra note 3.
264. 1995 OECD Model Treaty, supra note 1. See, e.g., the treaties with
Mexico, 2 Tax Treaties (WGL) 62,000; Germany, 2 Tax Treaties (WGL) 39,000;
and the Netherlands, 2 Tax Treaties (WGL) 1 66,000.
265.
See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
266.
1981 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 3, art. 16(2).
267.
U.S.-Mexico Income Tax Treaty, signed Sept. 18, 1992, art. 17(2), 2
Tax Treaties (WGL) 1 62,000.
268. Advance determination Is not a requirement under this rule. A
taxpayer could, conceivably, rely on its purity of motive to give itself
comfort that it could persuade the competent authority to make a
favorable determination after the fact or, if it failed, persuade a court that
the competent authority abused its discretion. For a variety of reasons,
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Largely representing a counter-reaction to its intense effort to
eliminate, or at least restrain, treaty shopping, the United States
is the first country to make use of derivative clauses. 2 6 9 These
clauses establish that benefits pursuant to a tax treaty between
two countries can be obtained by entities owned by third-country
residents. 2 70
Such clauses materialized in the recent U.S.
treaties with the Netherlands and Mexico. 2 7 1
Under these
treaties, entities owned by a narrowly defined class of thirdcountry residents are able to qualify for treaty benefits. 27 2 In the
U.S.-Netherlands treaty for example, European Community (E.C.)
members, whose treaty rate is as low as that claimed under the
U.S.-Netherlands treaty can claim treaty benefits under the U.S.Netherlands treaty if they operate a Netherlands corporation in
order to invest in the United States. 2 73 The same principle is
applied in the U.S.-Mexico treaty with respect
to North American
2 74
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries.
The appearance of derivative benefits in U.S. tax treaty policy
represents a principal achievement in the recognition of the
2 75
European Community and NAFTA as economic confederations.
however, at least where the United States is the source State, only the

boldest of taxpayers will rely on this provision without obtaining the
advance blessing of the IRS.
Mary C. Bennett et al., A Commentary to the United States-Netherlands Tax
Convention, 4-5 INTERTAX 165. 195 (1993).

269. The 1995 OECD Model does not contain any reference to multinational
economic groups. 1995 OECD Model Treaty, supra note 1.

270.

Id.

U.S.-Mexico Income Tax Treaty, signed Sept. 18, 1992, 2 Tax Treaties
(WGL) 62.000; U.S.-Netherlands Income Tax Treaty, signed Dec. 18, 1992. 3
Tax Treaties (WGL) 66,030.
272. U.S.-Mexico Income Tax Treaty, signed Sept. 18, 1992, 2 Tax Treaties
(WGL) 62,000; U.S.-Netherlands Income Tax Treaty, signed Dec. 18, 1992, 3
Tax Treaties (WGL) 66,030.
273. U.S.-Netherlands Income Tax Treaty, art. 26(4)(a(i)-(Ul), 2 Tax Treaties
(CCH) 6103 ([M]ore than 30 percent of the aggregate vote and value of all its
shares ... is owned, directly or indirectly, by qualified persons resident in the
Netherlands; [and] more than 70 percent of all such shares Is owned, directly or
indirectly, by qualified persons and persons that are residents of member states
of the European Communities... .".
274. The "ownership" test is fulfilled if more than 30% of the beneficial
interest is owned, directly or indirectly, by a resident of a contracting state and
more than 60% is owned, directly or indirectly, by a NAFTA member state. U.S.Mexico Income Tax Treaty, signed Sept. 18, 1992, 2 Tax Treaties (WGL) 62,000.
In addition, in order to qualify for treaty benefits, the treaty-country entity must
satisfy the base-erosion test. Under the base-erosion test, less than 70% of the
gross income may be used to directly or indirectly meet liabilities to persons not
entitled to benefits under this treaty and less than 40% may be used to directly or
indirectly meet liabilities to NAFTA members. Id.
275. Goossen, supra note 167, at 36.
271.
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The integration and harmonization process in Europe was mainly
furthered by the Treaty of Rome, 2 76 which prohibits states from
discriminating against residents of other E.C. countries. 2 7 7
Articles 52 and 58 of the Treaty of Rome provide that any
company incorporated under the laws of any E.C. country has the
right to establish itself in any other E.C. country under the same
conditions as a domestic company. 2 78 Because a limitation-onbenefits provision in a bilateral treaty usually favors only the
residents of one E.C. country, such a provision could conflict with
the freedom of establishment under the Treaty of Rome and
discriminate against other E.C. members. It is obvious that E.C.
members have to comply with the nondiscrimination rule
regarding treaties with each other. Controversy arises, however,
over whether E.C. member states have the right to negotiate and
conclude treaties with non-E.C. states that could indirectly result
in discrimination against other E.C. members. This issue was
discussed in the European Parliament after the conclusion of the
1989 U.S.-German tax treaty and has been analyzed by
practitioners. 2 79 Even though there is no explicit rule with regard
to treaties with non-member states, Article 5 of the Treaty of
Rome urges E.C. members to take "all appropriate measures,
whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the
obligations arising out of this treaty ...

and abstain from any

measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives
"28 0
of this treaty.
On this basis, the Dutch, when negotiating the tax treaty
with the United States, insisted on the first derivative clause ever
imposed in a bilateral tax treaty related to the E.C.2 8 1 In this
regard, the Dutch were in a good bargaining position because
they made so many concessions on most other treaty shopping
provisions.
Even so, the derivative provisions in the U.S.Netherlands treaty do not go far enough for most Europeans. 28 2
The ownership requirements allow only a certain percentage of
participation by European states other than the Netherlands. 28 3

276. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, as amended by Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1,
7 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
277. Dirk van Unnik & Maarten Boudesteijn, The New U.S.-Dutch Tax Treaty
and the Treaty of Rome, 1993/2 EC TAX REV. 106. 108.
278. Treaty of Rome, supra note 276.
279. U.S.-German Income Tax Treaty, signed Aug. 29, 1989, 2 Tax Treaties
(WGL) T 39,000. Helmut Becker & Otmar Toemmes, Treaty Shopping and EC
Law, EUR. TAX'N, June 1991, at 173.
280. Treaty of Rome, supra note 276.
281. U.S.-Dutch Tax Treaty. 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) T 6103.
282. Id.
283. Goossen, supra note 167, at 36, 44-45.
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benefits

policy

manifested

in

the U.S.-

Netherlands treaty and the U.S.-Mexico treaty represents the
beginning of a significant development that could set a pattern for
future treaty negotiations. By recognizing economic and legal
realities, the derivative benefits policy constitutes a breakthrough
2 84
in the area of bilateral treaties.
The 1977 and 1981 U.S. model treaties and recent treaty
practice demonstrate the change in the U.S. treaty shopping
position over the past eighteen years. 28 5 Since the radical turning
point in the early 1980s, 28 6 there has been an increase in the

sophistication and complexity of United States treaty shopping

284.
For a critical analysis of the derivative benefits policy, see Rosenbloom,
supra note 164.
285. Though none of the post-1981 treaties is identical to the U.S. model,
some of them directly correspond to the U.S. model. For example, see U.S.Cyprus Income Tax Treaty, signed Mar. 19, 1984, 1 Tax Treaties (WGL) 29,126;
U.S.-Jamaica Income Tax Treaty, signed May 21, 1980, 2 Tax Treaties (WGL) 1
55,117. Most of the post-1981 treaties have slight alterations in the ownership
threshold or base-erosion test. For example, see China Protocol, 1 Tax Treaties
(CCH) 2136; U.S.-Finland Income Tax Treaty, signed Sept. 21, 1989, art. 16, 1
Tax Treaties (WGL) 37,020; U.S.-France Income Tax Treaty, signed Aug. 31,
1994, 2 Tax Treaties (WGL) 38,020; U.S.-India Income Tax Treaty, signed Sept.
12, 1989, art. 24, 2 Tax Treaties (WGL) 48,100; U.S.-Indonesia Income Tax
Treaty, signed July 11, 1988, art. 28, 2 Tax Treaties (WGL) 49,100, at 49,128;
Spain, supranote 213; U.S.-Tunisia Income Tax Treaty, signed June 17, 1985, 3
Tax Treaties (WGL) 85,550. The treaties, however, with Australia, signed Aug.
6, 1982, 1 Tax Treaties (WGL) T 15,030; Italy, signed April 17, 1984, 2 Tax
Treaties (WGL) 53,060; and New Zealand, signed July 23, 1982, 3 Tax Treaties
(WGL) 67,046, do not contain any base-erosion test, with the result that an
entity that satisfies the ownership test is entitled to treaty benefits. The U.S.Barbados Income Tax Treaty, signed Dec. 31, 1984, 1 Tax Treaties (WGL) 1
20,100, provides a disjunctive rather than a conjunctive ownership and baseerosion test. See also 1977 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 9; 1981 U.S. Model
Treaty, supra note 3.
Following the development in the 1981 model, all subsequent income
286.
tax treaties contain full-blown anti-treaty-shopping clauses similar to those in the
1981 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 3: U.S.-Australia Income Tax Treaty, signed,
15,030; U.S.-China Income Tax
Aug. 6, 1982, art. 16, 1 Tax Treaties (WGL)
Treaty, signed Apr. 30, 1994, Protocol art. 7(1), 3 Tax Treaties (WGL) 1 72,100;
U.S.-Cyprus Income Tax Treaty, signed Mar. 19, 1984, art. 26, 1 Tax Treaties
(WGL) 1 29,100, at 29,126; U.S.-Finland Income Tax Treaty, signed Sept. 21,
1989, art. 16, 1 Tax Treaties (WGL) 1 37,020, at 37,020-P; U.S-India Income Tax
Treaty, signed Sept. 12, 1989, art. 24, 2 Tax Treaties (WGL) 1 48,100, at 48,124;
U.S-Indonesia Income Tax Treaty, signed July 11, 1988, art. 28, 2 Tax Treaties
(WGL) 49,100, at 49,128; U.S.-Italy Income Tax Treaty, signed Apr. 17, 1984,
Protocol, art. 2, 2 Tax Treaties (WGL) 5 53,030, at 53,060; U.S.-Jamaica Income
Tax Treaty, signed May 21, 1980, art. 17, 2 Tax Treaties (WGL) 91 55,100, at
55,117; U.S.-New Zealand Income Tax Treaty, signed July 23, 1982, art. 16, 3
Tax Treaties (WGL) 9 67,030, at 67,046; U.S.-Spain Income Tax Treaty, signed
Feb. 22, 1990, art. 17, 3 Tax Treaties (WGL) 9 79,550, at 79,550.17.
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provisions, culminating in the U.S.-Netherlands treaty. 28 7 The
United States apparently realized that the economic importance of
treaty shopping had grown tremendously and that urgent
measures were needed.
3. Judicial Precedents
Long before treaty shopping was addressed on a large scale in
U.S. treaty practice, the judiciary dealt with cases involving treaty
shopping and developed precedents based on domestic abuse
principles. 28 8 An evolution had taken place that had to be

considered in light of changing investment positions, the growing
number of claims for tax relief based on a few tax treaties, and
the increasing sophistication of treaty shopping structures. Since
most treaties at the time lacked detailed anti-treaty shopping
provisions, 2 89 the courts applied general principles of domestic
tax law to interpret the meaning and purpose of the treaties.
In U.S. tax law, there are two distinct approaches that can be
applied to deny treaty benefits to conduit companies: (1) the
sham doctrine and (2) the conduit concept. A sham corporation Is
a mere shell, lacking business activity or business purpose. To
the extent that a corporation lacks business activity or purpose, it
will not be considered a separate taxable entity. The result is that
all profits and losses of the company are imputed to its
shareholders. 2 90 Conduit companies, in contrast, are respected
as distinct legal entities, functioning as agents with regard to a
particular transaction or groups of transactions. Thus, the tax
consequences do not have to be determined with respect to the
treaty-protected entity, but the final recipient of the income. In
both cases, it must be considered whether it would be appropriate

287. For example, the limitation-on-benefits article of the U.S.-Netherlands
Income Tax Treaty, signed Dec. 18, 1992, art. 26, 3 Tax Treaties (WGL) 1 66,030,
at 66,056, covers almost seven pages. Additionally, the Technical Explanation of
the Protocol amending the treaty contains 38 pages explaining Article 26,
compared to 66 pages explaining the rest of the treaty. This proportion shows
that the limitation-on-benefits article was extremely important to the U.S.
negotiators. It is estimated that the new limitation-on-benefits provision will be
simpler than that in the Dutch treaty, which was "somewhat difficult to use In

negotiations." See Report Bulletins, 1 Tax Treaties (WGL). Vol. 26, No. 5, at 5 (May
27, 1994). The new model will probably contain provisions similar to the German
and Mexican treaties, whereas the Netherlands treaty will stand alone and not
become a pattern for future standards.
Because the complexity and

sophistication of the limitation-on-benefits article has increased drastically, as a
result of the changing U.S. tax policy, the need for a revised U.S. model treaty has

also increased. See supra note 236.
288. 1987 Hearing, supra note 6, at 360.
289. See supra Part IVA. 1.
290. WESTiN, supra note 87, at 554.
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to give effect to the substance rather than the form of the
transaction. Therefore, because a sham company will not be
regarded as a separate entity for tax purposes, 2 9the
1
characterization has been narrowly construed by U.S. courts.
In early cases, when facing the problem of form versus
substance, U.S. courts were reluctant to overlook the corporate
form of an entity established for tax purposes if the entity had
been formed for a substantial business purpose. The test did not
depend on the personal objective of the taxpayers creating the
corporations, but on whether the corporations were "mere skele2 93
tons." 29 2 If the court found "significant flesh on the bones,"
the foreign corporation would be considered a separate legal
entity and therefore entitled to benefits under the applicable tax
treaty. A minimal quantum of corporate activities was considered
sufficient to qualify for recognition as a distinct entity. The
purpose or business activity
alternative requirements of business2 94
were restated in a long line of cases.
a.

Bass v. Commissioner

The first time the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S. or Service)
used the sham argument in an international tax case was in Bass
v. Commssioner.29 5 In Bass, a U.S. taxpayer had organized a
Swiss corporation in which he owned 97.96 percent of the stock.
He transferred working interests in certain oil and gas leases to
this corporation, which then exercised those rights by signing
work agreements, collecting royalties, and carrying out other
activities. 298 This Swiss company then filed a U.S. income tax

Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
291.
292. Gregory v. Helvering. 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Hay v. Commissioner, 2
T.C. 460 (1943); Commissioner v. Smith, 136 F. 2d 556 (2d Cir. 1943).
293. Bass v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 595 (1968).
294. See Nat'l Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 429 (1949);
Jackson v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 1, 12 (1955). affd. 233 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.
1956); Aldon Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 582. 597 (1959); Shaw
Construction Co. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1102, 1114 (1961), aff'd, 323 F.2d
316 (9th Cr. 1963); Nat Harrison Assocs. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 601, 618
(1964); Columbian Rope Co. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 800, 813 (1964); V.H.
Monette & Co. v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 15, 35 (1965). affd, 374 F.2d 116 (4th
Cir. 1967); Bass v. Commissioner, 50 T.C 595, 600 (1968); Ross Glove Co. v.

Commissioner, 60 T.C. 569, 588 (1973); Achiro v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 881,

901 (1981).
295.
296.

Bass, 50 T.C. 595 (1968).
Id.
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return claiming that it was not subject to federal income tax
297
pursuant to the U.S.-Swiss Income Tax Convention.
The Bass court had to decide whether to disregard the

existence of the Swiss entity because the sole purpose for
incorporation was to avoid U.S. taxes. In accordance with the
definition of a sham company and the principle of substance
versus form, the court did not focus on the taxpayer's intent to
minimize taxes, but rather on whether the corporation was
carrying out "substantive business functons"--whether the
corporation was in fact a "viable business entity .

.

. actually

engaged in substantive business activity."29 8 The administration
of the oil rights required at least some business activity, which
was distinct from the decision-making process carried out by the

sole shareholder. Applying the narrow definition of a sham entity,
the court found that the corporation was engaged in a substantive
business activity,2 99 and that the Swiss company's status as a

separate entity would be respected.3 0 0 Relying on prior cases, 30 '
the court held that a tax avoidance motive was insufficient to
cause an entity to be disregarded for tax purposes if some
30 2
business purpose or activity existed.
b. Johanssonv. United States
The sham test was also applied in Johansson v. United
States.3 0 3 In Johansson, a Swedish heavy-weight boxer, Ingemar
Johansson, created a Swiss company that received the income
from his boxing activities and paid him a salary as an
employee.3 0 4 When filing his U.S. tax return, Johansson claimed
an exemption from income tax assessed under the Internal
Revenue Code (I.R.C.) for the services performed in the United
States on the basis of the U.S.-Swiss Income Tax Convention.3 0 5

297.
U.S.-Swlss Income Tax Convention, signed May 24, 1951, 3 Tax
Treaties (WGL) 82,101.
298. Bass, 50 T.C. at 600. See also National Carbide Corp. v.
Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 433 (1949).
299. The court held that a taxpayer may adopt any desired form for the
conduct of the business and the mere fact that this form results in tax savings
does not require that the form be ignored for tax purposes. Bass, 50 T.C. at 600.
300. Id. at 602. It is important to note that the Issue really concerned
residence-based tax.
Perry Bass was a U.S. resident who used foreign
incorporation and a tax treaty to avoid residence-based tax. Id.
301. See, e.g., Siegel v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 566 (1966).
302. Bass. 50 T.C. at 600.
303.
336 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1964).
304. Id. at 813.
305. Id. at 812. See also U.S.-Swiss Income Tax Convention, signed May
24, 1951, 3 Tax Treaties (WGL) 82,101.

1996]

TREATY SHOPPING

253

Using the conduit theory, the I.R.S. argued that treaty
benefits could not be obtained by entities organized in a treaty
jurisdiction solely to obtain treaty benefits that otherwise would
not be available for the ultimate recipient of the treaty-protected
income.3 0 6 The court, however, applied the sham corporation
doctrine and found that the corporation lacked any legitimate

business purpose and that the primary motive for its creation was
3 07

tax avoidance.
What distinguishes Johansson from Bass is that the income
from Johansson's activities as a boxer constituted the only source
of income for the corporation. The Johansson corporation carried
on no separate activity apart from his personal activities. The
case was not decided on the fact that Johansson was motivated in
his actions by considering the desire to minimize his tax
burden, 30 8 but rather by considering the nature of the service
contract.3 0 9 Because the only activity of the corporation was
performed by Johansson himself and the corporation did not have
administrative functions, the court concluded that the entity
Invocation of the
completely lacked a business purpose.3 10
conduit principle-treating the corporation as merely an agent
that received Johansson's income on his behalf so as to escape
U.S. taxation-may also have led to the Service's success in
Johansson.
c. Aiken Industries
The Bass and Johansson cases show that, in the early years,
U.S. courts focused primarily on the substance of the entity
rather than the transaction. However, because treaty shopping
structures often involved back-to-back transactions, a new test
was needed that would focus on the beneficial owner of the
3 11
income rather than the activity of the treaty-protected entity.
Since the Service would have had no chance to succeed in most

306.

Johansson,336 F.2d at 813.

307. Id. at 814. See also Noonan v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 907 (1969).
308. See also Siegel v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 566 (1966).
309. A similar issue arose in Jones v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1066 (1975),
where an official court reporter reproduced and sold official transcripts of trials he
was responsible for in the course of his official duties. Since an official court
reporter is required by law to be an individual and not a corporation and the
corporation did not have any other activities, its income was attributed and made
taxable to the court reporter himself under I.R.C. §§ 61(a) & 482 (1988).
310. Johansson,336 F.2d at 814.
1987 Hearing.supra note 6, at 364.
311.
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treaty shopping cases on the basis of a sham argument, 3 12 it had
to find another legal principle upon which to rely. The conduit
argument provides the needed focus on the true recipient of the

income.
The court applied the conduit theory in the leading case of
Aiken Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner,3 1 3 which dealt with an
incorporation obviously aimed at the receipt of treaty benefits. A
wholly owned U.S. subsidiary borrowed money from its parent, a
Bahamian corporation and in recognition of the debt, the U.S.
subsidiary issued to its parent a four percent promissory note.3 14
No income tax treaty existed between the United States and the
Bahamas. At the time, however, an income tax convention was in
force between the United States and Honduras.3 1 5 The Bahamian
parent assigned the four percent promissory note obtained from
its U.S. subsidiary to its other wholly-owned subsidiary in
Honduras.3 16 As consideration, the Bahamian parent received
notes of the Honduran corporation, bearing the same rate of
interest and having exactly the same value.3 17
Thus, the
Honduran affiliate became the recipient of the interest payments
from the U.S. company. Pursuant to the tax treaty between the
United States and Honduras, the interest payable to the owner of
the note would have been exempt from any U.S. withholding
obligation.3 1 8 If the Bahamian parent had received the payments
from the U.S. affiliate, the U.S. affiliate would have been required
to withhold at source a thirty percent tax on the interest
3 19
payment.
Even though the actions were taken to minimize the overall
tax burden, the court held that a treaty benefit could not be
denied to parties otherwise entitled to it under the terms of the
treaty.3 20 The court interpreted the words "received by" to mean

312. However, use of the sham argument to combat treaty shopping
structures has not been abandoned. The Service relied again on this argument in
1983 when dealing with a case involving a tax haven. Hospital Corp. of America
v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 520 (1983). However, the Service was not successful
because the Cayman Islands subsidiary was not held to be a sham company and
was recognized as a separate legal entity for tax purposes. Id. at 586.
313. 56 T.C. 925 (1971).
314. Id. at 926.
315. Id. at 927.
316. Id. at 926.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 927. See also U.S.-Honduras Income Tax Treaty, 1 Tax Treaties

(CCH) 1 257.

319. I.R.C. §§ 871(a) and 1441 subject foreign individuals, and I.R.C. §
881(a) and 1442 (1988) subject foreign corporations who are engaged in trade or
business in the United States, to a withholding tax on specific items of income
(dividends, interest, rent, etc.). See also I.R.C. § 864(c) (1988).
320. Aiken Industries, 56 T.C. at 933.
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more than just the momentary, physical receipt of the obligation
to transmit the funds.3 2 1 Therefore, the court considered the
for
Honduran company to be an agent that received the payments
322
the Bahamian parent without having actual rights to them.
In the Aiken Industries case, the only argument the Service
had to attack this obvious treaty shopping structure was that the
Honduran company was merely a conduit with no actual
beneficial interest in the payments received. Since the treaty
explicitly accorded treaty benefits to entities incorporated under
Honduran law and the entity had a business activity, it was not
possible to deny benefits under a sham approach. In substance,
the U.S. company was paying the interest to the Bahamian
parent.
For the first time in treaty shopping cases, the court
respected the existence of a conduit company, but treated the
income received by such an entity as having been received by it as
an agent for the ultimate foreign investor.3 23 The United States
took a flexible approach toward treaty interpretation allowing for
examination of the context of the parties' intentions and general
objectives.3 24
Under international law, however, it is a
controversial question whether the outcome of Aiken Industries is
covered by the scope of the treaty.
4. Congressional Attitude
As opposed to the 1960s and the early 1970s, when it was
still possible to deal with treaty shopping on a case-by-case basis,
the late 1970s and 1980s witnessed a tremendous increase in
treaty shopping. Treaty shopping became a common tool for
international tax minimization due to the growing number of tax
treaties, the increasing worldwide economic interaction, the
technological advances in communications, the growing
international banking network, the large number of investors
seeking stable political and economic systems in which to invest
their capital, and the increasing availability of tax advice for
investors in the international community. 3 25 Only when treaty

321.
The court reasoned that "the words 'received by' refer not merely to the
obtaining of physical possession on a temporary basis of funds representing
interest payments from a corporation of a contracting State, but contemplate
complete dominion and control over the funds." Id.
322. Id. at 934.
1987 Hearings, supra note 6, at 364.
323.
324.
See Alken Industries.56 T.C. at 934.
325.
Kenneth A. Grady, Income Tax Treaty Shopping: An Overview of
PreventionTechniques, 5 J. INT'L Bus. 626, 627 (1983).
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shopping attained widespread economic impact did it become a
3 26
subject of congressional debate.
a.

Changing Attitude

The beginnings of the treaty shopping debate may be traced
back to congressional hearings held in April 1979.327 In light of
the common tax planning strategies involving the Netherlands
and the Netherlands Antilles, the U.S. Treasury Department
announced its intention to investigate certain aspects of the
treaty, noting that it had been subject to widespread abuse.3 2 8
Until then, the United States had taken a pragmatic approach,
convinced that it would be in its best interest to abstain from any
significant action.3 2 9 Previously, the United States had thought
that even tax haven treaties were of substantial economic and
financial benefit to the United States, outweighing the revenue
loss.3 3 0 This attitude was based on the U.S. goal to attract more
foreign capital. When the United States switched from a capital
exporting country to a major capital importing country, the net
disadvantage grew to such proportions that urgent remedies
became essential. 33 1 The hearings of 1979,332 1983, 3 3 and
1987,33 4 as well as the Gordon Report, 3 35 provided enough
material to suggest that treaty shopping was detrimental to the
fiscal and economic well-being of the United States and that the
United States should undertake effective measures to stop it.
b.

Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act

The first legislative attack on treaty shopping was Section
342 of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(TEFRA),3 3 6 which increased the reporting requirements for
foreign investors and therefore provided a basis for the I.R.S. to
identify third-country users of U.S. tax treaties, as well as

326.
Rosenbloom, supra note 7, at 763.
327.
Offshore Tax Havens, HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter
Havens Hearings].
328.
Treas. Dept. News Release, B-1694 (June 29, 1979).
329.
Kooiman, supra note 225, at 195-96.
330.
Havens Hearings, supra note 327 (testimony of H. David Rosenbloom).
331.
Kooiman, supra note 225, at 196.
332.
1979 Hearing. supra note 9.
333.
1983 Hearing, supra note 86.
334.
1987 Hearing, supra note 6.
335.
GORDON REPORT, supra note 57.
336.
Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (approved Sept. 3, 1982).
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domestic investors abusing U.S. tax treaties.3 3 7 Until then, the
U.S. withholding agent, in the case of dividends, could rely on
nothing more than the foreign address to identify the recipient as
a qualified recipient of a tax treaty benefit. Under the new
provisions, the person qualifying under the treaty must get a
certificate of residence from the local tax authority, which is then
submitted to the withholding agent.
c.

Tax Reform Act of 1986

The U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986338 has had a significant
impact on treaties and treaty shopping, resulting in an elaborate,
unilateral override of bilateral tax treaties that would otherwise
reduce or eliminate the branch profits tax and branch-level
339
interest tax imposed under Sections 884(a) and (f) of the I.R.C.
Under Section 884, foreign corporations engaged in business in
the United States are subject to a branch profits tax and a
branch-level interest tax in addition to the regular tax on income
effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business in

the United States (or, in the case of a foreign corporation entitled
to treaty benefits, a permanent establishment in the United
States).3 40 The objective of the branch tax is to burden a foreign
corporation's U.S. business profits with roughly the same taxes
whether the business is done through a domestic subsidiary or an
unincorporated branch in the United States.
Because the branch profits tax is a substitute for the tax on
dividends that would be imposed under Section 881(a) of the
I.R.C., 34 1 if the U.S. branch were a separately incorporated
domestic subsidiary, the statutory branch profits tax rate is the
same as the rate of withholding. The base for the branch profits
tax-the
"dividend
equivalent
amount"-is
designed
to
approximate the amount of a corporation's earnings available for
distribution as dividends.3 4 2 The branch-level interest tax in
Section 884(f) of the I.R.C. also is intended to provide a similar
parity for interest paid by a foreign corporation engaged in trade
or business in the United States either through a branch or
3 43
domestic subsidiary.

337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Grady, supra note 325, at 630.
Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (approved Oct. 22, 1986).
I.R.C. § 884(a)(f) (1988).
Id.
I.R.C. § 881(a) (1988).
BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 34, at 66-92. 1 66.5.2.
Treas. Reg. § 1.884-2T (as amended in 1992).
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The branch taxes can be reduced by an income tax treaty in
the same way as the thirty percent withholding tax on dividends
and interest payments from a domestic subsidiary.3 44
The
branch profits tax can also be barred by nondiscrimination
provisions of treaties.3 45 A nondiscrimination clause Is violated
when a U.S. corporation carrying on the same activities as a
34 6
foreign corporation is not subject to the same tax.
Without a statutory anti-treaty-shopping rule, an income tax
treaty conflicting with the branch profits tax would usually
prevail. Congress was concerned that foreign corporations would
seek to make use of treaties that bar or reduce the branch profits
tax in order to avoid the severe impact the tax created on foreign
3 47
corporations operating branches in the United States.
Therefore, Congress sought to ensure that the benefits provided
under those treaties would only be used by the intended
beneficiaries. Accordingly, the chances for a treaty shopping
corporation to obtain the benefits of an advantageous treaty are
limited by statute. Under Section 884(e) of the I.R.C.,3 48 a foreign

corporation has no right to claim any treaty benefits if it is not a

"qualified resident" of the treaty country.3 49
884(e)(4) of the I.R.C.,

as °

Under Section

a foreign corporation is a qualified

344. Treas. Reg. § 1.884-4T(b)(7).
345. I.R.S. Notice 87-56, 1987-35 C.B. 367, listed 28 tax treaties that
prohibited the imposition of the branch profits tax and 9 treaties that permitted it.
346. E.g., U.S.-U.K. Income Tax Treaty, signed Dec. 31, 1975, art. 24(2). 3
Tax Treaties (WGL)
89,030, at 89,054 ("The taxation on a permanent
establishment which an enterprise of a Contracting State has in the other
Contracting State shall not be less favourably levied in that other State than the
taxation levied on enterprises of that other State carrying on the same activities.").
Even though Congress believes that the branch profits tax does not unfairly
discriminate against foreign corporations because it treats foreign corporations
and their shareholders together no worse than U.S. corporations and their
shareholders, it is necessary to consider corporations and shareholders
separately to determine whether discrimination exists. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 99TH CONG., 2D SEss., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF

1986, at 1036-38 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter 1986 Bluebook].
347. See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 346. at 1036-38.
348. "No treaty between the United States and a foreign country shall
exempt any foreign corporation from the tax imposed by subsection (a) (or reduce
the amount thereof unless (A) such treaty Is an income tax treaty, and (B) such
foreign corporation is a qualified resident of such foreign country." I.R.C. §
884(e)(1) (1994).
349. Id.
350. I.R.C. § 884(e)(4) (1994) provides that:
For purposes of this subsection
(A)
IN GENERAL.
Except as otherwise provided in this
paragraph, the term "qualified resident" means, with respect to any foreign
country, any foreign corporation which is a resident of such foreign
country unless-
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resident of a treaty country if the corporation meets at least one of

three tests: (1) the ownership or base-erosion test, (2) the
35 1
publicly traded test, or (3) the active business test.
(i)
50 percent or more (by value) of the stock of such foreign
corporation is owned (within the meaning of section 883(c)(4)) by
individuals who are not residents of such foreign country and who
are not United States citizens or resident aliens, or
(it)
50 percent or more of its income is used (directly or
indirectly) to meet liabilities to persons who are not residents of such
foreign country or citizens or residents of the United States.
SPECIAL RULE FOR PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS.
(B)
A foreign corporation which is a resident of a foreign country shall be
treated as a qualified resident of such foreign country if(I)
the stock of such corporation is primarily and regularly
traded on an established securities market in such foreign country,
or
(ii)
such corporation is wholly owned (either directly or
indirectly) by another foreign corporation which is organized in such
foreign country and the stock of which is so traded.
TRADED
OWNED
BY
PUBLICLY
(C)
CORPORATIONS
DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS. A foreign corporation which is a resident of
a foreign country shall be treated as a qualified resident of such foreign
country if(i)
such corporation is wholly owned (directly or indirectly) by a
domestic corporation, and
(it)
the stock of such domestic corporation is primarily and
regularly traded on an established securities market in the United
States.
(D)
SECRETARIAL AUTHORITY. The Secretary may, in [the
secretary's] sole discretion, treat a foreign corporation as being a qualified
resident of a foreign country if such corporation establishes to the
satisfaction of the Secretary that such corporation meets such
requirements as the Secretary may establish to ensure that individuals
who are not residents of such foreign country do not use the treaty
between such foreign country and the United States in a manner
inconsistent with the purposes of this subsection.
351. The ownership or base-erosion test is met if (1) more than 50% of the
corporation's stock is held by individuals who are either residents of the treaty
country, or citizens or residents of the United States and (2) less than 50% of the
corporation's income is used directly or indirectly to meet liabilities to persons
who are not residents of the treaty country or the United States. Under the public
ownership test, a foreign corporation that is a resident of a treaty country is a
qualified resident if the corporation's stock is primarily and regularly traded on a
recognized securities market in the treaty country or in the United States. A
corporation is considered to be a qualified resident if it meets the active business

test, which requires that the corporation (1) be actively engaged in business in a
treaty country, (2) have a substantial presence there, and (3) the income derived
from activities within the United States be a part of the corporation's active
business. See id.
Similar to § 884(e), the 1986 Act also made changes in the shipping and
aircraft area with regard to the reciprocal exemption provisions of § 883 of the
I.R.C. Under prior law, no U.S. income tax was levied on foreign ships and
aircraft if the country of their registration granted an equivalent exemption to U.S.
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The scope of the qualified resident definition considers both
U.S. and treaty-country residents in determining the beneficial
owner. Because the United States had experienced a flood of
third-country investors claiming treaty benefits under treaties to
which they were not a party, these provisions are directed solely
against third-country residents to prevent them from taking
352
advantage of treaties.
Fearing that, during the slow process of renegotiating tax
treaties, the United States tax base would be eroded, Congress

clearly intended to override conflicting provisions in U.S.
treaties. 35 3
The qualified residence provision therefore takes
precedence over all existing U.S. tax treaties since most older tax
treaties do not contain such a sophisticated and complex antitreaty-shopping provision. The enactment of Section 884(e) of the
I.R.C. considerably tightens the availability of treaty protection
from the branch profits tax in many instances and therefore may
abrogate treaty obligations under international law.
From the U.S. perspective, a unilateral treaty override,
Section 884(e) of the I.R.C., does not constitute a violation of
international law.
Under Article VI, Clause 2 of the U.S.
Constitution, domestic law and U.S. treaties have equal status as
the "supreme law of the land." Since both a statute and a treaty
are in parity, the law later-in-time prevails in the case of
conflicting provisions. The Restatement Third of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States provides that "if the purpose of
[an] act to supersede [an] earlier [treaty] ...
provision is clear or
[the two] cannot be fairly reconciled" the domestic act will
prevail. 3 5 4 A strong congressional intent to override an existing
treaty with a later-in-time domestic statute, however, is required
under U.S. law. 35 5 To comply with this requirement, Sections
884(a) and 7852(d)(1) of the I.R.C. were amended in 1988356 to
codify the equal status of statute and treaty for purposes of tax

residents or domestic corporations. The new provision in the 1986 Act still
retains the reciprocal exemption, but it makes it dependent on the taxpayer's
residency under a similar approach as in § 884(e).
352. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
353.
1986 Bluebook, supra note 346, at 1038.

354.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§

115(1)(a) (1987).
355. Id.
356. Section 7852(d)(1) codifies the co-equal status and later-in-time rule
by providing that "[for] purposes of determining the relationship between a
provision of a treaty and any law of the United States affecting revenue, neither
the treaty nor the law shall have a preferential status by reason of its being a
treaty or law." I.R.C. § 7852(d)(1) (1988).
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law and to explicitly express the intent to permit treaty
3 57
override.
The parts of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 dealing with treaty

shopping, which probably had the most massive impact on U.S.
domestic and international tax law, and the termination of the
Netherlands Antilles treaty in 1987 demonstrated that the United
States had declared war on treaty shopping in the mid-1980s.
Until recently, anti-treaty-shopping measures continued to be
discussed in Congress 35 8 and will likely continue to be an issue in
the future. The United States has heavily influenced several
OECD members, including Germany, to share U.S. views in this
regard. None of these countries, however, has attained the fiscal
perfectionism of the United States in the field of anti-abuse
provisions in treaty practice and domestic law.
B. Germany
Although Germany has long-standing concerns about treaty
shopping, neither the depth of its concern nor the scope of its
3 59
reaction has been nearly as great as that of the United States.
While Germany has not systematized its tax treaty policy in a
model treaty, the problem of treaty shopping is not unknown to it.
Consequently, Germany has adopted several approaches in tax
treaties and domestic law to deal with the issue.

357.

The Foreign Income Tax Rationalization and Simplification Bill of 1992,

H.R. 5270, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.. proposed in the House, was intended to extend

the scope of § 884(e), which is confined to the branch profits tax, to all treaty
benefits. The bill specifically directed that its provisions should take precedence

over all existing and future U.S. double taxation agreements.

However, due to

substantial opposition, particularly on the international level, this further
domestic limitaton-on-benefits provision was dropped. Hearings on H.R. 5270,
The Foreign Income Tax Rationalizationand Simplfication Act of 1992 before the
Comm. on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 11 INTERTAx 637 (1992).
358. The attempt by Congress to tighten the 1986 anti-treaty-shopping
legislation and extend it to all benefits available under a treaty instead of branch
profit tax relief peaked in the 1992 Foreign Income Tax Rationalization and
Simplification Bill, H.R. 5270, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., which was not enacted into
law.
359. Helmut Becker, Reportfrom Germany. in TREATY SHOPPING. supra note
45, at 138.
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1. Anti-Treaty-Shopping Measures in Tax Treaties

Germany has adopted several concepts in its treaties to
prevent abuse. The abstinence approach is maintained with
respect to well-known tax havens (e.g., Liechtenstein, the Channel
Islands, Monaco, Netherlands Antilles, and Panama). Specific
treaty provisions, however, are limited to the fiscal situation with
each treaty partner. A rather rudimentary approach Is to exclude
from treaty benefits companies that by their nature are used as
vehicles for tax avoidance. For example, Luxembourg holding
companies were excluded from the application of the GermanLuxembourg treaty in 1958,360 one of the first measures against
the improper use of a tax treaty. Similarly, the German-Canadian
tax treaty of 1984361 excludes tax-favored
Canadian nonresident3 62
owned investment corporations.
The treaty with Switzerland 3 6 contains more detailed
provisions, including the subject-to-tax approach, the channel
approach, and a provision following the Swiss decree3 64 providing
that entities substantially owned by non-residents of Switzerland
cannot claim treaty benefits unless they are fully subject to
cantonal tax under the law of the canton in which they are
incorporated.3 65 These provisions, however, were more likely
designed to prevent Germans from avoiding residence taxation
than to prevent third-country users from avoiding source based
tax.
After almost ten years of hard negotiations for a new tax

treaty, the United States and Germany signed the convention in
1989.366 The result is one of Germany's most complex limitationon-benefit provisions, which is directly attributable to the strong
U.S. negotiating position.

The treaty frequently has been

criticized for creating uncertainty as a result of the broad
discretion it gives to tax authorities,3 67 causing compliance
difficulties that could affect German investors and, arguably,

360.
361.

1959 Bundesgesetzblatt, Tell II [BGBI.II] 1270 (F.R.G.).
1982 BGBI.II 801; 1983 BGBI.II 652.

362.
363.
364.

Income Tax Act. R.S.C., ch.1 § 133 (1985) (Can.).
1972 BGBl.II 1021; 1990 BGBI.II 1698.
See supra notes 106 and 183.

365.

Art. 23(2) of the Swiss-German Double Taxation Convention, 1972

BGBI.II at 1022, 197 BStBI.I 519, as amended by 1980 BGBI.II 750, 1980 BStB.II
399; BGBIII 766, BStBI.I 409.
366. 1991 BGBI.II 355.
367. Klaus Vogel & Rainer Proklsch, General Report, in DOUBLE TAXATION
CONVENTIONS, supra note 77, at 102; Relnhard Poellath, German National Report,
In DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS, supra note 45, at n.115.
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violating the anti-discrimination requirement against E.C.
3 68
members.
Though Germany's treaty practice has not generally shown
great concern about third-country treaty shoppers, its recent
treaties with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) are
The 1989 tax treaty with
evidence of increasing concern.
Kuwait3 69 and the 1995 treaty with the U.A.E. 370 both contain

unique anti-treaty-shopping provisions that are designed to
seriously curtail treaty shopping. According to Article 23 of each
treaty, relief may be obtained with regard to all items of income 3 7 1
only if at least seventy-five percent of the entity claiming German
tax benefits is owned by the state (Kuwait or the U.A.E.) or one of
its government institutions. In addition, the corporation has to
provide sufficient proof that the remaining share is owned 3by
72
individuals residing in the contracting state in question.
Benefits with regard to dividends, interest, and royalties can also
be invoked if a company gives substantial evidence that it is
controlled by individuals of the respective treaty partner and
proves that the German company was not established for the
principle purpose of obtaining treaty benefits to the advantage of
nonresident persons. It is interesting to note that this limitationon-benefits clause is a one-way provision applicable only to treaty
partners who seek German source tax relief; the provision does
not impose similar limitations on German corporations operating
This kind of anti-treaty-shopping
in Kuwait or the U.A.E.
provision is wholly dependent on the specific circumstances of the
treaty party and may suggest a new pattern of tax interaction
between Germany and Persian Gulf States.
2. Interpretation of Tax Treaties
In the absence of specific treaty provisions, preventing treaty
shopping is highly controversial. It is generally acknowledged
that a bilateral tax convention cannot be interpreted against its

368.
369.
370.

Poellath, supra note 367, at 344.
1989 BGB1.II 354; 1989 BGBI.II 637.
The treaty with the United Arab Emirates was signed in July 1995, but

has not yet entered into force.
371. For example, residents of the United Arab Emirates may invoke treaty
benefits with regard to business profits, income from shipping and air transport,
dividends, interest, royalties, capital gains, independent personal services,
dependent personal services, and other income not specifically specified. Id.
372. Abkommen zur Vermeidung der Doppelbesteuerung [Agreement for
the Avoidance of Double Taxationi, F.R.G.-Kuwait, 11 VERHANDLUNGEN DES
DEUTSCHEN BUNDESTAGES 50 (1988) (F.R.G.) (Bundestagsdrucksach 11/2553 at

30).
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explicit wording, even if the result would be unsatisfactory or
contrary to the prevailing administrative practice.3 73 If a treaty
explicitly defines the persons entitled to treaty benefits, and if
those provisions apply to all residents of the contracting states
including the legal entities formed under the laws of those states,
then it will be difficult to ignore the express terms of the treaty on
the ground that the shareholders are nonresidents.3 74 Judicial
precedents appear to adopt the view that when results are
achieved through long-term negotiations and finally laid down in
a binding agreement, they must be respected in their full scope
and cannot be disregarded, either by unilateral actions within the
national tax law or by a one-sided interpretation of a contracting

party.

3 75

Even when the meaning of terms may seem unambiguous,
the wording of a provision regularly requires some kind of
interpretation.
Generally, interpretation is confined to the
"natural view"3 7 6 or the "common usage"3 7 7 of the terms. 37 8 If the
wording allows different interpretations,
a court may consider the
"objective and purpose" of the treaty.3 7 9 In this context, it is not
the "one-sided subjective conception" that is decisive but the
"common perception" reached during the negotiations.3 80 The
focus, however, is on the meaning of the words, not on the
purpose of the treaty. The German Tax Court requires a stricter
application of the wording in tax treaty matters than in domestic
law. 3 8 ' Therefore, unless the agreement contains an explicit antiabuse provision, it is almost impossible to deny treaty benefits on
the basis of treaty interpretation, despite the fact that strict
application of the terms often produces results that were not
382
intended by the parties.

373.
Germany follows the OECD view, which expressly states: "Existing
conventions may have clauses with safeguards against the improper use of their
provisions. Where no such provisions exist, treaty benefits will have to be granted
under the principle pacta sunt servanda even if considered improper." 1987
OECD Report, supra note 42, at 101.
374.
TREATY SHOPPING. supra note 45, at 8.
375.
Poellath. supra note 367, at 332. In past cases, the courts followed the
exact wording of the treaty not only with respect to the principle of state
sovereignty but also to the protection of the taxpayer. See Judgment of Feb. 5,
1965. BFH, 1965 BStBII.I, 258, 259 (Germany-Switzerland); Judgment of Sept.
13, 1972, BFH, 1973 BStBl.II 57, 59 (Germany-Netherlands).
376.
Judgment of June 18, 1969, BFH, 1969 BStBl.II 579. 581.
377.
Judgment of Sept. 13, 1972, BFH, 1973 BStBI.II 57, 58.
378.
Poellath, supra note 367, at 333.
379. Id. at 334.
380. Id. at 334-35.
381.
Judgment of Jan. 27, 1988, BFH 1988 BStBI.II 574.
382.
Becker, supra note 17, at 196.
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3. Application of Domestic Anti-Avoidance Regulations
When it appears that an abusive result may occur, a
domestic anti-abuse statute, which usually covers situations that
cannot be dealt with by mere interpretation, may offer a
mechanism for denying treaty benefits contrary to the parties'
intent.
a. Application of the General Avoidance Rule
Until recently, there was controversy over whether Section 42
Abgabenordnung (AO), the German general anti-abuse statute,
could be a legal basis for the denial of treaty benefits. Section 42
AO provides that "the tax law may not be by-passed through the
misuse of structural possibilities provided by the law."38 3 If an
abuse occurs, "the tax liability equals the amount that would
have been due in case a reasonable legal structure corresponding
with the economic necessities of the transaction would have been
3
chosen." 84
i. Application by the Courts
The Bundesfmanzhof (Federal Tax Court) ruled that Section
38 5
42 AO was generally applicable in the context of tax treaties.
However, abuse is deemed to occur only if the avoidance structure
directly affects internal German law, rather than the tax treaty
per se. 3 86

This means that in practice, the courts distinguish

between resident and nonresident taxpayers. The Federal Tax
Court has regularly considered foreign-based companies to be

abusive when no economic or other non-tax reason for their
establishment existed, or when a foreign-based company did not
Those rulings,
have any independent business activity.3 8 7
however, were based on facts relating to a resident taxpayer
"subject to unlimited taxation") 38 8 who, in order to take advantage
of a treaty, had set up a corporation in a low tax country, usually
Switzerland, to avoid the higher German residence-based tax.

383. AO § 42 (Steuergesetze, Textsammlung, C.H. Beck).
384. Id.
385. Judgment of Mar. 5, 1986, BFH, 1986 BStBl.II 496 (referring to
Judgments of May 21, 1971, BFH, 1971 BStBl.II 721 and July 17, 1968, BFH,
1968 BStBl.II 695).
386. Id.
387. Judgment of Jan. 29, 1975, BFH, 1975 BStBI.II 553; Judgment of Jan.
16, 1976, BFH, 1976 BStBI.II 401; Ruling of July 29, 1976, BFH, 1977 BStBI.II
263.
388. Ruling of Oct. 29, 1981, BFH, 1982 BStBI.II 150.
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The Federal Tax Court explicitly stated that the same reasoning
cannot implicitly be applied in cases involving third-country
residents (taxpayers "subject to limited taxation").3 8 9
The
formation of a foreign-based company in a treaty country by a
third-country resident as such, even if it derives income from
German sources,3 90 does not provide enough of a nexus with
German tax law to subject the foreign-based company to German
anti-abuse law. However, when the foreign-based corporation is
legally connected with a domestic company that Is controlled by a
third-country resident, there may be a sufficient nexus to apply
39 1
the domestic anti-abuse statute.
This approach is well reflected in the Monaco case,3 9 2 which
involved a typical treaty shopping situation.
In Monaco, a
resident of Monaco (which has no tax treaty with Germany)
organized a corporation under Swiss law to which he transferred
his participation in a German company. 3 93 As a result, the
dividend income of the German company was only subject to
fifteen percent taxation under Article 6(3) of the German-Swiss
treaty, rather than the regular German withholding tax rate of
twenty-five percent.3 94 Despite the fact that an economically
meaningless dummy corporation had been created to avoid the
otherwise applicable tax rate, the Federal Tax Court held that the
structure was not abusive because "the establishment of a
corporation in a foreign country by a foreigner is a procedure not
affecting the internal tax law and withdraws itself, as a matter of
principle from being considered as an abuse of forms and
concepts of the law."3 9 5 The court noted that the result is the
same when the corporation has some business activity and when
3 96
it is merely a letter-box company.

In the Quintet rulings, 397 the Federal Tax Court dealt with the
application of Section 42 AO to cases in which taxpayers sought
to rely on a treaty. These cases arose under the law applicable

389.
390.
391.

Id.
See Monaco, Infra text accompanying notes 392-96.
See Niederlaendtsche-BruederFall. Infra text accompanying notes 404-

07.
392. Ruling of Oct. 29, 1981. BFH, 1982 BStBI.II 150.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Detlev J. Piltz, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen und Steuerumgehung
unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung des Treaty Shopping, DER BETRIEB 1987,
Beflage 14, at 3 (citing Ruling of Sept. 13, 1972, 13.9 BFH, 1972-G.R. 130/70,
1973 BStBI.II 57; Ruling of Feb. 19, 1975, 19.2, BFH, 1975-GR 26/73. 1975
B~tBl.II 584; Ruling of Feb. 9, 1982, 9.2, Finanzgericht K61n, 1982-VI 452/77
KE).
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before 1977.398 The tax treaties in effect at that time contained
"suspension clauses," which denied treaty relief for foreign
corporations that owned more than twenty-five percent of a
German entity.3 9 9 To avoid the resulting tax disadvantage, the
foreign parent corporation split up its holdings in the German
company and created several new foreign corporations, giving
each less than twenty-five percent ownership of the German
company.40 0 While the tax authorities argued that the parent
foreign corporation actually owned one hundred percent of the
German company and thus was not eligible for treaty benefits, the

Federal Tax Court interpreted the wording "owned by" to mean
only direct participation, and not two-tier or three-tier
structures. 4 0 ' Although it was obvious that the intermediary
entities were established for the purpose of taking advantage of
the treaty and that Section 42 AO was generally applicable to tax
treaty situations, the court did not see any abuse under Section
42 AO. 40 2 Thus, foreigners were free to structure their businesses
in any way they considered appropriate from a tax point of view.
Even the predominant intent of achieving tax benefits was not
regarded as sufficient to constitute an abuse under Section 42

AO.403

40 4

In the third major decision, Niederlaendische-Brueder-Fall,
two Dutch partners of a German general partnership (Offene
Handelsgesellschaft or OHG) owned a Swiss corporation, which40in5
turn held a silent participation in the German partnership.
Under the Swiss-German tax convention, income from a silent

Id.
398.
399.
See, e.g., Denmark 1963 Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil II [BGBI.II] 1311;
France 1961 BGBI. 398; 1961 BStBI.II 343, as amended, BGBL.II at 770, 1990
BStBI.ll 413.
400.
See supra note 397.
401.
Id. The court interpreted the meaning according to German private
law because the treaty gave no indication about the extent of the term. According
to similar cases under German law, indirect holdings are not viewed as sufficient
to be covered by the term "gehoeren" (owned by). Therefore, it was irrelevant
whether the foreign recipient of the income was considered a "fiscal unit" or a
"controlling parent of a group" under its national law. All that counted was the
direct participation of the nonresident company itself. Id.
1975 BStBl. 11584. 586 (with reference to 1974 BStBl.II 645, 646 and
402.

1975 BStBI.II 553, 554).

403.

KRAFT, supra note 112, at 64.

404.

Judgment of Nov. 10, 1983, BFH, 1984 BStBI.II 605 (BFH Nov. 10,

1983).
405.

Id.
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partnership was not subject to German tax.40 6 Had the two
Dutch residents directly participated in OHG as silent partners,
the income therefrom would have been subject to German
withholding tax. The court held that this triangular structure
involving Switzerland, Germany, and the Netherlands constituted
40 7
an abuse under Section 42 AO.
Even though this ruling seems contradictory to the rulings of
Quintet and Monaco, the facts of this case can be distinguished.
The avoidance scheme was structured not merely to make
improper use of a tax treaty but to take advantage of German
domestic law as a whole. 40 8 The silent partners improperly used
domestic law by pretending that their silent participation was a
typical one, meaning a purely passive investment. In reality, they

were involved in management functions, which under German
law would lead to an atypical silent participation. The Dutch
partners simply wanted to profit from the preferential tax
treatment granted to truly silent partners by interposing an
entity. Clearly, a person cannot be both a co-owner of a business,
charged with all kinds of business activities, and a passive
investor, completely excluded from any business decisions in the
same company. Because the Dutch partners tried to circumvent
the passive partner prerequisite by creating a separate entity, the
case arguably involved "corporation shopping" rather than treaty
40 9
shopping.
While the courts held Section 42 AO to be generally
applicable in the context of tax treaties, the interpretation of the
term "abusive" was confined to situations that directly affect
internal German tax law. 410 Thus, the fact that a non-German
established a corporation in a foreign country with the sole
purpose of obtaining treaty benefits was held to be nonabusive. It

406. Id. See also Swiss-German Tax Convention, 1972 BGBI.II 1022, 1972
BStBl.I 519, as amended by 1980 BGBI.II 750, 1980 BStBI.I 399; BGBI.Il 766,
BSBI.1 409.
407. NiederlaendLsche-Brueder-Fal,1984 BSt.BI.lI 605.
408. German law recognizes silent participation as a form of hybrid
shareholder financing. The silent partner contributes a certain sum to a business
entity in exchange for sharing in the profits or losses. German commercial law
recognizes two types of such arrangements, "typical" and "atypical" participation.
The typical form requires pure passive investment, whereas in the atypical form
the silent participant has a status similar to that of a co-owner in entrepreneurial
activities. Under commercial law, the co-owner is then subject to full business
risk and, for income tax purposes, is treated as a partner. Thus, once a silent

partner participates in business decisions, preferential tax treatment is lost. FG

Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony), Nov. 8, 1990, VI 174/89, 28 R.I.W. 79 (1992),
See R. Prokisch & M. Rodi, GermanFinanceTribunal Finds Foreign"Atypical"Silent
ParticipantLiablefor German Tax, 4 TAx NOTES INT'L 418 (1992).
409.
Becker, supra note 17, at 193.
410. Niederlaendlsche-Brueder-Fall,1984 BStBL.II 605.
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is questionable whether this legalistic distinction is logically
comprehensible. 4 1 1 Abuse should be determined with regard to
the corporation's structure and the individual's motive-it should
not merely be a matter of the taxpayer's residence.
ii. Attitude of Tax Scholars
Many scholars believe that treaty law and domestic law are
two entirely separable areas of law and, therefore, that domestic
law cannot be used to deny benefits to anyone governed by a
treaty, regardless of taxpayer residence status. For purposes of
treaty shopping by third-country residents, the controversy
between the courts and tax scholars is largely theoretical,
differing more in approach than result. Moessner, for example,
to be
considers the application of the general anti-avoidance rule
4 12
inappropriate in cormection with income tax conventions.
Vogel contends that Section 42 AO is not a proper legal basis
for denying treaty benefits in cases involving treaty-protected
entities. 4 13 He asserts that denial can only be justified by the
general international anti-avoidance concept. 4 14 Vogel argues
that an unwritten, independent rule on abuse exists, which is
derived from corresponding national abuse conceptions. 4 15 The
fact that both contracting states have incorporated a general
abuse provision into their national laws implies that they would
have wanted to extend their application to income tax treaties.
According to Vogel's view, however, this general unwritten anti-

is only applicable in striking, intolerable abuse
abuse concept
4 16

situations.
Plltz, in contrast, rejects the idea that international law
provides an unwritten or implied anti-abuse rule and maintains
that governmental action to the detriment of the taxpayer requires
explicit legislative regulation. 4 17 Piltz deems it adequate to apply
Section 42 AO in situations within the scope of the treaty.4 18 He
realizes, however, that provisions of a treaty containing more
specific regulations in a certain situation will overrule the general

411.
Franz Wassermeyer, Die ML1brauchsvorschrften des deutschen
Gesetzgebers auf dem Geblet des Internattonalen Steuerrechts. 4 STEUER UND
WIRTSCHAFT INT'L 143 (1995).

412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.

M6ssner, supra note 190, at 213.
Vogel, supra note 184. at 378.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Piltz, supra note 398, at 6.
Id.
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4 19
statute, with the effect that Section 42 AO is not applicable.

The majority of other German experts agree with Piltz's analysis of
the applicability of Section 42 AO to the denial of treaty
benefits.

4 20

b.
Recent Anti-Treaty-Shopping Legislation:
EStG

Section 50(d)(a)

The enactment of the new German anti-treaty-shopping
statute may have stilled the controversy between tax scholars and
the courts. On December 10, 1993, the German Bundestag
421
passed the Anti-Abuse and Technical Correction Act (StMBG),
which became effective in January 1994.422 The new legislation
applies to all benefits otherwise available under an income tax
convention, 4 2 and also applies to the reduced dividend
withholding rate that is applicable to distributions made by
German subsidiaries of qualified E.C. parent companies. 42 4 The
StMBG denies treaty relief to foreign companies to the
extent that persons have interests in the foreign company who
would not be entitled to tax relief if such persons received the
income directly, and there do not exist any economic or other
adequate reason for the interposition of the foreign company and
the foreign company does not conduct its own business activity. 4 25

This provision, however, is rather vague and will lead to a number
of interpretative problems. The phrase "to the extent" does not

419. Id.
420. Helmut Debatin. Rechtsmlssbrauch tar internationalen Steuerrecht Em
Llchte deutscher Rechtsprechung, 1979 DER BETRIEB 211, 232; HANS FLIcK ET AL.,
DOPPELBESTEUERUNGSABKOMMEN DEUTSCHLAND-SCHWEIZ: STEUERN VOM EINKOMMEN
UND VERMOGEN NAcHLAss- UND ERBSCHAFTSTEUERN, 20 1981/1988; BERNHARD
GROSSFELD, BASISGESELLSCHAFTEN IM INTERNATIONALEN STEUERREcHT 99, 192 (1974);

Volker Kluge, Bastsgeselschaften und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, 21 RIW
525, 525 (1975).
421. Mlssbrauchsbekaempfungs- und Steuerbereinlgungsgesetz (StMBGBundesratsdrucksache 788/93m, as amended by Drucksache 12/6123. The
preamble to the draft of the StMBG (Bundestagsdrucksache 12/5630. Sept. 7,
1993) explains that the goal of the legislation is "the elimination of unjustified tax
advantages and undesirable structures for tax purposes."
422. Richard D. Minor, Germany, 8 TAX NOTES INT'L 76 (1993); Richard D.
Minor, Tax Legislation, 7 TAX NOTES INT'L 1539, 1540 (1993) (giving an overview of

the new German anti-abuse and technical corrections act, StMBG, supra note
421).
423. The new legislation adds to § 50(d)l(a). EStG § 50(d) includes special
rules for German withholding taxes in connection with reduced income treaty
rates.

424. EStG § 44(d) (providing a general reduction of the dividend withholding
tax to 5% with respect to distributions by a German subsidiary of a qualified E.U.
parent).
425. EStG § 50(d)(1)(a).
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specify any participation percentage that would trigger the antiavoidance rule, or whether treaty benefits should simply be
denied only with regard to the participation of nonqualifying
persons. 4 26 Similarly, the term "economic or other adequate

reason" is undefined in the tax code. A more serious problem is
that the wording of Section 50(d)(1)(a) EStG, "interests in a foreign
company," could be interpreted to cover only direct participation,
making it possible to circumvent the law by establishing a two42 7
tier structure in the treaty country.
Although the statute contains a number of uncertainties, it
provides a basis for combating current treaty abuses because it
explicitly covers treaty shopping by third-country residents.
Moreover, German courts will not be able to refuse to implement
the law on the ground that this domestic provision is not
applicable with regard to third-country residents. However, the
question of whether the application of the new statute is
compatible with treaty obligations will remain a controversial
issue among scholars. In the courts, the issue was resolved in a
recent Federal Tax Court ruling, 4 28 that legitimated a possible

treaty override arising from the application of Section 50(d) EStG.
Although not formally binding, this decision will likely be followed
by the courts. Yet, only the future will show the extent to which
the new legislation can clarify the controversial understanding of
The
the abusive character of treaty shopping structures.
judiciary definitely has a new basis for the interpretation of abuse
structures. The new provision as lex specialis will at least put an
end to the discussion about Section 42 AO.
Although the recent anti-treaty-shopping rule indicates a new
awareness of the problems of treaty shopping, German concerns
still lag far behind those in the United States. The new statute
emerged out of a concern that the general avoidance provision

was not enough to combat current treaty abuses. 429 Still, its
general language and vague terms indicate a certain ambiguity
toward the necessity of harsh anti-avoidance measures. It also
may embody a certain fear that overly complex and strict rules
may discourage investment. It seems that Germany prefers to
deal with treaty shopping on a case-by-case basis rather than on

426.

Minor, Tax Legislation. supra note 422, at 1540.

427. For example, a Japanese company (J) could qualify for a reduced
withholding tax under the Dutch-German tax treaty if that company (J) owned all
the stock of a Netherlands company (N), which in turn owned all the stock of
another Netherlands company (N2), which in turn held interests in a German
company (G). Wassermeyer, supra note 411.
428. Judgment of July 13, 1994, BFH, 1995 BGB1.II 130 (F.R.G.).
429. Id.
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the basis of objective but complex rules such as those involved in
the definition of a "qualified resident" in Section 884(e) of the U.S.
4 30
Code.
C. The United Kingdom
1. Anti-Treaty-Shopping Provisions in Tax Treaties
The United Kingdom does not use general anti-avoidance
provisions in its domestic tax law, nor does it include any
comprehensive anti-treaty-shopping provisions in any of Its
treaties. 43 1 Instead, U.K. domestic law contains anti-abuse
clauses that are aimed at some particular perceived abuses. For
example, the United Kingdom has negotiated treaty provisions
dealing with the refund of the imputation tax credit on
dividends, 43 2 or with fmancing and holding companies in certain
countries. 4 33 The United Kingdom is one of few countries
granting a tax credit refund under its imputation system to
foreign corporate shareholders with substantial interest in U.K.
companies. 4 34 This tax credit is granted in eleven separate
treaties. 43 5 A number of countries, including the Netherlands,
Switzerland, and Luxembourg, are often home to corporations
that seek to exploit these treaties. For a time, the common
practice was to set up a Netherlands Antilles company that wholly
owned a Netherlands company, that in turn held shares in a U.K.
company. 4 36 Because at one time there was no withholding tax
on dividends paid by a Netherlands company to an Antilles
company, and a Netherlands corporation qualified for a tax credit

430. I.R.C. § 884(e).
431. Leonard Beighton, the Deputy Chairman of the United Kingdom Inland
Revenue, indicated that the United Kingdom will fight treaty shopping, but is not
in favor of general anti-treaty-shopping clauses. He stated that the United
Kingdom prefers narrowly targeted responses to perceived problems. Jonathan
Schwarz, Survey of World Taxation, FIN. TIMES, May 20, 1994, available on LEXIS,
News Library, Fortune File. See also John Avery Jones, Anti-Treaty Shopping
Articles-A United Kingdom View, 8-9 INTERTAX 331 (1989).
432. Jones, supra note 431, at 331.
433. Id.
434. Eric Tomsett, Treaty Shopping and Debt/Equity Ratios in the United
Kingdom, 44 BIFD 107 (1990).
435.
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and, in a limited fashion, the United States. For
example, the United States-United Kingdom Income Tax Treaty, signed Dec. 31,
1975, 3 Tax Treaties (WGL) 89,030, grants such an imputation credit refund to
a U.S. corporate shareholder with an interest of 10% or more in a U.K. company.
436. Tomsett, supra note 434, at 108.
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refund under the U.K.-Netherlands treaty,43 7 the foreign
investor's refund could be channeled through the Antilles at
almost no tax cost.
As a consequence, the United Kingdom quickly inserted an
anti-abuse clause into the U.K. -Netherlands treaty that
completely denies a tax credit refund to holding companies
involved in this specific structure. 43 8
The anti-avoidance
provisions of other U.K. treaties, however, do not follow the
scheme of the U.K. -Netherlands treaty. Instead, they take a
qualitative approach, denying the tax credit refund to the foreign
corporate shareholder only if the structure is chosen to take
advantage of the tax credit. 43 9 Thus, the taxpayer corporation
bears the burden of proving that it has not structured itself for an

impernissible purpose. 440
The absence of any general, consistent treaty language
indicates that the United Kingdom is largely unconcerned about
being a potential target for treaty shopping corporations. This
has to do with the fact that the United Kingdom, as a net capital
exporting country, is primarily interested in unrestricted
investment flow.
2. Application of Domestic Precedents in the Treaty Context
The U.K. tax authorities have never issued rulings similar to
those of the U.S. Internal Revenue Service.
The U.K. Inland
Revenue, however, has indicated that it regards the Ramsay
case 4 4 1 as a precedent for further international proceedings, even
though Ramsay occurred within the domestic context.
In
Ramsay, the court held that artificial avoidance structures can be
ignored for tax purposes when they involve a series of
transactions that are ultimately self-canceling. 4 42 The case of
Craven v. White,4 43 however, restricts the Ramsay holding to
circumstances in which there are (1) a "preordained series of

437.
438.
439.

10 INTERNATIONAL TAX TREATIES OF ALL NATIONS 349 (1981).
Tomsett, supra note 434, at 108.
Id.

440. It specifically says that "unless the recipient of a dividend shows, if
required to do so .... that the shareholding in respect of which the dividend was
paid was acquired by the recipient for bona fide commercial reasons or in the
ordinary course of making or managing investments and it was not the main
object nor one of the main objects of that acquisition to obtain entitlement to the

tax credit...." Id. (quoting the U.K.-Switzerland double taxation treaty).
441.
1981 S.T.C. 174.
442. John Avery Jones, U.K. National Report, In
CONVENTIONS, supra note 77, at 597.
443.
1988 S.T.C. 476.

DOUBLE TAXATION

274

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 29:191

transactions" or "one single composite transaction" and (2) steps
are inserted purely to avoid tax.4 4 4

Whether these precedents

could really be applied in a treaty context remains doubtful. In
the United Kingdom, a judge is strictly bound by the literal
wording of the statute or treaty provision, and this is particularly
true in tax law.4 4 5 Although, a court would probably be reluctant
to find treaty abuse unless the specific anti-avoidance clauses
clearly apply,4 4 6 the U.K. courts have not yet addressed this
issue.
There are only fourteen cases in which tax treaty
interpretation has ever been relevant. 44 7 In addition, CIR v.
Commerzbank" 8 is the only case in which a court seriously
discussed the method of interpreting tax treaties and applying
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. 4 4 9 Under the old U.S.-U.K.
income tax treaty, 450 the court advocated a literal approach, using
the ordinary meaning of words. 45 1 Inland Revenue argued that
because the provision was applicable only to residents of
contracting states, the U.S.-U.K. treaty should not be read to
exempt from tax the U.S. dividends and interest income of a
third-country resident entity. 4 5 2 Nonetheless, the court held the

exemption applicable to the permanent establishment, in this

case a German bank, because the treaty4 53 did not contain any

limitation to residents of one of the contracting states.4 5 4 Even
though the result might be considered improper or unreasonable,
the court gave preference to the literal meaning of the provisions,
because there was nothing in the purpose or context of the treaty
4 55
that could alter the words' ordinary meaning.
Clearly, the United Kingdom seems unwilling to make a
serious issue out of treaty shopping either in its treaty interpretation or treaty practice. The most obvious and damaging treaty
shopping structures are handled by inserting highly specific

444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.

Id.
Jones, supra note 442, at 597.
Id. at 597.
For a list of the fourteen cases, see td. at 597.
1990 S.T.C. 285.
Id. See also Vienna Convention, supranote 176, art. 31.
3 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 13,001.

451.
452.

Commerzbank. 1990 S.T.C. at 285.
Id.

453.

The former U.S.-U.K. treaty (1945), 3 Tax Treaties (CCH)

13,001,

provided in Art. XV that "[dlividends and interest paid by a [U.S. corporation]
shall be exempt from tax by the [United Kingdom] except where the recipient is a
citizen, resident, or corporation of the [United Kingdom]." See Jones, supra note

442, at 599.
454.
Provisions of this sort are contained in 1995 OECD Model Treaty, supra
note 1. art. 1.
455. Id.
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Otherwise, the United Kingdom's main interest is to

maintain a free and unrestricted exchange of goods and capital,
without burdening investors with complex compliance rules.
D. Summary
Analysis of the general attitude of the United States,
Germany, and the United Kingdom toward treaty shopping
suggests that European states regard specific anti-avoidance
rules as valuable in preventing certain particularly abusive
situations. However, this flexible, case-by-case approach to treaty
abuse means that, under a strict constructionist view, treaty
benefits cannot be denied unless a specific provision is included
in a treaty. This flexible approach is controversial. An important
counterargument is that the flexible approach creates two legal
uncertainties that may have an impact on the planning decisions
of international taxpayers. First, the courts in most countries
have not yet developed regarding the treatment of third-country
residents who take advantage of a treaty. 45 6
Second, the
application of domestic law to treaty law interpretation is so
controversial that many decisions based on such rules are based
4 57
on a fragile legal foundation.
Despite these problems, many OECD countries view a
complex anti-abuse clause, such as the U.S. Model Convention's
Article 16, as inappropriate to their specific economic
situations. 4 58
In contrast, the United States claims that an
efficient and necessarily complex anti-treaty-shopping clause is
inevitable for the economic well-being of the country. Part V will
explore the circumstances that influence a country as it shapes
its own anti-treaty-shopping rules.

V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

The preceding Part shows that the problem of treaty shopping
and the means of its resolution can be looked at from many
different perspectives. No one remedy is globally acceptable and

applicable. Therefore, it is important to evaluate treaty shopping
456.

KRAFT, supra note 112, at 117.

457.

Id.

458.

As to the United Kingdom, see Hugh Rowland et al., British

Multinationals Bracedfor a Double Dutch Tax Threat, THE TIMES. Feb. 25, 1993,
availableon LEXIS, World Lib., Txtln File. As to France, see Jean-Pierre Le Gall &
Sonia Reeb. Treaty Shopping: The French Policy, 8-9 INTERTAX 364 (1989). See also
1981 U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 3, art. 16.
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and anti-avoidance measures in light of historical and economic
developments.
Only when all forces and counterforces are
weighed objectively does it become possible to analyze each
solution's advantages and disadvantages.
A. Economic Considerations
1. Competing Interests in Anti-Treaty-Shopping Policy Decisions
The economic situation of a country and its role in the
international community play a decisive role in the country's
approach to anti-treaty-shopping measures.
A state, when
crafting a limitation-on-benefits provision, faces a conflict of
interest.
When attempting to remedy the treaty shopping
practice, a state must ensure that it does not create a cure worse
than the illness. Thus, the drafting of counteracting measures
requires a delicate balancing of economic and political interests
with regard to a country's role both as a source and residence
4 59
state.
a. Varying Objectives of Source and Residence Countries
As a residence country, a state seeks to provide an
environment in which it is as easy as possible for its own
investors to do business abroad. The state has a legitimate
interest in minimizing foreign taxes imposed on Its
corporations. 4 60 Therefore, the residence state must consider
whether its interests would be best served if a stringent antitreaty-shopping policy were universally applied. 4 6 1 The state
must address whether the measures would burden its own
investors and give the other contracting party more power to
actually deny benefits to them. For the source country, however,
the primary concern is to maximize taxation on inbound
investment, 46 2 which means that it seeks to capture all revenue
and particularly seeks to avoid giving tax relief granted to
unintended beneficiaries.

459. A.L.I., supra note 5, at 163.
460. VOGEL ET AL., supra note 8, at 30.
461.
A.L.I., supra note 5, at 162.
462. For background and issues relating to the taxation of foreign
investment in the United States see STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 101ST CONG.,
2D SESS., BACKGROUND AND ISSUES RELATING TO THE TAXATION OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 64 (Comm. Print 1990) [hereinafter BACKGROUND

AND ISSUES].
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Whether a country is more concerned about its needs as a
source or as a residence country largely depends on whether the
country is a net capital exporter or a net capital importer. A net
capital exporting country will seek to avoid rules that operate to
the disadvantage of its resident investors or its fisc, in case it has
a tax credit, when it is the country of residency. 463 A net capital
exporting country will thus consider the ability of its own
investors to take advantage of treaties to which it is not a
party. 4 8 ' In other words, a net capital exporting country sees
treaty shopping as less of a problem when it is conducted by its
own investors. Treaty shopping benefits the residence country's
economy by reducing the tax burden for its domestic companies
operating abroad and benefits the residence country's fisc by
reducing the amount of creditable tax. The more oriented a
country is toward external investment the stronger these
concerns will be.
Most of the countries this Article discusses have far more
A general complex
outbound than inbound investment. 4 6 5
avoidance clause would give the contracting state the power to
deny treaty benefits to its investors on a larger scale than would
be in the interest of the capital exporting country. 4 66 Because the
source country's focus is on maximizing source taxation on
foreign investment, it will happily accept measures making it

more difficult for its treaty partner's investors to qualify for treaty
benefits.
b.

The Position of the United States

The United States interest in implementing hard restrictions
on treaty benefits both in treaties and domestic tax law became
significant when it shifted from being the world's largest capital
exporting country and its largest net international creditor, to
being the world's largest debtor nation.46 7 In this respect, the
United States occupies a unique political and economic status
and has experienced an extraordinary economic development in

Rosenbloom, supra note 7, at 775-76.
463.
464. A.L.I., supra note 5, at 162.
465.
In 1993, Germany had a trade balance surplus of DM 61 billion.
However, in the years 1986 to 1990, the annual balance of trade surplus was over
DM 100 billion. Beat Gygi, Revision der Deutsche Aussenhandelszahlen, NEUE
ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, Aug. 2, 1994. at 17. France had a trade balance surplus of
FFR 92,49 billion in 1993. Weiterhln aktive Handelsblianz Frankretchs, NEUE
ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, June 20, 1994, at 10.
Jones, supranote 431, at 331.
466.
RAGLAND, supra note 208, E-3.
467.
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the last four decades. No other country has undergone such a
significant change. This trend has had an enormous impact on
U.S. tax policy regarding inbound investment. The U.S. role as a
net international creditor shaped U.S. tax policy toward
international investment for many years. 4 68 Now that the U.S.
role has been reversed, one may question the usefulness of the
former system. Arguably, the general orientation of U.S. tax
policy should respond to the changed conditions, especially
because the overall situation of the United States is unlikely to
change in the foreseeable future.4 6 9 With these considerations in
mind, the United States allows its own residents to treaty shop by
including U.S. residents in the ownership and base-erosion
thresholds. On the other hand, the United States position as a
source country requires the United States to prevent its tax
treaties from being abused.
2. Impact of Stringent Anti-Treaty-Shopping Measures on
Inbound Investment
a. Generally
When negotiating an anti-treaty-shopping provision, a
country also must consider the impact of drastic measures on the
inbound investment flow.
In the present situation of
international tax competition, a country must weigh carefully the

possibility that stringent anti-avoidance measures might make It
less attractive to foreign investment and that the economic loss
caused by reduced foreign investment may far exceed the revenue
lost from tax treaty abuse. Overly stringent avoidance rules may
cause the treaty partner to conclude that the burden of qualifying
for treaty benefits will outweigh the potential profits. 47 0 Largely
net capital exporting countries cannot afford to discourage
inbound investment without the possibility of creating investment
imbalances. Countries in need of capital will be very sensitive to
the fact that compliance complexity, or the fear of not qualifying
for treaty benefits may deter incoming investment. 471 Therefore,

468. BACKGROUND AND ISSUES, supra note 462, at 151
469. Some adoptions have already been made. The abundant volume of
foreign investment flooding its markets led the United States to sudden and often
harsh course corrections, starting with the Foreign Investment in Real Property
Tax Act, § 897, 94 Stat. 2682 (1980) [hereinafter FIRPTAI, followed by the branch
profits tax in 1986 (11-646; 1986 U.S.C.C. & A.N. 4084) and the 1989 earningstripping rules, Budget Reconciliation Act 1240; 1989 U.S.C. C. & A.N. 2637.
470. A.L.I., supra note 5, at 163.
471. Rosenbloom, supra note 7, at 775.
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those countries must weigh tax policy changes very carefully
472
against their possible economic impact.
b. The Status of the United States
The United States seems to be less vulnerable than other
countries when implementing its strict tax on inbound
investment. 4 73 The reason for this is that the United States is
unique in its status as an invaluable investment place. The
United States has a large, stable economy that is desirable to
foreign investors. 4 74 Its huge market, with tremendous potential,
attracts direct investment, while its preferential treatment of
Under federal
portfolio investment 4 75 lures needed capital.
commercial laws and most U.S. states' liberal business laws,
there is more flexibility than in many other countries and the
United States still imposes some of the lowest corporate tax rates
in the world. This is especially true if one takes into account the
overall corporate tax burden. All of these facts indicate that, far
from refraining from investment in the United States, even
extremely strict measures against treaty shopping may result in
the reorganization of existing structures or outright acceptance of
a thirty percent withholding tax.4 78 Moreover, the United States,
as a capital importing country, with its main desire to collect as
much tax as possible, will not have to fear that the restrictions, if
reciprocally applied, would reduce the overall revenue income.

472.

When Germany introduced its 10% withholding tax on interest

payments in 1989, large amounts of foreign investment were withdrawn
immediately. Two years later the withholding requirement was dropped as a
result of investment losses. Forced by a decision of the constitutional court,
legislation had to be enacted imposing a withholding tax on interest earnings.
Due to the prior experience, however, foreign investors have the opportunity to
obtain a waiver while being guaranteed full protection under the German bank
secrecy law. § 43 Abs. 1 Nr. 7 Einkommenssteuergesetz, Steuergesetze, C.H.
Beck, 1993 BGBI 1 2310.
473. FIRPTA, supra note 469, in 1980, was followed by the branch profits
tax in 1986 and the 1989 earning-stripping rules. Even though the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, 11-646; 1986 U.S.C.C. & A.N. 4084, was clearly unfavorable to U.S.
based foreign companies, it has by no means affected the influx of foreign
investment. See Ross, supra note 14, at 331.
474.

BACKGROUND AND IssuEs, supra note 462.

475. See I.R.C §§ 871(h), 881(c) (1988) (exempting "portfolio interest" from
U.S. gross withholding tax).
476. U.S.-Netherlands Accord Seen Causing Business Reorganizations, BNA
INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Dec. 9, 1993, availableon LEXIS, News Lib., BNAIBF File.
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3. Influence of Revenue Considerations on the Shape of
Limitation-on-Benefits Provisions
The stringency of anti-treaty-shopping measures will be
heavily influenced by revenue considerations. Although a country

has an interest in adopting more stringent anti-abuse clauses
designed to prevent the erosion of its source tax base,4 7 7 if it is
not a likely target for treaty abuse, there is no need for harsh
countermeasures. The abuse can simply be handled on a caseby-case basis or ignored because the foregone revenue is
negligible.
Treaty shopping by third-country in the United States was so
478
widespread that it caused erosion of the U.S. tax base.
Although it appears that no accurate estimates of the revenue
loss due to treaty shopping exist, it is clear from U.S. policy that
the U.S. Treasury Department believed the revenue loss was
substantial. Developments in the late 1970s and mid-1980s show
excessive erosion of source-based taxation caused by worldwide
4 79
investment flows structured through the Netherlands Antilles.
Once again, the United States position was unique. No other
4 80
country had to deal with tax avoidance of this magnitude.
Whereas other countries could adopt a laissez-faire attitude
without fear of an excessive revenue loss, the United States was
flooded by treaty benefit claims of unintended beneficiaries.
Consequently, there is no real question about the need for
efficient anti-abuse provisions.
B. The Effect of the Treaty Network on Treaty Shopping
1. The Importance of an Extensive Treaty Network
Treaty shoppers are not attracted to a country solely because
it is a popular place to invest; they also assess the reach of the
targets country's treaty network. 4 8 ' Countries with extensive tax
treaty relations do not need to include specific anti-avoidance
provisions in their treaties because most foreign investors can
take advantage of a treaty in their home country. These investors
would be more likely to shop for a favorable treaty if they were
subject to full tax rates in the absence of a treaty.

477.
478.
479.
480.
481.

A.L.I., supra note 5, at 163.
See discussion, supra Part W.A.
Id.
1983 Hearing, supra note 86, at 7.
Schwarz, supra note 4. at 3.
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The likelihood of treaty shopping diminishes with an
increasing network of tax treaties. 4 8 2 While there is some tax
planning opportunity when certain treaties provide more
advantages for a person than an investor's nation's treaty,
individuals from countries that do not have any treaty with the
target country are much more likely to structure their business
through third countries. Therefore, treaty shopping is less of a
threat when the targeted country has tax treaties with the most
important countries of the world, the most advantageous
of which
4 83
would result in a "one-way treaty with the world."
2. The U.S. Treaty Relationship with Other Countries
It is noteworthy that the United States, with the largest

48 4
economy in the world, has just fifty-five tax treaties in force.

In comparison, the United Kingdom maintains some eighty
comprehensive tax treaties, 48 5 Germany about seventy, Italy
about seventy, Canada about fifty-six, the Netherlands around

fifty, Norway around fifty-three, Sweden about fifty-three, and

488
even Finland has forty-six tax treaties with other countries.
Countries that maintain extensive treaty networks that include
most of their trading partners do not need a strict anti-avoidance
rule as urgently as do those with weak treaty networks.
Unfortunately, the United States is more likely to be a potential
target for treaty shopping constructions than many other states.
On one hand, the United States is the world's largest economic
power and most attractive country for foreign investment; on the
other hand, it has a treaty network comparable to that of Sweden.
This discrepancy certainly leads to frequent use of one especially
favorable treaty, which then becomes, in effect, a "one-way treaty
4 87
with the world."

3. The Influence of Anti-Treaty-Shopping Provisions on the
Expansion of the Treaty Network
In order to become less vulnerable to treaty abuse, the United
States should establish a long-term policy objective to drastically

482. Jones, supra note 431, at 332.
483. Kooiman, supra note 225, at 196 (statement by Lesly Schreyer, Deputy
International Counsel, during the 1st Treasury Hearing in 1982).
484. 1-3 Tax Treaties (WGL).
485. Jones, supra note 431, at 332.
486. The numbers are provided in the national reports of the countries. See
DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS, supra note 77.
487. Kooimam, supra note 225, at 196.
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expand its treaty network, and at the same time make the
accorded treaty benefits more homogeneous. Foreign investors
can obtain treaty benefits through a one-way treaty with the
United States, foreign countries have no incentive to negotiate or
renegotiate tax treaties with the United States. For example,
there is no reason why Saudi Arabia should be willing to make
concessions on its own source tax on a reciprocal basis if its
residents can obtain full benefits in the United States through the
use of the U.K. treaty. The probable result is that the United
States will be unable to expand its treaty network, forcing it to
remain a treaty shopping target.48 8 Thus, an effective anti-treatyshopping provision is inevitably necessary to force other countries
4 89
to come to the bargaining table.
4. A Pattern of Treaty Overrides
The existence of one-way treaties with the world is not the
only reason countries may be reluctant to negotiate tax treaties

with the United States. Countries are unlikely to be willing to
make reciprocal concessions in a tax treaty if they fear that the
treaty will soon be valid for only one party. This fear is grounded
4 90
in the United States pattern of unilateral treaty overrides.
Foreign countries' confidence in the reliability of bilateral
agreements is certainly shattered, and this fact does much to
obstruct the United States long-term policy goal of extending its
treaty network.

488.
489.

1987 Hearing,supranote 6. at 349.
This argument also might be true with respect to beneficial owners

from countries that have no income tax treaty with the United States. But what
happens if, for example, Japanese, Canadian, and German residents form a
corporation under German law to invest in the United States? If the corporation
is not engaged in an active trade or business it could be denied treaty benefits
despite the fact that all three countries maintain comprehensive Income tax
treaties with the United States. See A.L.I., supra note 5, at 166, 167. Under
these circumstances, the argument that anti-treaty-shopping provisions Induce
treaty negotiations Is worthless. In this case, the limitation-on-benefits provision
would adversely affect the freedom of decision-making, specifically, to choose the
structure of doing business under pure economic considerations.
490. The 1986 Tax Reform was an effort at undercutting the reciprocal
nature of tax treaties (11-646; 1986 U.S.C.C. A.N. 4084). Fortunately the Foreign

Income Tax Rationalization and Simplification Act of 1992, H.R. 5270, 102d
Cong.. 2d Sess., was never enacted into law.
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C. Simplicity Considerations

1. Complexity of the U.S. Anti-Treaty-Shopping Provisions
One of the main problems of a complex and detailed antitreaty-shopping provision is administrative feasibility.
Many
countries doubt that it is possible to draft a general antiavoidance provision in a way that finds a workable balance
between administrative feasibility and efficiency. The Deputy
Chairman of Inland Revenue expressed the United Kingdom's
view that general anti-treaty-shopping articles are costly to
administer and may not actually prevent abuse. 49 1
Overly
complex provisions are regarded as inefficient because a taxpayer
has to put time, money, and effort into compliance activities when
those resources could otherwise be used to make investments.
Complex provisions cost governments money as well, because
they must operate a large agency to interpret such rules and
ensure compliance through regular auditing measures. 49 2 This
argument has been used to critique the United States latest
efforts to construct a loop-hole-proof anti-avoidance rule. 4 93 The
very complexity of the benefits article creates tremendous

difficulties in its administration and, at the same time, imposes a
severe administrative burden on the taxpayer
who has to provide
"sufficient proof" for its tax relief eligibility.4 9 4
2. Balancing a Provision's Complexity and Effectiveness
The level of complexity and detail in a law is largely
influenced by the provision's purpose and the government's desire
to achieve the highest possible standard of compliance. When the
final goal is to combat treaty shopping, a general abuse rule may
be more costly and labor-intensive than a precise ex-ante
determination of which entities are eligible for treaty benefits.
Promulgation of precise rules is more expensive than general
provisions because precise rules involve advance determination of
the law's content.
In contrast, general avoidance provisions
involve more costs for legal advice to predict or to enforce the law
because the law's content is determined later. 49 5 Thus, in view of

491.
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495.
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Schwarz, supra note 431.
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A.L.I.. supra note 5. at 170.
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See Louis Kaplow. Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42
557. 562 (1992). For example, if a third-country user is confronted
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the promulgation costs of a complex rule and the legal costs for
enforcement of an overly general anti-avoidance provision, the
decisive factor in determining the degree of complexity is largely
496
the frequency of violation of a law.

If treaty shopping occurred randomly, it would not be
appropriate to burden other taxpayers with high compliance costs
and the increased administration costs associated with increased
auditing measures; it would be enough to leave the final
determination of an alleged violation to the courts on a case-bycase basis. However, if treaty shopping occurred regularly and
the abuse features could be more or less determined, it is more
efficient and less costly to precisely define what constitutes treaty
abuse. The tax authorities could specifically direct their auditing
measures to perceived abuse structures and deny benefits on the
basis of the provision, without incurring the danger of constant
litigation on the basis of a general standard. The deterrence
function of a complex rule would be significant and this, in turn,
would facilitate tax administration.
The effectiveness of the complexity and inclusiveness of antitreaty-shopping provisions can be seen in the corporate
restructuring that occurred after conclusion of the U.S.Netherlands treaty.4 9 7 An optimally complex rule is certainly
hard to achieve and lawmakers will always run the risk of
creating a treaty that is either overinclusive or underinclusive. 49 8
3. Effect of Deterrence
The United States has been criticized for inserting severe
anti-treaty-shopping provisions into its treaties just in case they
are needed. 4 99 In view of the provisions' complexity, it is
uncertain whether they are genuinely enforceable, because it is

questionable whether all of the necessary facts can be verified. In
the United States, which has years of experience with the
limitation-on-benefits articles, not a single reported case has
invoked one of these provisions in the last fifteen years.5 0 0 The
value of a severe treaty shopping provision is certainly open to

with a specific anti-avoidance provision. If faced with a general avoidance rule,
the third-country user might take the risk. Then the courts would have to decide
the user's eligibility for treaty benefits. Id.
496. Id. at 563.
497. U.S. NetherlandsAccord Seen Causing Business Reorganizations, supra
note 476. See also U.S.-Netherlands Treaty, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 6258.
498. Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Rules, HARVARD
PROGRAM INLAW AND ECONOMICS, Discussion Paper No. 97 (1991).
499. Jones, supra note 431, at 331.
500. Rosenbloom, supra note 13, at 92.
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question if its deterrent effect is accomplished by means of
complexity rather than efficient administration. If this is indeed
the United States strategy, it is overly broad. The complexity of
the system equally affects bona fide and abusive investments,
whereas efficient administration specifically aims at abuse
structures. However, it appears that the United States complexity
strategy has actually caused many foreign companies to
restructure their businesses that were established for the purpose
of treaty shopping. 50 I Thus, it can be argued that complexity
actually serves the goal of efficiency, because complexity
provisions actually were designed to have a preventive function,
in particular with regard to multinationals of a certain size and
importance. As opposed to foreign corporations with minor U.S.
inbound investment, which will always, to some extent, be able to
slip through the net of auditing measures, large multinationals
cannot risk routine noncompliance with limitation-on-benefits
provisions because multinational corporations are certain to be
audited on a regular basis. Thus, the preventive effect facilitates
the administrative feasibility of countermeasures. The strict antiavoidance measures are not a farce, but actually do prevent
treaties from being abused.
D. Impact of Overly StrictAnti-Avoidance Measures on Economic
Efficiency
Rules that seem both necessary and appropriate in tax haven
jurisdictions, seem less urgent and intrusive on international
economical relationships when they are applied to industrialized
countries that have comprehensive tax systems and substantial
amounts of trade.5 0 2
Because the insertion of anti-treatyshopping provisions in tax treaties is a very recent phenomenon,
no empirical data exists on the effect of those provisions upon
trade and investments.
Even in the absence of statistics, it is obvious that an overly
strict avoidance policy inevitably entails less-than-optimal
resource allocation decisions. 50 3 Taxation is only one of a variety
of costs that might play a role in an investment decision. For
example, there are compliance and tax planning costs that are

501. U.S.-Netherlands Accord Seen Causing Business Reorganizations.supra
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normally very small in relation to other costs. 5 0 4 If a substantial
tax burden or administrative burden is imposed, however, these
smaller costs may be decisive in determining whether to proceed
with a certain activity.50 5 If businesses involved in true treaty
shopping are forced to restructure or give up their activities, then
the provision has worked. What about entities possessing sound
business reasons for structuring their investments through a
third country? Although U.S. policymakers fortunately thought
about this situation and provided bona fide clauses, these clauses
contribute to corporations' uncertainty because it is not clear how
the bona fide clauses relate to the strict rules of a treaty. The
United States resolved this problem by permitting businesses to
obtain a private letter ruling from the I.R.S.5 0 6
Depending,
however, on how many letter rulings the I.R.S. can handle, the
companies may not get the ruling at the right time and may incur
the risk of not qualifying under the treaty. Other companies with
widely dispersed ownership of a substantial investment in the
United States might be forced to list their company on recognized
stock exchanges in order to qualify under the tax treaty,
regardless of the general economic desirability of trading on the
exchanges. Detailed compliance requirements give rise to high
compliance costs and, therefore, indirectly inhibit the free flow of
capital.

VI.

CONCLUSION:

DIRECTIONS FOR CHANGE

A. Tax Harmonization
Even though strict anti-treaty-shopping rules constitute a
useful tool for eliminating treaty abuse, efforts should be made to
level out the imbalance of the international tax system and
neutralize the incentive to shift income and legal entities into
other jurisdictions. 50 7 A country's long-term policy goal should
not be the anxious protection of revenue sources but the growing
liberalization of world trade and economic flows.
Unfortunately, the present international taxation system is a
web of increasingly varied and complex tax agreements with
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greatly disparate judicial and administrative interpretations. This
situation raises the question of whether a balanced international
tax system will ever be achieved.5 0 8
Only international tax
harmonization can effect the global neutrality that is required to
ensure that an investor's choice of country is not influenced by
international tax differentials. Tax harmonization would help to
fight tax avoidance and treaty shopping more than any other
existing anti-abuse measure. The United States could contribute
greatly to tax harmonization by increasing its treaty network, but
the complexity of its anti-treaty-shopping provisions must be
restricted to an administrable extent. Because the United States
is the world's most important economic power, the United States
must extend its treaty relations at least to a level reached by
other developed countries such as the United Kingdom and
Germany. This would effectively reduce the need for complex
anti-treaty-shopping structures.
B. MultilateralTax Conventions

A multilateral treaty offers the prospect of even better results
than a web of bilateral tax treaties.5 0 9 For example, the OECD
model treaty could be adopted, resulting in internationally shared
terms and concepts and assuring that taxpayers are treated
equally within member states.51 0 The approach of multinational
agreements is feasible 1 1 and already exists elsewhere in
international legal diplomacy.5 12 The advantage of a multilateral
tax agreement addressing treaty shopping is that it requires
states to find a homogenous way to treat entities incorporated in
other treaty countries. This would benefit both the taxpayer and
the fisc. Taxpayers could structure their businesses more flexibly
(e.g., by using capital from several countries' investors) without
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states. However, the multilateral tax agreement between the Nordic Countries is
of much more importance because the agreement was concluded by OECD

member states on the basis of the OECD model treaty.
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the fear of not qualifying for treaty benefits. The tax authorities
could more easily identify treaty shopping structures because of a
common definition of abuse structures in the treaty, which would
be binding on all members. A multilateral treaty would also
provide better exchange of information.
Presently, it seems unlikely that a multilateral agreement will
be achieved in the near future. Even though the advantages of
reducing the possibility of treaty shopping are considerable,
several obstacles remain. Concessions in the area of tax law
would affect the core of state sovereignty, and reduce countries'
willingness to enter into such agreements.
The unrestricted
sovereignty to assert tax jurisdiction and the attendant possibility
of exploiting every revenue source in order to minimize growing
budget deficits, is one of the most sensitive areas in public
international law. Moreover, countries that need to increase their
revenue generally tend to expect foreign investors to bear a larger

share of the tax burden.5 13 The reason for this trend is the fact
that domestic measures affecting foreign investors can be
implemented very easily-foreigners lack voting power and do not
participate in influential interest groups.5 14 Unfortunately, at
present, multilateral tax treaties are seen as too inflexible to meet
domestic revenue needs. As a consequence, the promise of a
multilateral treaty in the foreseeable future is illusory,5 15 even
though it would definitely reduce the incentive for treaty
shopping.
Thus, efficient and detailed anti-treaty-shopping provisions
are necessary to prevent revenue losses on a large scale in the
short-term perspective. Anti-treaty-shopping provisions might
even be appropriate to achieve mid-term policy goals, because an
increased harmonization in the international setting is not likely
to be accomplished in the near future. Yet, the United States, as
a major world economy, should not lose sight of long-term policies
while focusing on today's revenue needs. The United States
should seek to promote global economic growth in the
international community, undistorted by tax differentials and tax
competition and to contribute more stability, efficiency, and
neutrality to the international tax environment. Accordingly, the
United States ultimate goal should be a broader coordination and
greater uniformity of tax policies, which, in the long run, will
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result in greater efficiency that benefits the United States and the
world economy.

